






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1606

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THE  
BEGINNING,  
CONTINVANCE,  
AND DECAY OF  
ESTATES:

*Wherein are handled many notable Questions concern-  
ing the establiſhment of Empires  
and Monarchies.*

Written in French by *R. de Luſing, L. of Alynnes:*  
and translated into English  
by *I. F.*



LONDON,  
Printed for *John Bill.* 1606.

TO THE  
LIBRARY OF  
CALIFORNIA



TO THE MOST REVEREND  
*Father in God*, RICHARD, Lord  
 Archbishop of Canterbury his Grace,  
 Primate and Metropolitane of all  
 England, *and one of his Maiesties*  
*most Honorable Priuie*  
*Councell, &c.*



*Most reuerend Father, it pleased  
 your Graces right woorthy pre-  
 decessor, to vouchsafe my vn-  
 woorthy letters sent him in  
 my trauailes, a gracious accep-  
 tance. The greatest trouble they  
 put him to, was to peruse them;  
 so were the proofes he gaue of  
 his vertue, and the signes of his  
 loue towards me, the onely end  
 and vse I euer had or made of them. Your Grace hath had the  
 happines, with the merit, to succeed him in his dignities: his  
 vertues were already yours in proprietie. Of his loue I may  
 say, as of your Graces, that I then did, as I now doe, rather  
 desire to deserue it, then deseruing it, desire to make bold vse  
 of it. Loue that descends on vs from men of vertue and emi-  
 nencie, is it selfe both hope and reward, hire and payment.  
 That to-boote which we call doing good, or a benefit, as it is*



## THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY.

*an effect that true loue matched with ability, will euen strue to produce, so is it then most welcome when it cometh sooner imparted then expected. With this freedome of minde, and dutie of respect, I present to your Grace this new apparelled discourse: It hath alreadie put on the habit of three seuerall languages, and if my iudgement erre not, our English fashion will not ill become it. I met with it in my wandrings, and brought it along with me, with an intent, for my priuate exercise of that tongue it first spake in, to translate it: that performed, my determination to recommend it to your Graces patronage, fell to be at this late dangerous time, when the diuell (arch-enemie of trueth) and his execrable ministers held their generall counsaile how they might make but one fireworke of our whole estate: but the consideration of your Graces most iust employments in so weightie. a businesse, withheld me with a reuerend feare of their disturbance, till I weighed that euen this subiects handling might perhaps doe good to some bad that had a head, if not a hand (for so great a clock could not strike without many wheelles) in so damnable a proiect: since if they will needs out-strip former ages, or forreine countries in strange plots of ruining kingdomes and common-wealths, they may by this discourse be drawen to practise them vpon the common enemy of Christendome, and not vpon vs that acknowledge with them one Iesus, one Bible, one Baptisme. Your Grace seeth the reasons and scope of these my well intended endeuours, which subiect their allowance or disallowance to your Graces most graue censure, so doth my vnworthy seruice with my selfe, to your much desired imployment, as*

Your Graces most seruiceably deuoted,

I O H N F L N E T.



*The Epistle Dedicatorie of the*  
Author to the Duke  
of Savoy.



Fall we admire in these times there is nothing comparable to the fortune of the *Ottomans*, and the increase of their greatnesse; if we examine their beginning and meanes, for they are by nation *Tartarians*, sprung from the most base and remote parts of *Asia*, in former times as vnknownen as vnworthy: If we consider their conditions, they bewray no feeling of civility or curtesie: If we regard the parts of their minde, where shall we see ought more rude, and rough hewen then the spirit of that people? What haue beene the souldiours they haue had through whose valor they haue aduantaged themselves by so many memorable victories? No better then slaues haled in their infancy from the breasts and laps of their mothers, children of tribute tythed euery yeere from amongst the miserable Christians ouer whom they command and domineere. Yet we see that with these feeble meanes they haue, in lesse then three hundred yeeres, conquered *Asia* as far as *Tigris*, and the Gulse of *Persia*, posselt themselves of *Egypt*, *Numidia*, and all the red sea. More, hauing archieued these glorious cōquests they haue beene seene to march, as they say, with colours flying thorough Europe, to ouerrun large countries, seaze themselves

## *The Epistle Dedicatory of the Author*

ofkingdomes and most puissant Estates, finally to become Monarches of Greece, and to haue caried the Empire of Constantinople, whose neighbours haue not bene exempt from the hauocke of their forces, so many armies ouerthrowen, so many Princes ruined, so many rich cities and townes sackt and rased. Their power, overflowing in happinesse, is at this day the scourge of the East and the terror of the West: In sum, they are feareful to the whole world. But the greater is the astonishment, when we consider, that naked and vnarmed, they haue marched victorious ouer the bellies of the most warlicke nations vnder the heauens, the best provided of forces and all munition necessary for the wars, that such a people as they vnskilld in navigation should become masters almost of all the seas. Many haue gone about to search out the cause of this thruiuing greatness, and I amongst others haue for my part with no small diligence perused such authors as haue written their history; but when I haue narrowly sifted all they haue said of that matter, I finde not this my honest appetite and curiosity as I would contented; rather as one ill satisfied with the diuersity and negligence of their Historiographers, all of them nothing neere approching the course and knowledge of the first and essentiall cause of this their so raised fortunes, I haue sought to please my selfe with setting down as I haue, the many acts and obseruations I haue thereof collected, and which well deserue to be published: not that I so far forget my selfe as to thinke my selfe able to flie a higher pitch then others whom I much honour and esteeme; but because I haue taken cleane an other way; with this hope neuertheless, that liuely representing and distinguishing by order as I doe, the establishment of this Monarchy (answerable to what may be vnderstoode thereof) the apparence and truth of my discourse wil somewhat inlighten this subiect & affoord me an honest excuse vpon the defects which may be discouered in my opinion. The argument then of this book consisteth of three points, whereunto



whereunto the order of the whole discourse hath reference : In the first place I summarily handle the meanes they haue practised for their aduancement and greatnesse; secondly with what cunning and deceit they maintaine what they have gotten : and lastly how we may be able to assaile them, and turne the chance of their victories and powers. This my trauaile (most mighty Prince ) taketh his flight straight to your Highnesse to range it selfe vnder the shelter of your protection , armed with the allowable opinion, that your Aighnesse as a generous Prince cannot but take especiall pleasure to heare, see , & waigh such speculations. To say the truth , the ordinary discourses of your Highnesse table are no other but sundry questions, which it pleaseth your Highnesse vsually to propound to all those noble spirits that attend you; but aboue all, when any one awaketh matter cōcerning either Estate affaires, or the archieument of deedes of armes; then is the time your Highnesse lendeth an attentiuē care to such as discourse thereof, and to all mens admiration resoluerth the most difficult points of the matter in handling, wherein you discover a iudgment so far beyonde the vulgar and surpassing your age, as we cannot but confesse that the propositions you make are so many proofes and resolutions which you deliuer, and please to draw from out the capacity of your seruants. Which considering often with my selfe, I finde forthwith allaied in me the heat of the intention I had to dedicate this my booke to your Highnesse, but at the same instant finding represented before mine eies; the excellency of your iudgment, together with your noble and gentle disposition, which knoweth how to accommodate your greatnesse to the honest designs of your subiects, such especially as reuerence you like me , feare immediatly vanissheth and my desire gathereth strength, with assurance that you wil be so gracious, as, though I be the least of your seruants, you will not spare to enterraine and honour this my little labour with your iudgment: practising vpon me

## *The Epistle Dedicatory of the Author, &c.*

what the Sunne (common father of generation) doth on the earth, bestowing his beames indifferently as well vpon the low plants as high trees. It may please your highnesse then to vouchsafe to receiue this treatise with the like countenance as you would ought else especially labored, in imitation of the diuine Maiesty ( only *Idea* of all perfection ) which as well excepteth the offering of the poore widow, as the presents of great Princes. Againe, it may please your highnes not to thinke amisse so farforth to protect the whole discourse, that it may, supported by your authority, passe with that credit as I wish among men, and remaine free from the many censures of such as take no other delight then in reprehending other mens inuentions. This assurance will make me lift my head higher then otherwise I would, for two causes: The one for the honour and particular contentment I shall receiue hauing performed ought pleasing to your Highnesse, the other

for the testimony I shall heereby haue of the participation of your fauour beyond

my merit and expectation: for

which I offer vp my selfe

not to die vngrate-

full, as


*Your Highnesse most humble*

Subiect and vassall,

R. de LV SING.



## To the Reader.



*He world had neuer more Bookes,  
Bookes neuer lesse woorthy matter:  
learned, vnlearned, all will be writing,  
and of these the most affecting the glo-  
rious names of Authors, become the  
authors of their inglorious names.*

*Pro captulectoris habent sua fata libelli.  
The Readers skill,  
Makes Bookes thrue well or ill.*

*But the true life of a worke, and sound discretion of the wri-  
ter, appeere not more in the well handling, then wise choice of a  
subiect. I know diuers courses may meete with one end, as  
many waies leade to one citie, so may one theame entertaine a  
world of inuentions; but of these (like the same meate serued in  
in seuerall fashions) some few onely shall carry the true pleasing  
relish and temper; the rest (as knots in names) stand rather for  
ornaments or flourishing differences, then matters regardable or  
of consequence: well may the will or appetite for a time transport  
vs, but reason as soueraigne must in the end controule and checke  
vs. In the compasse of my obseruations, I haue seene discourses  
and stiles, otherwise hollow and vnfound, sway even the best  
iudgements, not alone to allowance, but imitation. Whether this  
were the infection of ignorance, that seasing the most might  
spread to the best; or the tyrannie of fashion, which must, how-  
soeuer monstrous, (if our selues will not seeme monstrous) be  
followed, I know not: one thing I am sure of; time hath discou-  
ered their weaknesse, and trueth his concealed daughter is come  
to light, when such light owles line (or to say better) die con-  
fined*



## To the Reader.

fined to perpetuall obscuritie. This worke seemes to haue passed the pikes of such dangers; it hath for a sufficient time undergone the view and censure of the best discerning nations of Europe: it hath bene taught to speake both their and the old Roman language: if England should not now affoord it kind entertainment, I should thinke it in an error (not to say of iudgement) of custom, as being not yet cleere of the imputation it carries of harshnesse towards enen woorthy strangers; but since I finde (as doe themselves that suffer) that this discourteous fault is laid upon the common sort, and the contrary extolled in the gentrie & persons of more eminent quality, *Vilia miretur vulgus*: We will appeale from their ignorance, to the more generous and better bredde understandings. And to awake these, let me tell them, they shall finde it a discourse not faint or languishing, but such as like a wel breathed runner, gathers more strength towards the end of the race, then was bewraied in the beginning. Now to others which shal perhaps obiekt, that the scope hereof lying out of our distance, asketh as small heede, as it smally concerneth vs; I answere, that when the gout or gangrene is not to be regarded because the great toe onely hath it. Time and sinne may one day (which God turne from vs) make vs more sensible, and this subjects debating more necessary: such as it now is, or may prooue (Reader) I heere expose it to thy view and censure. I know some acquainted with me and my courses, will expect rather matter of mine owne, then others inuention. They haue reason in this, howsoeuer I haue abilitie: but I cannot yet forget an honest learned Physician I once obserued, who (it seemes) to spare others, so spent his owne spirits in the personall practise of his medicinall conclusions, as his bodie yet suffers the iniuries of such selfe-offered violence. I am not so charitable; neither hold I him the unwiseft, that out of others triall frameth his owne confirming. It is time that begets iudgement and assurance. And to this purpose I will close with a saying of that euer most reuerenced Master of moralitie Seneca, *Non ignoro etiam quæ in speciem laborant, dignitatem dico & eloquentiæ famam, & quicquid ad alienum suffragium venit, mora conualescere.*





## *The Table of the Chapters of the first Booke.*

|                                                                               |           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>T</b> He Turke hath applied his thoughts wholly to the warres.             | Chap. 1.  |
| He hath alwaies fought to make offensive war.                                 | Chap. 2.  |
| He hath made no account of fortresses.                                        | Chap. 3.  |
| He hath trained vp his souldiours to valour and hardinesse.                   | Chap. 4.  |
| He hath maintained his souldiours in military discipline.                     | Chap. 5.  |
| He hath made no reckning of other forces then his owne.                       | Chap. 6.  |
| He hath to power ioyned cunning and deceit.                                   | Chap. 7.  |
| He hath bene alwaies serued in his warre by good and valiant Cap-<br>taines.  | Chap. 8.  |
| He hath made no skip in his enterprises.                                      | Chap. 9.  |
| He hath not spent time vpon enterprises of small importance.                  | Chap. 10. |
| He hath laide hold on occasion.                                               | Chap. 11. |
| He hath behaued himselfe with nimblenesse and celerity vpon his<br>occasions. | Chap. 12. |
| He hath gone himselfe in person to the warre.                                 | Chap. 13. |
| He hath euermore gone well appointed to the wars.                             | Chap. 14. |
| He hath neuer fought out of season.                                           | Chap. 15. |
| He hath neuer diuided his forces.                                             | Chap. 16. |
| He hath not long held warre with one alone.                                   | Chap. 17. |

## *The Table of the Chapters of the Second Booke.*

|                                                                                     |          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| <b>O</b> F religion.                                                                | Chap. 1. |
| Of the direct dependency of the Turkes subiects vpon their so-<br>ueraigne.         | Chap. 2. |
| How he hath depriued his subiects of strength.                                      | Chap. 3. |
| The causes that may moue a people to fury.                                          | Chap. 4. |
| The common remedy applied by the Turke against the force and<br>fury of the people. | Chap. 5. |
| How the Turke curbeth the power of the great men of his Estate.                     | Chap. 6. |
| How                                                                                 |          |

## The Table.

How he confoundeth the practises of forraine Princes his neighbours. Chap. 7.

### *The Table of the Chapters of the Third Booke.*

|                                                                                              |           |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>T</b> He causes of the fall and ruine of Estates.                                         | Chap. 1.  |
| From what coniectures the continuance of Estates may be gathered.                            | Chap. 2.  |
| That the Monarchy of the Turke is comprehended within the number of great Estates.           | Chap. 3.  |
| Whether the Empire of the Turkes draw towards an end.                                        | Chap. 4.  |
| By what kinde of causes the Empire of the Turke might most easily faile.                     | Chap. 5.  |
| That it is not an impossible thing for the Christians with open force to vanquish the Turke. | Chap. 6.  |
| Why the leagues amongst Christian Princes are commonly of small effect.                      | Chap. 7.  |
| The defects which may be obserued in the leagues of the yeeres 1537. and 1571.               | Chap. 8.  |
| A league which may be treated without danger of the former defects.                          | Chap. 9.  |
| Wherein consisteth the greatest forces of the Turke.                                         | Chap. 10. |
| Where the Turke might be most easily assailed to ouercome him, either by sea or by land.     | Chap. 11. |
| Of the inward causes whereby the Empire of the Turke may come to ruine.                      | Chap. 12. |
| Of the mixt causes.                                                                          | Chap. 13. |
| How particular persons may be gained.                                                        | Chap. 14. |
| How the people of the Turke may be wrought from his obedience.                               | Chap. 15. |



# CONSIDERATIONS

VPON THE GREAT

*nesse of the Turkish*

*Empire.*

Wherein are handled the manner how it is  
*become so great, the meanes whereby it is*  
 maintained, and how it would  
*be easie to bring it*  
 to ruine.

- 1 *The summe of this discourse.*
- 2 *The diuision thereof into 3. principall parts.*
- 3 *The argument of the first booke.*
- 4 *Steps to the Turkish greatnesse:*



Ist : My purpose is to examine in this treatise how the Empire of the Turke is growne to that height and greatnesse. 2: And the better to effect it I will diuide the whole discourse into three principall parts. The first, what way he hath taken to attaine to the top of such a raised greatnesse as he now

is. The second, with what meanes and arte he behaneth and maintaineth himselfe therein; and finally I will declare

A

how



how the pride of this Tyrant may be abated ; his greatnesse diminished, and his Empire ruined. 3 : The subiect then of the first booke shall be to examine what haue beene his courses in his conquests ; and though they haue beene without any order, reason or faith : yet will it be no hard matter to discerne, by the successe of such counsailes as he hath put in practise in his most difficult enterprises, the good from the bad, and also to separate in the course of his actions all whatsoeuer hath beene profitable ; from what hath beene hurtfull and ill vnderaken : heerein imitating the Bee which from bitter herbes sucks most sweete hony. These are in my opinion the steps and designes he hath followed to attaine to his greatnesse, wherby as by degrees he hath built his strange fortune which makes vs at this day so much to feare him.


- 1 First he hath applied himselfe wholly to the wars.
- 2 His war hath beene alwaies offensive.
- 3 He hath made slender account of fortresses.
- 4 He hath fashioned his wisdom to valour and hardnesse.
- 5 He hath maintained his great and mighty armies in military discipline and policy.
- 6 He hath made no reckoning of other forces then of his owne.
- 7 He hath to power ioyned cunning and deceipt.
- 8 He hath beene serued by excellent Captaines.
- 9 He hath not made any skip in his enterprises.
- 10 He hath not spent time vpon matters of small importance.
- 11 He hath laid hold on occasions.
- 12 He hath speedily put in execution his designes.
- 13 He hath gone in person to the war.
- 14 Well appointed.
- 15 In a fit season.
- 16 He hath not diuided his forces.
- 17 He hath not long continued war with one alone.



## CHAP. I.

That he hath applied his thoughts  
wholly to the wars.

- 1 *Bookes held by the Gothes a let to armes.*
- 2 *Charles the 8. his expedition to Naples.*
- 3 *Christians held unfit for wars, because so intent to studie.*
- 4 *The Turkes wholly addicted to the wars.*
- 5 *The Romans most martiall.*
- 6 *Barbarous nations most warlike and prompt in their attempts.*
- 7 *The Turkes despisers of Liberall arts.*
- 8 *They innuade Italy.*
- 9 *Their military vertues.*
- 10 *Whether liberall artes disable their followers for the wars.*
- 11 *The use of History and the Mathematikes.*
- 12 *Letters and armes fitly married together.*
- 13 *Learning and valour necessary in a Commander, obedience in a Souldier.*



1 **A**T the time that the Gothes made a most featefull sacke of Greece, and as a violent streame overflowed her fruitfull plaines, ransacking her many cities and rich townes; amongst other spoiles there fel into their hands a great number of bookes of all sorts of professions; wherewith not knowing what to doe, as vnprofitable stuffe, they would haue burnt them, if one amongst the rest had not opposed himselfe: who stepping foorth cried out; it was requisite they should carefully preserue them, and leaue (quoth he) this poison amongst the Grecians, since in time they will bereaue them of all martiall courage, as ordinarily they do all such as apply themselves too much to the like learning and knowledge, making

king them become tender, effeminate, and altogether unfit for the vse of armes; so as failing of courage they will prouue more easily the pray of our fortunate conquest.

1494. 2 When *Charles* the eight of France with so smal an army  
*Gucciard. li. 1.* made his way thorough Italy, and that without vn-sheathing his sword or couching his lance, he became master of the kingdome of Naples, and of the greater part of Thorseany; the French Nobilitie reasoning among themselves whence such a base cowardlinesse, as they had founde amongst the Italians, should proceed, imputed the cause thereof to the studie of learning, as that which softenerh the courage, and is not fit for ought but to make a man fearefull, vnapt, and of a weake resolution for the wars.

3 Heeretofore and at this day, the Turkes haue and doe esteeme the Christians of little valour in martiall affaires, becaus of the varietie of Arts whereunto they vsually addict themselves; and though a man be so finally durable as he cannot attaine to perfection in diuers sciences, nor so inable himselfe to the attention of sundry matters as hee may gaue the mastery for which he struieth; yet all men will busie themselves about knowledge, and intermeddle with all Arts and practises, not heeding that instead of forwarding themselves, they recoile from that perfect knowledge which is requisite for them, and so remaine unfurnished, or but weakly grounded in one onely profession.

4 On the contrarie, the Turkes fashion their whole designes to the war, and bend all their thoughts and studies to the exercise of armes, reiecting all other courses, and pleasing themselves onely in what may stand them in stead for that profession.

5 There is nothing more true (and we finde it in histories) then that the Romanes were most excellent Souldiers, but especially before they opened their gates to Arts, and Sciences presented them by the Greeks, and that they gaue themselves ouer to the pleasures of the East. Then were they at the best for true cariage of marshall affaires when their Consuls scorned not to hold the plough; when  
 Physicians,

Physicians, Surgeons, & men of such like profession were in no credit amongst them. And to say the truth, we haue that if afterward they did archieue any worthy enterprife, it was not by meanes of any valour which was remaining with them, but by the reputation & strength they had formerly gotten. For prooffe heereof we may plainly perceiue that as soone as they had giuen entertainement to forraine sciences, made tender by study, they receiued notable and dishonorable ouerthrowes, as well at the hands of *Jugurtha*, *Mithridates*, the *Cimbrians*, *Numantins*, *Spartans*, the *Parthians*, as of others.

6 For confirmation whereof we obserue in ancient histories, that the most warlike people, & withal such as haue performed the memorablest acts, haue beene the most grosse, rude and inured to paine and hardnesse, far from all ciuility; free from such delicacy and wantonnesse as is corruptly stept in amongst vs; such as had no learning or taste of any knowledge or action which might allay or neuer so little shake their couragious resolutions and warlike designs. Of this composition were long since and are at this daie the *Scythians*, who sometimes made their worthy armes resound as far as the most remote parts of the East, as far as the *Danow* and the bankes of *Nilus*. It is not long since that they, conducted by *Quingus* their King, ouerran all *Zingis* the East, harrowed the plaine country, and replenished all with misery and desolation. The memory of the famous acts of great *Tamberlane* is yet fresh, who only hitherto may vaunt that he hath in a ranged battel vanquished the Turkish armies, & led their Comander captiue, making him serue as his foottoole. In our time the *Mogores*, a grosse and ignorant people sprung out of *Scythia* (or to say better) out of *Tartaria*, haue archieued great conquests towards India. Euery man also knowes that the great *Cham*, as rude & rough hewen as these, is notwithstanding one of the most mighty potentates of the world, ruling ouer a people of the least ciuilitie that can be imagined. But not to wander out of Europe, let vs behold the Swizzers, &

1397



I 477. we shall finde that for knowledge and ciuility they are no  
I 513. better then these, yet haue they performed many worthy  
I 515. exploits as well at *Nancy, Dijon, Neuaire, Marignan, Dreux,*  
as else where : In such sort as, not infected with our vanity,  
they giue (as a man may say) the law to the mightiest  
Princes that seeke their assistance.

7 Now the Turks aboue all nations haue euer profest to  
follow this course of life so barbarous and rude, and euen  
at this day they contemne all knowledge and profession of  
whatsoeuer arte, be it neuer so noble or industrious ; a-  
mong the rest they abhor painting and ingrauing, neither  
make they any account of architecture : and in very deede  
we see that they haue euer held it an especiall offence to-  
wards God, to ingraue or paint him. As for learning they  
recker it as meere foolery : In a word, there are none a-  
mongst them so slenderly esteemed as men learned and  
seene in any kinde of knowledge. In their garments they  
affect not stufes wrought, imbroidered or curiously cut  
and fashioned, but such as are whole and lasting ; laces,  
fringes and other ornaments are by them reiected : beaten  
and masse gold is only in request amongst them. In the  
wars they seeke rather to appeere fearece and terrible, then  
gallantly set forth and apparelled : their whole delight is set  
vpon war and armes in somuch as it is hard to finde any one  
of them who will not manifest by his fashion of liuing that  
he is rather borne for the wars then ought else : so as when  
there is any leuying of Souldiours, such as are left at home  
hold themselues highly iniured ; so honorably doe they  
esteem of the life of a souldier. Whence it proceedeth,  
that they are so feared in all their attempts, either for be-  
seeging, battering, or forcing of places of greatest strength ;  
for skirmishing on foote or on horsebacke, in set battailes  
by sea or by land, or for fortifying and defending.

I 480. 8 Whereof they gaue sufficient prooffe when hauing  
gotten *Otranto* they valiantly made it good against the  
forces of all Italy ; euen till the death of their master *Ma-*  
I 482. *hom*et the 2. leauing behinde them, trenches, bulwarkes,  
ramparts

ramparts and all other sorts of fortifications, so well contrined and disposed, as they haue serued since for patterns and models to our Commanders of Christendome.

9 Such is their laborious vertue in the wars, as there is no place so strong, or enterprise so difficult which will not prooue easie at the enforcing of their powers.

10 Returning now to that I said concerning knowledge: I expect that some one should say: And what I praie, is learning a let to military vertue, or a meanes to hinder a man from becomming a perfect souldier? surely no: I am of a contrary opinion, and I ground it in part vpon the experience of such Captaines as I will heere reckon.

*Alexander the great and Caesar* who were of the principall most aduenturous, and politicke Masters of the wars were most excellently seene in all sorts of knowledge; for my owne part I hold it very difficult for any without the aide of Historie or the Mathematiques, to deserue the name of a great Captaine and sage conductor of armies:

11 Since Historie by the variety of examples both of good and bad successe furnisheth a man with heedfulnesse and discretion, with resolution and aduice in all occurrents, and makes him more considerate in what he vndertaketh; like as the Mathematikes refine his knowledge and iudgement, as well in engines of war as in fortifying.

12 In conclusion, it is not to be denied but that learning is most proper to mould and perfectly fashion a heart and courage borne and disposed to armes: for this cause they would in old time; that *Pallas* armed should signifie vnto vs the marrying of letters with armes. Now to come againe to the Turkes rudenesse, we shall finde (examining some of their Princes), that somewhat must be abated. Let vs consider what were *Mahomet the 2.* and *Selim* and *Soliman* his sonnes (the most valiant Princes of the race of the *Ottomans*) and we shall see that they delighted in reading Histories, and in studying the Mathematikes: so as though nature dispose a man to hardinesse and magnanimitie, it is sure that if he be wholly vnfurnished of artes and learning, he

he will be of a disposition doubtfull, vnassured, vnresolved and without any true stomacke or valour ; parts especially required in a Souldier. This hath beene seene in those of the *Ottomans* which wanted the vertues of the three aboue named; and amongst others *Bairzet* the second and *Corcas* his sonne can witnesse it. These indeed had in some measure the knowledge of good letters, but these performed no valiant act, because they had not hearts and courages borne to the wars.

13 Whence it followeth that the study of learning auaileth much to the forming of a wise and discreet Captaine, and to helpe him to attaine to the perfection worthy his name ; nature withall disposing him to valour and generositie.

As for the priuat Souldier I hold that he needes not know more then to obey it, not being necessary he should be instructed in so excellent an vnderstanding of matters as the Commander, considering that humane Sciences and the liberall arts in an vnsetled minde make it embrace ciuility, wantonnesse and ease in stead of trauell ; make vs loue quietnesse ; feare death, flie hunger and thirst, with other paines and periles of the wars : In sum, they imprint in a man rather a desire to husband his life then to lauish it for the glory and good of his country, and for his particular honour : which is more dangerous in a souldier then in a man of any other profession : for this reason such an one neede know no more then to obey, goe well armed, and valiantly defend himselfe against his enemy.

## CHAP. II.

That he hath alwaies sought to make  
offensue war.

1 Of offensue and defensue war.

2 The authors opinion thereof.

3 Others opinions.

4 Reasons



- 4 Reasons in behalfe of the offensive, and inconueniencies of the defensive war.
- 5 Commodities of the offensive war.
- 6 Spoiles in our enemies or our owne countrie : their difference.
- 7 Machiavel confuted.
- 8 The chiefe cause of the Turkish greatnesse hath beene the Christians idlenesse.
- 9 The war upon the Turke must be offensive.
- 10 Examples of good succeſſe in that kind.

1



T is a doubt often disputed, and not yet resolued, whether it be better to assaile the enemy at his own home, or to attend till he assaile vs : The Lord of *Langei*, *Machiavell*, and others of our times haue discoursed heereof to the full.

2 For my part I am of opinion (as also the worthiest capitaines haue beene) that it is alwaies better to assaile, then stay till we be assailed : *Alexander the Great*, *Hannibal*, *Scipio*, *Cesar*, and many other *Romans* serue to approue it; and all these would haue laughed at such as should haue otherwise counselled them.

3 Yet some there are in our times which haue endeouored to proue the contrarie by demonstrations subtil enough (but vnfound) and to this very purpose of the Turke, to wit, that it were better to attend him then to seeke him out vpon his owne dunghill : These are counsailes more curious then well grounded, whereof consequently ensue few effects of moment : we may couple such men with those vaunting Ingenours or Artists, who discoursing vpon some worke of their inuention promise of it wondrous effects, and set foorth some simple module which serueth but for demonstration only ; but when it comineth (as they say) to the push, and that they must put their instrument to his true triall and vse, then is it that they are farto seeke, and that they confesse the difference betweene an essentiall ef-

fect and a superficiall flourish, such as their first module afforded. Iust in this manner these contemplatiue state-Philosophers will attend the Turke at their owne home, whom they dare scarce looke in the face neither in nor out of his country.

4 It is most certaine that hee which assaileth hath alwaies more resolution and courage then he that attendeth. For he hath already formed his determination and prouision when the other goeth by heerefaie and likelihoods : moreouer in assailing, the war is vndertaken with more aduantage, and commodity then otherwise it would be ; and he which mindeth to force a country or prouince may make his vse of all such aduantages and commodities as he findeth may serue his turne in the country he intendeth to conquer. Asamong others, if he haue set on foote some practise, or hatched some treason in the minds of two or three, such of the subiects of the prince he assaileth as he knoweth offended or malecontent. Or if he haue plotted some matter of purpose for an vniuersall rebellion. All which incountring with the designs of the supposed conquerour, he makes them serue his turne with more aduantage in going to seeke out the enemy ; then he should doe in staying for him at his owne home. By these meanes  
 1494. *Charles* the eight King of *France* found the way open to the  
 1499. conquest of *Naples* ; and *Lemes* the 12. posselt himselfe of  
 the estate of *Milan* : by the like occasion also the Empire  
 1516. of the *Mamelucks* subiected their neckes to the yoke of *Selim* the first.

5 But of all this we may collect a more sure prooffe of my proposition then when the enemy is at our doores, and that the astonishment surpriseth vs, ouerthroweth and confoundeth all counsaile and courage ; at such a time vnexpected disorders hem vs in on euery side ; necessitie presseth vs ; all things become suspected and difficult, so as most commonly we know not to what Saint to recommend vs ; nor what course were best to be taken ; for since we must haue an eie, misdoubt, make prouisions in sundry places,

places, bestowe garrisons where most need requireth; we shall finde that applying remedies on the one side our affaires will grow desperate on the other. Moreouer by distributing garrisons in this sort, it must needs follow that we so much the more weaken the body of our armie; and that through this constraint we quit the field to the more strong; which disaduantage commonly drawes with it the ruine of our whole estate.

If contrariwise we will preserve all our forces in one bodie, we leaue to the assailer many passages and places where he may set downe and fortifie himselfe there to hold vs play and traine vs on at his pleasure; but if it should so happen that the assailer were encountred by him which attendeth with equall force, with as braue a countenance, and like courage, the retraiect and defence rest at his election, so he be a Captaine wise, and aduised, such as was *Solyman* when he marched into Hungarie, and when the Emperour *Charles* the 5. went couragiously to meet him.

6 And because the *Disastrous* chance of war may sometimes light vpon the assailer be he neuer so warie and valiant; it is to be presupposed (that being granted) that he will sell his skin at so deare a rate, as the forces of the assailed shall remaine thereby so disordred, as he will not be able to offend the vanquished, or disturbe his affaires, notwithstanding that his countrey be farre distant from the countrey assailed: this may be seene by the example of the ouerthrow the French receiued, and the taking of their King prisoner before *Panye* insomuch as that losse (besides that of their Prince) did not afford ought to the victorious whereby he might aduantage himselfe vpon the kingdome of France. Also it is much more easie to set a foote againe an armie discomfited, abroad then at home; because if fortune haue shewed her selfe aduerse and our foe at our home, then is the time that such as are malecontents and mutinous lift vp their heades, and that our people stand amazed and for the most part vntractable. Then must we trauaile amaine to put our men in hart, then must



we make much of those few good men, the remaines of a battell to bestowe in our Townes and trust them with the government thereof. On the other side if these losses be tide vs far from our home and in another country, the feare and the stonishment will be the lesse amongst our subiects, and they more pliable and forward to succour vs, were it but to keepe the danger aloofe from themselves.

*Mac. disput. lib.*  
*2. c. 12.*

7 Me thinkes *Machiauel* much abuseth himselfe when he so opiniatiuely mainteineth, that if the Romans had receiued out of Italy the blowes *Hannibal* gaue them by the ouerthrow of \* three armies, that they had neuer beene able more to haue held vp their head or re-established their affaires as they did: *Machiauel* laieth this ground; That they had neuer found meanes againe to set a foote so soone as they did the residue of their forces, had it beene out of Italy. Marke I praie how he erreth; for it is well knowen that the ouerthrowes they had in their owne country made them lose, besides their souldiours, many good townes, and bred reuolt in their Colonies which followed the fortunes of the victorious, with diuers other accidents that shooke their estate; all which had not succeeded with such disaister if the losse had befell them far from Italy: for in this case both heart and meanes had serued them more abundantly then they did, to assemble new forces and as great as they had lost. It is also certaine that if *Hannibal* had knowen how to make good vse of his victory the Romans had beene vtterly ouerthrowen. It must needes be, that their meanes and power were very great, and that God had an especiall hand in their affaires, seeing that in such disorder they should recouer themselves; & that with such corage, as they refused to serue their turns with those which had by flight escaped from their ouerthrows, neither made they any account of redeeming those which were taken prisoners, nay rather in stead of doing this they deprived some of them of all honour and confined others into *Sicily*. It seemeth to me that these reasons may serue to confute those of *Machiauel*, and that it is high time we returne to that principall

*At the river of Trebia, where Sempronius was slaine, at the lake of Trasimene where Flaminius was overcome, and at Cannas where Terentius Varro and L. Paulus lost the field.*

*Maharbal's saying to Hannibal, was, Vincere sis Hannibal, sed victoria uti nescis.*  
*Liv. Dec. 3. l. 2.*

principall point concerning the fortune of the Turke.

8 We will say then that the faint-hearted slacknesse of the Christians hath made way to the Turke for the inlarging of his limits, so as they abut almost of all sides vpon *Europe*, and hath beene a meanes that he can now not only attend the enemy (as *Machiavel* saith) but goe to rowse him at his owne home. It is the course he hath obserued and taken; to ruine his neighbours round about him, and increase his power, which he hath so doone as he hath cleane bereaued vs of all stomacke to assaile him, yea or once to dare to attempt it. For though there be Princes enow which hold it necessary for the good of *Christendome* to set vpon him at his home, yet to this day we see none that will begin to strike the first stroake, or set first hand to the breaking of this ice.

9 But if euer God gaue vs the courage vertuously to attempt this enterprize in reuenge of the oppression and wrongs Christendome hath endured at his hands; we must not thinke to vndertake it by other meanes then those he hath himselfe put in practise against vs, & that is to seeke him out at his owne home and nobly to embrace the designes himselfe hath obserued; which doing, and hauing God to guide, we shall doubtlesse obtaine those victories of him, which he hath had of vs. Admit he haue beene for a time our Schoole-master, and that we haue learned of him to our cost, it is now high time that wee shew how we haue profited by his instructions, and that we know how to put them in practise and pay the interests of our damages.

10 Now to make it appeere that it is not a matter of that difficultie and danger that some imagine, let vs note these examples which are in a maner familiar vnto vs. Had not *Andrew Dorea* the courage with a small number of ships to enter into Greece where he got *Patras* and *Coron*? *Don John of Austria*, did he not affoord a notable prooffe hereof in the yeare 1571. when being Generall of the league, he fought the enemy out in the inmost parts of the *Leuant*

1532.

where he gaue him battaile with that courage, that though he were inferior to him in men & galleies, yet failed he not (assisted by God) to ouerthrow the most puissant & great armie that the *Ottomans* euer set foorth by sea against the Christians: There is nothing the Turke so much feareth, as to be set vpon by the Christians, both because he knowes they haue valor in them, as also for the ieaiousie he conceiue of the great number of them vnder his obedience: All which would without question rise in armes if they might but once see the Christians Coulours flying, and so accompanied, as that they might to some purpose make head against the *Ottomans*.

## CHAP. III.

That he hath made no account  
of Fortresses.

- I *We must endeuour as well to keepe as conquer.*
- 2 *The reason and vse of Colonies amongst the ancient.*
- 3 *Their discommodities.*
- 4 *The causes of rebellions.*
- 5 *An other discommoditie of Colonies.*
- 6 *The Portugals manner of planting Colonies.*
- 7 *Their benefite.*
- 8 *Fortresses the second meanes of preserving an estate.*
- 9 *Their vse and necessitie.*
- 10 *Machiauels vaine opinion confuted.*
- 11 *Forces euer in readinesse, the third meanes of preserving an Estate.*
- 12 *Whether is better to maintaine Fortresses vpon the borders, or to haue an armie euer ready.*
- 13 *How the Turke countries line in peace by means of the latter.*
- 14 *In keeping the second meanes, in getting the third is most approoued.*
- 15 *Whence the power of the Turke doth grow.*
- 16 *Wars abroad beget peace at home.*



I



Rinces generally strue by all meanes to preserue not onely their own estates, but such prouinces also as they haue conquered; obseruing what the time, the humour of the people, and their meanes will permit. But because each one takes a different course, and of this difference hapneth both good and euill, I iudge it necessarie to say somewhat thereof by way of discourse: I will spare to meddle with the forme each one keepeth in the politicke gouernment of his dominions or principalities; and will draw my selfe within compasse of handling, in three seuerall points, all that may be said or alleaged vpon this subiect. First then we will speake of Colonies, next of Fortresses, and last of Armies, entertained for the defence of the countrey.

2 Colonies haue beene one of the meanes which the Ancients haue most ordinarily obserued; and at this day they are practised to mainteine a subdued people vnder the obedience of a new soueraigntie. Such then as allowed of this manner of preseruing Estates, by way of Colonies bestowed the lands of those they had conquered vpon their naturall subiects, equally distributing them according to their merits; supposing that in so doing, they should sowe the countrey conquered with new men, which might behaue themselues with a like deuotion and dutifull obseruance towards them, as vassals performe toward their Soueraigne.

3 The Grecians vsed them first, and then the Romanes: but this manner of assurance is not so commendable, as many may suppose, insomuch as it draweth after it these two dangerous consequents. The first is, that when a Prince depriueth such of their goods as are naturall owners thereof, to bestow them vpon his owne subiects, it winneth him and his immortall hatred, accompanied with an euerlasting thirst of reuenge, and of regaining their libertie

bertie, for though such as are so despoiled of their goods be but few in number in regard of the Colony, yet it is to be imagined that they haue many kinsfolkes and friends interested in their miseries, and that there need but three or foure men of resolution to draw all the rest to a mutinie and reuolt. If this be held a difficult matter, yet is it a thing naturall to become wise by anothers mishaps, and to feare and be prouident lest we fall into the like inconuenience as our neighbours. The apprehension of which calamitie makes vs oftentimes conceiue worse of the euill then it deserueth, especially when the actions of the conquering prince are grounded rather vpon force then reason, as ordinarily they are.

4 Most commonly the rebellions and insurrections of people and cities, happen not so much for the outrage done to a whole communaltie, as for the iniuries particularly received by some of those which haue reuolted: but howsoeuer, such wounds alwaies breed the vniuersall destruction of a common weale. To this purpose we may alledge the example of *Roderick* King of Spaine, who hauing rauished *Cuba* the daughter of Count Iulian, the indignity of the fact entred so far into the hearts of al the Nobles of the country, as euery one took the wrong to be his, and hauing thereupon taken armes to aide the father in his reuenge, it grew to a worse matter; for hereby they gaue the Moores entrance into the Estate who put to death their King; and were themselves beholders of the spoile of their country by persecuting vengeance vpon so infamous an act performed by the disordinat lust of him who ought to haue reprobued and chastised it in others.

5 The other discommodity which they meete who will settle the establishment of their fortunes vpon the erections of Colonies is, that in succession of time those men so remoued from their owne country into another newly subdued, fashion themselves vnto the climat, humors, and complexions, and to the same minde of preserving their estate, as those amongst whom they are sent to inhabit.

And

*Tolet. lib. 3. c. 8.*  
*Rer. Hisp.*  
*Rit. Neap. l. 2.*  
*Rer. Hisp.*  
*Lod. Vines de*  
*Christ. sœm.*  
*lib. 1.*

And hauing thither transported their goods and begotten children, they thenceforth make more reckoning of the country whither they are come as *Colonies*, then of their naturall country whence they were displaced: like trees which planted in an other soile change much both of their nature and taste. This the more easily happeneth to Colonies by how much the more remote they are from their native place of abode. For proöfe, finde we not that euen the neighbour Colonies of Italy during the time of the second Punicke war would not in any wise contribute to the necessities of Rome their originall mother?

Liv. dec. 3. lib. 7.

7. Annal. v. c.

545. Olymp.

144.

6 The Portugals obseruing these inconueniences haue to assure the Indies, practised a manner of *Colonies* much more sure, tolerable, and lesse enuied; which is thus: They plant their *Colonies* not all at once, but few at a time by *Carauans* or companies according as neede requireth, to inhabite the countries by them newly discovered; yet not throughly to people them, but after as they shall see they thrive, and so accordingly they by little and little replenish the Colonie. *Goa* is the best provided of all they haue established, and there they contract alliances with the ancient inhabitants, and take and giue their daughters in mariages: by this meanes (which is as I haue said the more plausible) they liue free from violence, assured of the good wils of the first inhabitants who enrich themselues greatly by their trafficke and commodities. In this manner they multiply and are scarcely perceiued how, growing to such a multitude of people as they serue to enlarge and establish the name and gouernment of the Portugals. From yeare to yeare they ad to this increase which serueth them instead of a fortresse amongst such as they subdue, and in such prouinces as they will people and accustome to their fashions and rule.

7 Time and experience make it plainly appeare, that these formes of Colonies are more tollerable and sure then any heeretofore practised, for in these the naturall inhabitants are so farre from being thrust out of their houses, as



on the contrarie, they are therein maintained and more confirmed in the peaceable inoying of their goods. Moreover the vnion and commixture of blood one with another softning their naturall roughnesse, retaineth and redoubleth the affection as well of the auncient inhabitants, as of those of the Colony. The *Spaniards* do the like in the West Indies: that which I finde most notable heerein, is, that the one and the other rest not satisfied onely with establishing Colonies, but further they conuert and instruct the Indians in the Christian faith, to Gods glorie and theirs: It is that which the king of Spaine performeth and continueth by meanes of such religious orders as he hath planted among them: for not being able to store so many and so large countries as those are with naturall Spaniards and Portugals, they by this conuersion and Baptisme, make those people become Portugals and Spaniards.

8 Having discoursed of the forme of Colonies, and how the conquering Prince may profit himselfe by them, it is now time that we come to the second thing which may afford assurance to an estate. The meanes are many, but the Christians most vsually make choise of fortifications, as seeming to them most strong bridles to raine in and curbe both the auncient and newly subdued prouinces. There they appoint their Magazins for munition and other prouision for the wars; there they bestow garisons of souldiers for their defence; some places they fortifie vpon the frontiers, where they constitute for Gouvernors and officers, creatures of their owne fashioning, the better to containe all vnder the obedience of the victorious.

Disl. 2. c. 24.

9 Yet is it that which *Machiavell* reprobeth and reiecteth as vnprofitable: but because they are reasons or opinions so weake as that like Spydres cobwebs, they are easily broken, I will not spend time farther to confute them; onely I will say thus much, that *Alfonso* king of Naples, a most iudicious prince, whose authoritie should carrie credit, alwaies esteemed this practise of fortification most  
necessarie

necessarie and profitable, especially in a countrey newly conquered, and not to leaue it open and consequently subiect to iniurie and reuolt. The proceedings in this kinde, of *Francis Sforce* duke of Milan, of the Emperor *Charles* the 5. and of so many other Princes and Captaines which haue woone reputation and renowne amongst men, are such as who well considereth them will laugh at the opinion of *Machiauel*. Without seeking any further, haue we not the French for example? who made no account of erecting cittadels in the Ile of Sicily: but after they had conquered it, they asloone lost it not without a most lamentable slaughter executed on them by the inhabitants; 1281.  
 but contrariwise deriuing their wisdome from their owne miserie, after they once tooke in hand to make fortresses in sundry places of Italy, there was no meanes but by peace to dislodge them. The Mamelucks who were in the same error of not trusting to Fortresses, found themselues in lesse then two daies depriued by *Selim* of the most part of their liues, estate, and powers. The Spaniard imbracing the indifferency of this opinion, and desirous to gratifie the Flemings whom they thought to appease by this moderation, returned into their hands the strong holdes of their Provinces: which they had no sooner done, but they were neere-hand expelled the Low-countries. 13. Ap.

10 And though all these examples are but too sufficient to confute the opinion of *Machiauel*, yet will I bring him once more vpon the stage, and sifit him a little better: See heere the substance of what he saith: Either thou art able (saith he) to bring sufficient store of men into the field (in which case fortresses are not any waies necessarie) or thou hast not meanes to leaue such forces as are requisite to defend and warrant thy estate, and then they are vnprofitable. Marke, I praie, the wrong course he taketh, walking as he doth in extreames, without keeping the meane, most necessarie in these propositions: to say the truth, he is much mistaken; since this matter as others, should be distinguished by the portions and qualities thereof, the bet-



terand more easily to vnderstand it. In my opinion then (which I deliuer not to exclude others) we must say thus: Either a Prince hath meanes to leuie men out of hand by an ordinarie continuance of armes, or else he must haue time to doe it, be it either by leuying a sufficient number of his subiects trained vp to armes, and by the assistance of friends and associats, or of neighbours, which in regard of their particular interest, will willingly ioyne with him, that he may protect them from the same iniurie he may himselfe receiue. In these two first cases, Fortresses would prooue more profitable then necessarie; or else a Prince is of that power as he is able at once to assemble so manie men as he will keepe or winne the field from the enemy, or will be able, at least, commodiously to succour the place besieged. In these two respects, Cittadels are necessarie though not much profitable, because they by their constant defence, stoppe and intertaine the enemy, affoord by such temporising, meanes and leasure to order matters; for (as the Venetians say) *Chi ha tempo, ha vita*, who hath time, hath life.

11 The third meanes for a Prince to preferue his estate, is that which those allow of, who not trusting to Fortresses, and making no account of Colonies, doe ordinarily intertaine strong companies of horse and foote, and in such numbers, as they may alwaies containe their subiects in naturall obedience, hinder rebellions, and which most importeth, repell, and oppose the enemy, and as occasion requireth, visit him at his owne home. In time passed the *Mamelucks* practised this forme of government; and the *Turkes* at this day obserue it in all points. The *Visconti* sometime Lords of *Milan*, vsed this forme of preferuing their estates, and amongst others *Azzo-Visconti* ordinarily gaue intertainment (yea euen in time of peace) to 22000. horse, and they did him no small seruice.

12 A man may yet put one doubt more of this matter, the resolution whereof shall fit very well for the course and concluding of the discourse. That is, which is best either

*Aemil. lib. 3.*  
*Turca.*



to erect *Citadels* or alwaies to maintaine a great army. Experience ( our comnion *Mistres* ) teacheth vs that for the conseruation of great Princes estate fortresses are the best ; because they doe not so much incumber nor dislike the subiect as doth an army, whose troupes dispersed in diuers parts of the country waste and disorder all : on the other side souldiours shut vp in a fortresse are not so insolent and licentious as those commonly are which keepe the field , yea and that oft-times with more hauocke then if the enemy himselfe had ransaked and ouerrun it. The liberty which armies dispersed thorowout an estate challenge and assume to themselues, is such as makes them forget all policy and military discipline : the example of the *Milanois* heerein will not be beside the purpose. They neuer complained of the *Garrison* of the Castle, but when it came to that that *Lemes* the 12. would haue lodged his horse within the towne they presently reuolted ; whereupon ensued the losse of the estate. What was it that wrought the reuolt of the *Flemings* ? was it not the obstinate mutining of only 1500. Spaniards, who crying after their paie ouerran and made spoile of all the country ? The selfe same Spanish nation disquieted the Estate of *Milan* vnder the *Marques* of *Gnasto* and the *Ile* of *Sicily* vnder *Ferdinand Gonzaga*. The *Sorians* and the *Egyptians* no sooner saw *Selim*s standards displaced but they rebelled against the *Mamelucks*, whose armies had maruellously oppressed them, they hauing beene constrained to maintaine them at their owne charges.

176 5.

1526.

Paul. Iou.  
lib.7. de Vita  
vir. ill.

13. Whereto I know may be replied, that the *Turke* neuertheless peaceably holdeth his estate after the same manner we speake of, his forces being euermore on foote and in a readinesse : it is true, and so is it that to cleere this, two principall reasons may be alledged. The one that he hath deprived such his subiects as are Christians and of a different law, of all vse of armes ; and that he hath brought them to this passe that they cannot want to hold any thing in propriety : which was not practised towards

the aboue mentioned; moreouer all assemblies vpon whatsoever cause are expressely forbidden them: he keeps them vnder and makes no more reckning of them then of sheepe pend vp in a fould vsing them like brute beasts, not once vouchsafing to imploy them in the wars. The other reason is that they haue no power of themselues to oppose the *Turkes* so mighty forces; and (which is worst of all) they neuer haue had any forraine succour to incourage them to such an enterprise.

14 I will forbear to diue any deeper into this subiect; me thinkes we may see sufficiently by this how much more supportable are *Cittadels*, then armies ordinarily interained. But if we speake of conquering, I allow that armies are more to be preferred before fortresses, considering that we thereby inioy meanes to embrace all occasions offered, and at an instant to execute both the will and designe of a Prince so prouided.

15. To say the truth it is that which the *Ottomans* haue practised, to aduance their Empire to such greatnesse as at this day we see it; it is that which hath heaped on them the honors of so many victories, and which hath endowed them with authoritie, reputation and meanes. They haue alwaies had (as they yet haue) their armies in a readinesse, and haue fought with their neighbours in a manner with as much aduantage as a man armed against one that is naked.

16 Some I know will maruell how such a number of people so armed, can containe themselues from reuolting. I am of opinion, that if they were not ordinarily imployed as they are, in attempts of warre, that in the end their multitudes growen ranke with quiet, would easily be drawn to rebellion or mutinies; which the souldiers of *Alexander* the Great can witnesse, for whilest the enemy kept them in doings, who were then they more hardy and valerous: but after their victories, who more insolent and vsufferable? The Roman armies, how fortunate were they whilest they had continuall warre, atchieuing all their enterprises in a manner



manner as they could wish: but after their conquest they became so turbulent and vniquiet, as they assumed to themselves the authoritie of creating Emperors, and for the most part so licentious, as euery armie made his particular choise, so as there was no remedie but to trie by fight who should carie it; which occasioned the ouerthrow of the state. The French, haue they not evermore faithfully serued their king against strangers: but so soone as they had peace with the English, and after with the Spaniard, they filled euery corner of their country with sedition, sackings, cruelties, and slaughters; and that with such obstinate persisting, as the contagion thereof hath not beene able for 25. yeeres space to be remooued. But that which is most to be lamented, is the scandall they haue brought vpon the church. This selfe thing may be appropriated to the Flemings, and the cause may be impured to idlenesse, and the exceeding plentie wherein they liued. The example of *Bajazet* the second shall serue to close vp this discourse, for he being giuen ouer to his ease; the soldiours, who could not brooke such idlenesse, so awaked the courage of his two sonnes, *Selim* and *Acomath*, as all the forces of the Empire (which had established the Turkish scepter) were diuided into two, and it lacked not much of being vtterly ouerthrowne, euery one for his part seconding the rebellions of the sonnes against the father.

### CHAP. IIII.

That he hath trained vp his soldiours  
to valour and hardinesse.

1. Why the armies of these daies consist not of so good soldiers as in former times.
2. Principall causes of victories.
3. What care is to be had in leuying of good soldiers: and this to be wrought by a fourefold meanes.
4. By election.
5. Exercise.



5. *Exercise.*
6. *Honors and profit.*
7. *The Turkes proceeding heerein.*



**I**T is seldome seene that the armies of these times consist of good souldiours, for the more we vary from the course our forefathers tooke to bring them to perfection, by so much the more are we deprived of that happinesse which were to be desired and seriously sought after by Princes, and those which as Commanders would reape honor and profite by the wars.

2. Victory ( which dependeth of the diuine will ) deriueth her successe and principall ground from the multitude of men, but especially from the wisdom of the Commanders and from the valour and generositie of the Souldiour.

3. It is requisite then that we looke more narrowlie then we doe vnto their choice, and that they be such as we may honour and profit our selues by them : now we must deliuer how we may light vpon, or make good and hardy souldiours, which is doone in my opinion by a foure fold meanes, by election, exercise, honor, and profit.

4. By election, because all those which we leuie for the wars haue not that naturall inclination to valour and courage, nor a constitution of bodie fit to indure the trauailes and dangets incident thereunto. Moreouer a gallant fashion and spirite are not found in euery one, much lesse a resolution to attend, desie, and assaile the enemy ; also euery mans hart will not serue him to enter the trenches, throw himselfe desperatly into the dike, scall the wals, offer himselfe valiantly, to make good a breach in despite of the Cannon, of stones, of wilde-fire, and of death it selfe : Their complexions perhaps will not brooke that they should spend the whole day in continuall turmoiles without eating, and the night without rest, so as where some  
make

make account that Antwerpe is able to make 30000. men, Venice 40000. Gant 60000. Paris 100000. all fit and able to beare armes, me thinkes they should be vnderstood that they are such as haue the age required, but not the disposition proper to such a profession. For prooffe hereof haue we not of late seene that the Prince of Parma hath ranged vnder the obedience of the King of Spaine euen with small forces those of Gant & Antwerp which had formerly together with those of the low countries rebelled against their Soueraigne. The Romans held in such esteeme this manner of making choise of their Souldiours as when they would expresse a leuy of men they termed it *Delectum agere vel habere* to make a choise. In our times no man hath beene more carefull and circumspect in the choise of his souldiours (at the least of the Captaines of Italy) then *Cosmo de Medici* Duke of Florence; and indeede he was prouided of the best and most approued souldiours of his time.

1584. &amp;

1585.

5 To election we are to adde exercise, without the which there is no forwardnesse or constitution of body be it neuer so strong, able to attaine to the perfection requisite to execute and accomplish, as appertaineth to a good, braue, and noble souldiour.

*Veget. lib. 1. c.*

15.

6 But if the Generall be so wise as to ioine to exercise profit and honor, then is it that there is no danger or difficulty be it neuer so great which his souldiours will not overcome; no incounter which they will not force; no enterprise which they will not happily compasse. As for a Prince there is no mony better bestowed then that where with his Captaines wher and intertaine the courage of the Souldiour. This was the cause why the Romans beside the ordinarie pay of their armies, ordained crownes for them which had in the wars saued the life of a citizen, first entred the breach, or boarded a ship: these were termed *Coronæ*

*Eo enim impenditur labor & periculum aperiſq; vnde emolumentum & honos speratur:*  
*T. Liu.*

*Plut. lib. 2. c.*  
*5. & 6. li. 16.*  
*c. 4. Gel. lib. 5.*  
*cap. 6.*

*Cinica, Murales, & Navales.*

7 The *Turkes*, to our confusion, are not inferior to the Romans, be it either for the choice they make of their souldiours,



diours, or for rewarding them. For they chuse from among the nations vnder their obedience, the most warlike, and take of them but the flower and such as are most proper for the wars, sparing not afterwards to recompence them at the full. It is a thing incredible with what continuall excercise they inure their souldiours, in so much that euen from the cradle (if a man may so say) they traine them vp vnto the wars. The intertainment the *Turke* giueth them is sufficient; but as for the rewards, honours, and commodities he shareth among them, it is hardly to be expressed: There is not any Prince at this day liuing that may in this regard bee compared to him; and which is more, the meanest of his souldiers vpon his vertuous behauour in armes is capable of attaining to the most eminent charges and dignities of his estate, and of enriching himselfe with inestimable treasure. To confirme this, the goods which *Meehmet Bassa* left behinde him, (who of a Christian *Apostate* aspired to that greatnesse) were valued at two *Millions* of Crownes. In a word they are sure that rewarde waiteth alwaies vpon valour. Moreouer the prowesse of the priuate souldiours cannot be smothered amongst them, it is rather immediatly discovered and notice taken thereof. Of all the *Ottoman* Princes *Mahomet* the second was the most bountifull, for he gaue beyond measure, so as sometime he increased the souldiours pay a thousand fould. *Selim* the first did the like; and it is worth the noting, that as those two surpassed the residue in liberality, so did they in honourable and triumphant victory.

#### CHAP. V.

That he hath maintained his  
Souldiers in military  
Discipline.

1 A very great army may be easily ouerthrowne by a meane army.

2 The



- 2 *The cause hereof, and benefit of the latter.*
- 3 *Care is to be had that an army be not overcharged with baggage.*
- 4 *A Generall with more ease may command a meane, then too great an army.*
- 5 *Souldiers are animated by the perswasion and presents of their chiefe commander.*
- 6 *They are in seruice to be well acquainted with one another.*
- 7 *The incumbrance of huge and ouer great Armies.*
- 8 *How it commeth to passe that the Turkes so great numbers of men prone victorious.*
- 9 *Defects in Christian armies.*
- 10 *Obedience of the Turkes.*
- 11 *Battailes lost through disobedience of the Souldiours.*
- 12 *The military discipline of the Turkes notable.*

1



He happy successe of battailes by those of ancient times with such wisdom achieved, makes it most apparent vnto vs that most commonly the meane armies haue overcome the great. *Alexander*

the Great, diuers *Grecian* Captaines, amongst others *Miltiades* and *Themistocles*, and among the Romans *Lucallus*, *Scylla*, *Pompey* and *Cesar* alwaies assailed and vanquished the barbarous people rather with vnequall then equall numbers, if we respect the multitude; but they went far beyond them if we consider their militarie vertue. In these latter times the Commanders of the *Emperour Charles* the 5. and of *King Philip* his sonne haue likewise gained the victory of many armies greater then this.

2 To such as demaund the reason of it, I wil answere that it was because the principall strength and sinew of an army consisteth, in affection, in military Discipline, and in a well disposed order in the day of battell: without which parts an army is as fraile as glasse. A few may be more easily and orderly ranged then many. Vertue vnited is al-

waies more powerfull then separated and disiointed. Hence is it that bodies of an indifferent stature are for the most part more vigorous then such as are ouer great and huge, which the Poet (speaking of *Fidens*) expressely signifieth in these words. *Maiores in exiguo regnabat corpore virtus*. Great vertue in a little body raigned. And Virgil alluding to the Bees saith, *Ingentes animi angusto in corpore versantur*. In slender bodies they haue mighty mindes: questionlesse a meane army must needes be more stable and vnited then a great, because multitude is naturally accompanied with confusion, commonly waited vpon by disorder.

3 Moreouer, it is a thing of high consideration to be able to take such order that a campe be not incombred with baggage: rather that it be free and manageable, so as it may be euery where commodiously cōducted, ranged and euer in a readinesse, to gaine and make good dangerous & difficult itraites and passages; that it be not tired and discouraged for the long marches it must often vndertake; that it doe not faint for such accidents as diuersly chance, nor for any exploits or executions which present themselves vnexpected. All which a meane campe will be more proper to performe then a great: for it shall not neede so great a quantity of victuals, nor so great an incombrance of baggage or cariage as the other.

4 Moreouer seeing it is more profitable and necessary that an army be conducted & gouerned by one only Generall; and that it depend of no other then him; It will be more easily effected in a meane then a great army, especially compounded of diuers nations. And this dependance shall be better ordered if the Generall can content himselfe with small store of luggage and that well trussed vp. The multitude of meane causes slacketh alwaies the course of the efficient, and keepeth backe the fruite thereof. A little army hath not neede of so much luggage as a great.

5 And it is much better that the Captaine himselfe know his fouldiours and they him; then to rely vpon the credit  
and



and report of such as are vnder his charge; for the souldiour that shall heare himselfe named by his Captaine aduanceth himselfe so much the more, and becommeth more desirous of honor. Whereas if he see himselfe forgotten and vnrespected of him which commandeth, he groweth distasted and out of heart, and almost carelesse how matters haue their proceedings. Who doubteth that the presence of the Captaine or Generall of an army doth not serue as a motiue to the souldiour to make him diligently preserue his reputation, and to shunne the reproch of cowardise? which he will not so carefully performe, if he finde himselfe out of the presence of his Commander, or that his Commander make as if he did not see him.

6 It is good also that the souldiers frequent brotherly together, for that assureth them more, and maketh them trust to one anothers assistance in time of the most crosse fortunes. All these parts incounter and are intertaind more easily in a meane, then in a great armie.

7 Which is often attended vpon by more inconueniences then the other, as by famine, plagues, contagious mutinies and dissentions. There is yet another dangerous inconuenience which is most vsually the companion of a multitude; that is, that they forme to themselues a confidence of their owne forces greater then they ought: of this confidence followeth a contempt of the aduerse power, of this contempt a presumption, author of infinite mischiefes.

8 But how happeneth it then (will some say) that the Turkes haue euery where gained the victorie by multitude? Would you know how? Because they haue betimes trained vp and instructed their great armies, to keepe so good an order, as well in execution, iudgement, military discipline, readinesse, as disposition to armes, that they are become as tractable, and easie to manage as ours though meane and few in number.

9 On the other side we haue suffered our armies to slide into such insolencie and libertie, as we can hardly rule and



conduct them without so many dangers, confusions and luggage, as it were enough to trouble Captaines of great policie and experience; and to say the trueth, see wee not that the Turke more easily furnisheth an hundred thousand men with vittailles, then we fiftie thousand? for besides that his souldiers make not, as ours, any account of the diuersitie of vittailles, of delicacie or of toothsome morsels, they drinke no Wine nor Beere, which importeth the consideration of almost the one halfe of our munition and charge.

10 What need I speake of obedience, nurse of the order obserued amongst them? since it was neuer seene that the Turkes euer lost battaile through disorder, much lesse left off pursuing any attempt for their souldiers mutinies.

1396.

11 Whereas almost all the battailes we haue bid them, had not beene lost, but by the meere disorder and disobedience of our men. Whereto may we impute the miserable losse of *Nicapolie*, but to the disordinate rashnesse of the French, who serued at that time in the armie? *Sigismond* king of *Bohemia* (afterward Emperour) seeing that contrary to his will and commandement they aduanced themselues as couragiously as vnaduisedly. What shall we speake of the ouerthrowe of the same *Sigismond* which hapned some few yeeres after? came it not to passe by meanes of the disordering of his infantry? which being not yet fully set in battaile array were couered with a cloud of arrowes, let flie by the enemy so to the purpose as they were all hewen in peeces even vnder the noses of his horse; which seeing themselues destitute of foote were strooke with such a feare as they betooke themselues to flight not without the losse of many good souldiours and worthy Captaines, all to the shame and confusion of the Christians. *Ladislaus* King of *Polonia*, was he not overcome at *Varna* through the disorders of the *Bishops* of *Strigonia* and *Varadin*? who to the end to chace inconsideratly the enemy, shaken and flying in one part of his army, forsooke their rankes to pursue them, so making way for them: who  
laying

1409.

1444.

laying hold on the occasion came with the rest of their army to charge them there where they lay most open, in such sort as they won the victory most miserably slaughtering the Christians. At *Buda*, at *Exechium*, at *Gerba*, and in sundry other places where we haue bene ouercome, it proceeded rather of our disorders then of the *Turkish* forces.

1541.

1538.

1560.

12 So as we must acknowledge that the *Turke* excelleth vs both in number of good Souldiours and in all other military discipline: He is followed with such numbers of men as it seemeth he relieth wholly on their multitude, but it is in so good a manner as if he respected nought but order & military discipline, parts (to our dishonor) far from vs.

## CHAP. VI.

That he hath made no reckning of other forces then his owne.

- 1 *The wars are to be maintained by our owne strength, neither must we rely vpon forraine powers.*
- 2 *The good and ill that resulteth of both these.*
- 3 *Conditions of confederate forces.*
- 4 *Other inconueniences which arise from the assistance of forraine powers.*
- 5 *Examples of Leagues against the Turkes.*
- 6 *Their defects, hindrances of their successe.*
- 7 *The Turkes not accustomed to make Leagues with any, but using their owne forces, haue ouerthrowne many armies confederates.*
- 8 *With whom they might well haue ioyned in league to their advantage.*



11 high enterprises either for preservation of an estate, or for denouncing of warre, haue beene ill plotted and as ill caried when they haue relied vpon the assistance and fauour of a third power, and not of our owne; seeing that from hopes

hopes and proiects so ill grounded we neuer come to inioy the fruits which such a succour, the desseigne of him that enterpriseth, & his extraordinary preparation promised vs; rather they are infallibly attended on by some lamentable accident which vtterly ouerthroweth them.

2 Since oftentimes it falleth out that the expectation of such succour promised, serueth rather to slacke the course of our endeauours, and lessen the preparation of the enterprise, then otherwise to forward or better them; were it not for the confidence of such succour he that attempteth would prepare his forces proportionable to his proiect, and not trust to outward helpes either of friend or confederat. Who doubteth, when we so repose our selues vpon an others forces, and that he is at charge for our loues sake, that he doth not make vs more backward to provide and disburse of oure owne store? But this is not all: the worst is, that while we thus expect, time wasteth vnprofitably, and occasion (which once escaped cannot be laid hold on) is let slip and lost without reconery: for whilst we so attend our assistants our practises are discovered.

3 And who will beleue that a friend or associat will embrace the desseign of him he assisteth, or wish his good fortune with such hartie affection, as he wil not be ready vpon the least occasion he shall desire to finde, to leaue him in the lurch? And without question this occasion will offer it selfe at any time whensoever he hath a purpose to dissolue the league and couenants agreed vpon betweene them; especially if he be the stronger and more mighty, and finde not himselfe interested in the successe of the enterprise, for which he tooke armes and became confederate.

4 We may also adde another defect and imperfection; & that is, if the succour we attend be to be assembled from diuers places, or, that the windes (if it be by sea) or some vnlooked for accident (if by land) hinder by so many meanes the preparations for the war and intended voiage, as that the season fit for execution escapeth him that enterpriseth; so as before he begin to march or set forward to  
the



the *Rendement* his opportunities of attempting or atchieving any memorable act, vtterly faile him in a matter which he had before discretely enough plotted and disposed: moreouer he cannot beare swaie as master of the confederate forces, insomuch as he which sendeth succours may vnderhand deliuer to his Commanders memorials and instructions more strict and limited, then the necessitie of the vndertaken affaire would permit. Also the least distaste either of the Prince which assisteth, or of the Captaine which conducteth such succours, serueth oft-times to dismisse the promised forces, deceiue the others expectation, and bring all he vndertaketh to nothing: So as he remaineth not onely more weake by this disappointment, but his owne forces also become vnprofitable, and consequently himselfe exposed to all wrong and ruine: for as if one only wheele of a clocke be out of temper, it sufficeth to disorder the whole motion; so where the vndertaker faileth but of one part of his promised troupes, the effects, which in part depend thereon, likewise faile, and the course of his warlike designes remaine crossed and peruerterd. I will not forget also to say that a campe consistng of such borrowed peeces, hath necessarily need of many heads to command it, and an armie compounded of so manie heads (because of the diuersity of opinions and affections) will most commonly haue the woorse when it commeth to handie blowes.

5 We may illustrate these discommodities with examples that touch vs neere, and are familiar vnto vs, and were not long since practised; for this cause I will more willingly, then otherwise I would, heere produce them. In our time we haue seene two most memorable leagues between the Pope, the king of Spaine, and the Venetians, consenting and vnited to vndertake one warre against the Turke: the one was vnder Pope *Paul* the third, and the other in the life time of *Pius Quintus*. The first was caried with an excessive charge, yet without any effect woorthy so great an assembly: The cause in my opinion proceeded of the

1537.

1570.

difficulty that was found to ioyn in one body the confederat forces, and draw them together at the *Rendevous* in due season : for they met not till the end of *September*. Although an other inconuenience may be alledged to this purpose, which ouerthrew, the good successe of such a holy and *Christian* attempt; yet it may appeere that to auoide the shame and dishonour that followed thereof, it had beene easie to haue performed somewhat of more memorable consequence, then was the taking of *Castle-novo*, if we had knowen how to husband the times and occasions fit for the imployment of so combined a power. Concerning the second, which was (as I said) in the time of *Pius Quintus*, the army of the *Venetians*, very gallant and strong, spent all the sommer in attending the *Galleis* of *Spaine* which were to conuoy succours into the *Ile* of *Cypres* then attempted by the *Turke*; so as this slacknesse of assembling the Galleyes was a cause that the army became almost quite vnfurnished of good souldiours drawn together to their great costs by reason of the plague which had made a most pitifull hauocke amonge them. Notwithstanding all this they forbear not to make towards *Cypres* so late, as by the way they receiued the newes of the lamentable taking of *Nicosia*: Which made them imagine that the *Turkes* had, vpon that commodity, most strongly manned their Galleyes ( as it was likely enough ) with land *Souldiours*, and that therefore there was more appearance of danger thē of good successe in assailing them : vpon which consideration they held it best to turne their course homeward and refer that businesse to an other time; hauing then thus dishonorably behaued themselues : returning they incountred so many misfortunes, as well weatherbeaten by reason of the Winter then approaching, they at length arriued at their home sorely brused and spoiled. The yeare following the army of the confederats met, notwithstanding all this very late, yet vnderooke they to incounter the enemy, of whome they got that so renowned victory in the yeare 1571. if God had permitted vsto reape thereby those worthy fruits that we had

had reason to expect. Now for all this *Cypres* was not recovered but remained to the infidell as the reward and wages of his valour. The third yeare of the league the king of *Spaine*, in stead of pursuing his enterprise against the *Turke* as he had determined, caused *Don Iohn of Austria* Admirall of his fleete to stay at *Messina*, because he then doubted that the French would assaile *Flanders*, with such forces as they had that yeare rather suffered to take breath then wholly cased and dismissed : So as the whole season was spent vnprofitably without attempting ought worthy such preparation, as the confederates had in due time set forth. This was an occasion of excessive charge, and that the armies did not once stirre till it was too late, attending what their neighbours would do, who, as I haue said, seemed to threaten the *King of Spaine* with some attempt vpon his country of *Flanders*. In the meane time the *Venetians*, tired with the charge and trouble they were at to no purpose, treated a peace with the *Turke*.

6 Who will make any question now (those things well weighed and considered) that if the leagues (both the first and second) had beene well caried without these crossings, iealousies and suspicions which accompanied them, (though vainly and vpon no ground) but that they would haue brought forth some woorthie and honorable fruite, to the glory and honour of God, the peace of his church, the encrease and establishment of the Christian commonwealth : This may be enough to prooue that forces compounded of diuers nations, depending of many and different heads, are in marching more slowe, and at a time of need lesse effectuall then others. It may appeere to some that I heereby inferre, that leagues betweene Princes are vnprofitable, and therefore not to be made : so farre is it from me to maintaine that opinion, as I rather willingly embrace the contrarie : but I reserue a time to handle how and in what manner it would be good to make such a league, (especially against the *Turke*) when I shall arriue at the place appointed for this purpose, to the end I may



*Vid. l. 3. c. 7. 8. 9.* discourse of it at full. Now let vs returne to the argument of discourse in handling.

7 The *Ottomans* neuer made league, either offensive or defensive with any: and neuer had helpe of strangers: on the contrarie, they haue alwaies had to doe with armies compounded of different nations confederate, and conducted by sundrie Commanders, all which (asill vnitied, not vnderstanding one another) they haue euermore vanquished. Moreouer we haue ordinarily seene them more forward and deliuer about their enterprises being alone, then accompanied; and consequently more vnitied in their force, more nimble in execution, and (it must needes follow) more renowned and fortunately victorious.

8 Yet they had no lacke of whom wherewith to practise their associations (if they had approoued them as good & necessarie) as among other with the Soldan of *Cairo*, with the kings of *Carmania* and of *Persia*, and with many other great princes al of their owne sect and religion, who would not (as it is to be supposed) haue set light by their league and amitie; especially then when they saw them so increase in power and greatnesse. But they haue euer made verie slender account of such practizes and confederacies, esteeming them vnprofitable for him, who of himselfe hath a high courage, and forces answerable wherewithal to goe thorough with a conquest, which they iudge will admit no sharing or diuision, since the ambition of rule striues to be alone and brookes no fellowship, no not betweene brothers; as little betweene father and sonne. It is true, the Turkes haue sometime taken to their seruice some few troopes of *Allarbs* paid as mercenaries, in like manner as now a daies the French entertaine the Switzers and other forreigne nations; but they neuer termed them, as they now vse, Confederates or Associates, titles inuented purposely to giue colour and applause to such leuies.

## CHAP. VII.

That he hath to power ioyned  
cunning and deceit.

- 1 *Machiauels peruerse opinion of not obseruing faith, reiected.*
- 2 *The ground of a Princes authoritie and estimation laide by the obseruation of his faith.*
- 3 *Confutation of Machiauels opinion.*
- 4 *Breach of faith a heinous crime.*
- 5 *Other mischiefes that spring out of Machiauels position.*
- 6 *To obserue faith is godly, honest, and profitable.*
- 7 *What we are to conceine of the Turkes falshood and periury.*



*Acbiauel amongst other vertues where- Princ. c. 18.*

with hee would adorne his imagined Prince, woonderfully commendeth disloyaltie in a great person, affirming that he ought not to make reckoning to obserue his treaties of peace or ought else he vndertaketh, at the least when his game is faire: and that he may at such a time without scruple of conscience, or other honest respect, violate his faith, breake the lawes of nations, and his oath. A thing questionlesse vnbesitting a magnanimous spirit, and which ought neuer to haue place among the actions of a Chrastian Prince, to the end he may not by so foule and dishonest a staine disgrace the residue of his vertuous operations. This makes me esteeme this axiom so lewd and detestable, that we should blush, so much as to imagine it, much lesse to propound it as a precept for Princes; who are not to professe other then Iustice and generositie. It is good for none but those whose case is desperate, and who respect not that their posteritie condemne them for men of foule and cauterized soules.

2 To say the trueth, no man can with reason gainsay, renowne and a good reputation, as well at home as abroad,

to be the most firme foundation of all principalitie. And what reputation can a Prince haue either among his owne people or strangers, if he be noted for a disloyall, vnfaithfull, and periurde person, one that stands neither to his word nor agreement?

3 *Machiavel* to conceale the fault he not ignorantly committeth, saith, that this is sometimes most requisite for the good of Princes affaires, since occasion once passed is irrecoverable. What more meere folly could he discover to his confusion, then in thus concluding, that a Prince is not to regard the bond of his faith, if the good of his estate present an occasion to violate it? Truly none at all: neither were it necessarie according to Gods lawes, or the carriage of humane affaires, that Christian Princes were of that minde; for it would prooue the direct course neuer to see but fire and sword amongst vs.

1539

4 Such as are good detest these opinions, as did heretofore *Frances* the first; who professing faith and honour, reiected such counsaile when the Emperour *Charles* the 5. about the establishment of the affaires of Flanders, passed thorow France, and vpon the Kings word, crossing his country came to Paris. That word this Noble Prince preferred before the greatest good that could betide his estate, if he would haue retained the Emperour, and constrained him to forgoe the places and estates he held in Lombardy and Italy, whereto the King pretended a right, which he often vnprofitably disputed, as did also *Henry* the second.

5 By the same reason a man may also say that sometimes it is well done to ransacke Churches, robbe Altars, oppresse innocents, and succour the wicked: for there is not any vice so detestable, or crime so hainous that sometime carrieth not with it a shew and colour of good, and pro-ueth not profitable to him which in due season performeth it; were it for nought else but because he attaineth the effects of his corrupt will. If that were not, should wee haue so many murderers, falsifiers, sacrilegious persons and  
men



men giuen ouer to all reprochfull vices ? if thereby they did not reape some temporall commodity ?

6 I will yet adde further, and maintaine it to the end, that for a man to keepe his promised faith, and be so accounted of by the world, is a worke of God and without comparison much better then to violate it and embrace such a damnable opinion as that of *Machiavel*, yea though the profit were immediat and such as might afford wherewithall to ballance his breach of faith and promise : Not to keepe touch with one is enough to incurre the suspicion and ill conceit of all ; neither is there any which will not thinke he doth God good seruice in performing the like towards all such Princes as shall take such courses ; which will yet farther administer matter for an other repentance, to see that when they shall tell or meane truth no man will beleue or trust them. I could illustrate this proposition with infinite examples, but I will content my selfe with that one of *Duke Valentine* sonne of Pope *Alexander* the 6. cited by *Machiavel*, as a perfect Captaine ; who without respect of truth, his oath, reuerence of religion, or honour, which is so charily to be preserved amongst men ordinarily, abandoned himselfe to all disloyalty, breach of faith, and whatsoever other wicked and traiterous courses ; so they caried with them some shew of present commodity. This man during the life of his father went thorow with certaine his designs, borne out rather by the Popes authority then any fortunate successe of his mischieuous attempts. After the death of his father it was quickly seene how smally durable are all such estates as are founded vpon deceit. For he found himselfe immediatly forsaken of his friends and pursued by his enimies ; so as more liuely to expresse what he came to, after he had most maliciously hatched & atchieued so high enterprises, he serued ( as they say ) but for a cipher, and was as one that had no being, leauing nought behind him but only the footsteps and a cursed memory of his wickednesse, which made his life and name infamous to all posterity.

*Ion. lib 8. hist.*

7 Some one will tell me that the *Turkes* haue done the like, and haue vsed all sortes of cunning, deceit and treachery, towards their neighbours, and that neuerthelesse they haue thrived by it. It is true, but the causes are different, and yet we see that the most disloiall amongst them were not the most assured in the forces of their trecheries. *Amurath* the second, *Mahymeth* the second, *Baiazeth* the second, *Selim* the second, were held the most subtile Princes of their race; but we must grant that if those their wicked proceedings thrived for a time, it was more through the coldnesse and dissentions of the Christians when they should haue reuenged and repelled their iniuries, then that we should therefore belecue that it is well done to proue periured and disloiall. *Amurath* the second made prooue of it to his cost, and hauing receiued an overthrow at the handes of *Ladislaus* King of Polonia, he speedily made peace with him and turned his forces against Caramania, where whilest he was busied, *Ladislaus* iudging (so pertwaded and backt by Pope *Eugenius*) that hee should not doe amisse to falsifie his faith with a Barbarous *Turke* of so insolent a nature, and so capital an enimie of Christendome as all breach of peace might seeme as a true performance thereof; resolved to make war vpon him on the sodaine, which proued so dangerous as *Amurath* was neere tumbling from the top of an high and glorious fortune to the lowest degree of misery; so as his estate was neuer more shaken and endangered; if the Christian army (which followed their victory) had not, as I haue said, disordered themselves: Whereupon the glory and triumph fell to the Infidels to the great misery and confusion of the Christians. *Selim* the second, hauing vnlooked for, attempted vpon the *Venetians* to the preiudice of his vowed faith pulled vpon his necke the forces of the league, & had too late repented himselfe if God in regard of our sinnes had not in such sort sealed vp the eies of the Christians as they could not see nor make their benefit of the gate his diuine Maiesty had set open to a more high enterprise then the losse they

At the Mountaine Hemus.

At Varna.

1444.

1570.

they receiued at *Lepanto*. *Soliman* that was held the most wise Prince of all the *Ottomans* (if wisdom be able to shine where there is no light of true faith and Christian beleefe) hauing vnderstood at such time as he caused his army by Sea to fall downe towards *Otturanto* the yeare 1537. that *Mercurin de Gatinaro* and the Citizens of *Castro* were made prisoners after they had surrendred the place contrary to promise, hee forthwith commanded that they should be released, saying that disloyaltie to violate their faith and word once passed, was not the meanes to win the hearts and likings of strange nations.

## CHAP. VIII.

That he hath beene alwaies serued  
in his wars by good and valiant  
Captaines.

- 1 *Whether an experienced Commander and rawe Souldiers:  
or experienced Souldiers and an vnskilfull Commander be the better.*
- 2 *The first best allowed and the reasons.*
- 3 *Examples heereof.*

1  T is ordinarily disputed amongst Souldiers and martiall men, which is the better, a good Captaine emploied about the conducting of an armie consisting of raw Souldiers, or an armie of old Souldiers committed to the command of a raw and vnexperienced Captaine.

2 As for me (if my opinion may carie credit amongst so many, sufficient to decide this question) I hold it better that a worthy and valiant Captaine should haue the charge of an armie of vntained men without experience, then that an armie of old Souldiers trained and beaten to the wars, should be recommended to a Captaine, yet a nouice and



vnskild in the profession of armes. The reasons proper for the maintaining of this proposition are so plaine to such as without being obstinate or passionate, in behalfe of either party, will entertaine them, as they are not to be gainsaid: for is it not much more fit and easie that a good Captaine make and fashion a campe of rawe Souldiers, then that good and experienced Souldiers prepare and fashion their Captaine to the conduct of an armie? who can without shame denie that an armie doth not rather obey the voice and command of their Captaine, then the Captaine of his armie? otherwise it were as they say, to set the cart before the horse.

*Male impera-  
tur cum vulgus  
regit duces.  
Senec. trag.*

1396.

1526.

3 Now we must come to such examples as may instruct and make cleere the truth of my proposition. If we will as we ought, examine how many times the Christians have beene ouerthrowne by the Turkes, we shall vndoubtedly finde, that it hath euermore hapned rather through want of experience, courage, sufferance, concord, and authoritie in the Commanders; then for any other default. So at the battailes of *Nicopolis*, for that such like Captaines did set light by the Turkes forces, and tooke not a sufficient suruey of them, they receiued a most shamefull ouerthrow, a woorthy reward of their weake experience, in not knowing how to fight with those barbarous nations, whom they might well thinke wanted neither skill nor valour. Did not *Lewes* king of Hungary by meanes of the Bishop of *Tomerea* (who brought him almost to the slaughter) endure the like disgrace, at the battaile of *Mogoria*, for want of experience in matter of warre, and of iudgement sufficiently to discouer the enemies forces, and the passages of the countrey where he was to buckle with him? In like sort was not the vnskilfulnesse of the Italians cause of that victorie the Turkes gained at *Grado*, who had then for their leader *Hömarbiay*, Generall of the Turkish armie? Also the yeare 1537. at *Exechium* (*Mahomet Iahiaoglis* being Gouvernour vnder *Soliman* of *Belgrad* and the frontiers of *Hungarie* in the time of king *John*) the great *Cazianer* losing

losing his courage, did he not abandon to spoile, death, and ruine a faire and strong armie, which he commanded for the Princes of Germany and Italy, some one troupe excepted, which dishonorably together with him saved themselves by flight? Also before this heauie losse, did not *Anthony Grumani* Generall of the Venetian armie faile of courage when with great aduantage he might haue charged the Turkes, and put them to the woorse? The *Sabel. En. 10.* very like want of experience and valour was seene in an *l. 9.* other Venetian Generall, who shamefully left the Ile of Negropont to the spoile of the enemy. To conclude, haue not the Christians beene so many times put to the woorse neere about Buda, for want of valiant and experienced Captaines, as it cannot without griefe be related? On the contrarie, the *Ottomans* haue neuer suffered misfortune of warre; at the least for lacke of authoritie, command, or wisdom in managing their armies: for they themselves haue in person conducted them, and beene present at all their high exploits and important enterprises by them atchieued. They haue likewise evermore committed the charge of their difficult actions and affaires of warre to the most valiant and experienced Captaines amongst them, whom they had formerly well knowen, trained vp, and exercised to such charges by infinite proofes of their courage and wisdom in most dangerous and difficult occasions. In summe, experience is that which perfecteth valor: The Turkish Emperors haue alwaies giuen to their Captaines ample power & commission freely to dispose of their most important affaires, wherein they haue bene thus happy that we cannot finde that euer such Captaines lost battaile for lacke of command or obedience; or that they euer for want of courage or experience in the arte military, made stay or question of their proceedings. Of all the *Basbas* that euer had the managing of matters of importance, & had greatest hand in the affaires of their Masters, *Acomet* was the chiefe (who serued *Mahomet* the 2. and added much to his greatnes by obtaining many glorious victories) insomuch

as he was no lesse feared then his Soueraign. To him *Sinam* may be ioyned who liued vnder *Selim* the first, and being slaine at the battaile of *Matarea* (wherein he wan the victorie for his Master) *Selim* said of him that the death of so worthy a man as he, was cause of such great griefe vnto him as it equalled the ioy he conceiued for so happy a victory: such also was *Barbarossa* that famous pirat, who for his many warlike acts wan the renoune of a valiant Captaine, and was most highly reputed of his Master *Soliman*, for whom he performed many memorable enterprises as wel by sea as by land. Hence we may gather that vndoubtedly a great Prince cannot doe worse then commit the charges of his wars, the dignities and conducts of his armies, to them which inioy his fauour but vnworthily: he should consider the deserts of others, & especially of such as with more sufficiencie would render an honorable account of so worthy an imploiment. We see it fall out oftentimes that for default of wel measured elections a Prince plungeth himselfe and his estate in a thousand dangers and confusions through the insufficiency of his vnskilful ministers: the examples of such infortunate euent would fill this volume if I would stand to relate all such as my memory presenteth vnto me. But omitting all I will only put you in minde of the Emperour *Charles* the fifth well known for most iudicious in all his elections, meruellous in his actions, mighty for the great number of his excellent Captaines bredde and trained vp vnder him; all which can witnesse the care he had in his choice, and in very deede they did him such seruice as by their meanes he enlarged his dominions with many rich Prouinces, adorned his scepter with most memorable victories, and his house with triumphes to his immortall glory.



## CHAP. IX.

That he hath made no skippe in his  
enterprises.

- 1 *Vnited vertue strongest.*
- 2 *The strength of kingdomes by their situation.*
- 3 *What it is to skippe in an enterprise.*
- 4 *Kingdomes preserued by the coniunction of their subiect  
prouinces.*
- 5 *Confirmation of the Roman Empire.*
- 6 *The meanes of establishing an Empire by confederacies.*
- 7 *The French as quicke in losing as in conquering countries.*
- 8 *We are not to indeauor so much to conquer as to keepe.*
- 9 *The Portugals and Spaniards distracted gouernment.*
- 10 *Industrie of the Ottomans in conquering.*
- 11 *An admonition to Christians.*
- 12 *Horror of the Turkes.*

I  Othing would be so strong as a point, if it were to bee found in nature; at the least if the rules of the Mathematicques be true as they be held, because being most simple, it cannot be corrupted either by inward beginnings, or outward causes; so is a body more induring and powerfull, the neerer it approacheth to the resemblance of a point, that is to say, the more it is vnited and compact in it selfe. And in very deede as nature vnable to bring to passe that all the world should be one only body, made it continued and ioining one part vpon another; and as to preserue this continuation, she in all she may opposeth *Vacuum*, which is onely able to corrupt and destroy her:

2 So estates become more durable, and of greater abilitie to maintaine themselves when they are (as I may say) sowed, linked, and bound together, the one helping to

entertaine and preferue the other. Hence we may gather that such prouinces as haue their situation trussed vp together in a round forme, are more strong and mightie then such as extend themselues in length: as for example, one may say of France in comparison of Italy, because this latter resembling a legge stretched out is lesse fit to defend it selfe then France, which is round, as her prouinces lie and are situate: whereby she is consequently not only more vnited in her forces then *Italy*, but also more nimble and able to maintaine herselfe then the other.

3 Now let vs come to our discourse and make it appeare what it is we vnderstand by this discontinuation, and that which we tearme to skip in our enterprises. It is properly when we regard not the contiguity (if I may so say) or neere adioyning of our estates; and that happeneth as often as we leaue an enemy behind vs, at one side of vs, or otherwise, in such sort, as he may crosse, cut off, beseege, or inclose vs when we so inconsideratly skip or stride; we may likewise saie that he truly skips who crosseth from one country to another so far distant, as by that time he hath finished his voiage, his strength failes him and his troopes proue so out of heart and tired, as they become vtterly vnprofitable. We may alledge for example that which befell the Emperours of *Germany*, the king of France and of England in their voiajes of the holy land, for the length of the iourney, the far distance of the country, the diuersity of the Climate, the change of the aire, and many other such like inconueniences, so tired and discouraged them by reason of the trauailes and miseries they had suffered vpon the way, as they could not attempt any matter of importance, or goe thorow with their enterprise according to their proiect: not vnlike a ball which stirreth not from the place where it is once setled, through want of that moving power which shouldASSE and raise it. So if these Princes at the first arriuall did afford any prooffe of their courage, valour, and likelihood of good fortune; the languishing of the principall motiue suddenly made them  
lose

lose their aduantages, and reduced the whole to tearmes vnwoorthy the merit of their holy intentions and trauels.

4 We must then allow that it is requisite for the preservation of estates, either that their prouinces touch and intertaine the one the other, or that their forces be of ability to maintaine themselves of themselves: for this continuation hath of it selfe such force and efficacie for the lasting and preservation of estates, as we see that common-weales and meane kingdomes haue thereby longer maintained themselves then great and rich monarchies. Wee may alledge for example the common-weales of Sparra and of Venice; of the kingdomes of Persia and France, whose rule hath much longer endured then that of the Sarazins, of the Mamelucks, or of other more mighty Empires. The cause proceedeth, as I haue said, of the vnion of that enter-tainment and coniunction of prouinces, abutting the one vpon the other, which is of such vertue and efficacie to giue strength and continuance to a monarchie, as it almost exceedeth conceit and imagination.

5 The Romans which saw wel enough that the inlarging of their Empires limits, trained after it a consequence of a necessary dispersing of their forces, endeuored by al means possible to reunite this body, augmented and made huge by their aduantageous conquests; reducing to their obedience and rule, all they got both by maintaining sufficient forces vpon the frontiers of their Empire or garrisons in places of importance, as also by establishing Colonies, and infranchising many strong townes, with bestowing on them the like liberties as the people of Rome enjoyed, by them tearmed *Municipia*. In other places also they instituted certaine fraternities and assemblies of people, with prerogatiues of the Romanes priuiledges, which they named *Conuentus*: Moreouer, they committed estates and intire kingdoms to the gouernment of certaine Princes held and esteemed as friends of the people of Rome. By these meanes ioyning them to their loue as well by gratifying them with their liberty and bounty, as with  
other



other priuiledges, honours and dignities, whereof they did partake in their towne as in right of Citizens: They rearmed these townes and people their confederates, and the Kings their friends. As for example in *Africke* they had *Massinissa*, and *Iuba*; in *Asia*, *Eumenes*, *Prusias* and the King of *Egypt*. In *Europe* those of *Marseilles*, *Aniun*, *Auergrnia*, *Rennes* and others; making account more to auaille themselves by such confederacies and amities then by meanes more strickt and seuer: so then power is established and continued either by our owne forces, or by annexing of the forces of our friends which serue vs as a continued rampart and conducteth vs out of danger euen into the country which we intend to invade, and that with so much the greater aduantage, when vpon some part it consisteth with the country of our confederates.

6 But because we are neuer able with good assurance (especially Princes amongst whom this is a tickle point) to maintaine so good intelligence, it is requisite if we will make this vse of an other, to make him confident either through the hope of participation in our conquests, or else by intimating vnto him (if he be our inferiour) an euident assurance in our proceedings, and such a plainnesse and integrity in all our other actions, as euen that may rid him of the distrust he might conceiue of being one day praied vpon and brought vnder by that insolencie which accompanieth the prosperitie of fortune, and may serue to stretch the conscience of a conquering Prince. After we haue in this manner framed an impression of our integritie in the heart of our neighbour, we may march in his countrey as securely as in our owne, and rest assured that we shall by him be furthered and assisted.

7 The French could neuer keepe any countrey by them conquered abroad, vlesse it were *Piemont* and *Sauoy*: for if one day they had gained a foote of land, they were enforced to forgoe it the next, no sooner winning it, but they lost it.

8 We commonly say, that there is no lesse vertue in him  
that

that keepeth them in him that getteth. I affirme that there is neede of more dexterity in keeping then in getting, for an amazement of the people we inuade, a rebellion in our behalfe, or any other such like sturre makes vs easily masters of that whereto we aspire; but to preserue what we get, we must maintaine a continuall counsaile which must haue all the parts thereto appertaining, as grauity of iudgment, ripe deliberation, nimblenesse to dissemble; industry ioyned with a daily heedefulnesse and patience to attend occasions. The French (which are reputed the most warlike nation vnder the sunne,) are but too sodaine; open, impatient and of too stirring a nature; for prooue you shall obserue that what they atchieue not when they first attempt, they almost neuer compasse it: all their boiling heat is soone exhaled and spent by the sodaine feruencie of their courage, which most commonly transports them beyond all moderation and aduice most requisite in what wee vndertake, without heeding the end for which they begā. This negligence together with their impatience hath made way to all the misfortunes which out of their countrie they haue induced: The voyage of the Terferas and certaine other attempts vpon the Portugales haue not long since confirmed this opinion, and made the wound of their unhappines bleede a fresh. Lews the eleuenth, a prince of an approued wisdom and cleare sighted in matters of estate, would neuer lend any care to the perswasions of sending an army into Italie or other remote parts; reiecting all such practises, as well for the reason formerly alledged, as because of the infidelitie which he thought to be in the *Italians*, and particularly in them of *Genoa*. If *Charles* the 8. his sonne, *Lewis* the 12. *Francis* the first, and *Henry* his sonne had inherited this their predecessors opinion, they had not with such excessiue charge, mishap, and misery attempted *Italy*.

9 Heere some one will obiect that neuerthelesse the dominion of the Portugals is of 90. yeares continuance or thereabout in the Indies, so far distant from the first spring



and originall. The like appeareth in the government of Philip King of Spaine spread and diuided in so many places aswell in Europe as in India. Surely it is not possible to imagine a greater distance then from *Lisbon* to *Ormuz*, *Goa*, *Malaca*, and *Ternate*, so as from Portugale to their farthest Conquests; there are no lesse then twentie thousand miles; and although they endeavour to ioyne these estates so seuered, by the neerenesse of sundry fortresses heere and there bestowed in the midway ( as *Zofala*, *Mohambique*, *Melinde*, which belongeth to a certaine King their Ally, besides other like meanes) yet all these are but weake sinewes long to sustaine the vnion of so far separated members. But it is Gods pleasure that by how much the foundations of this rule are more feeble and subiect to be shaken, by so much the more we should admire the omnipotency of his diuine Maiesty, whereby they are maintained, fortified, and protected. The dominion likewise of the King of Spaine is spread into so many parts of *Asia* ( especially by meanes of annexing the crowne of Portugale ) of *Afrike*, of *Europe*, and of the new found world, as there appeareth in this preservation a greater miracle then counsaile or humane prouidence, for in very deed to rule so many and so seuered nations differing in religion, manners and tongues without stirring from home, is it not a worke of heauen rather then of humane policy or discourse? God therefore which hath of his goodnesse made him owner of so many and so goodly countries, hath not denied him wisdome and counsaile to know how to order and maintaine them, as he doth, vnder his obedience.

10 The *Ottomans* haue ordinarily behaued themselves more iudiciously in this one part of conquering ( without inconsiderat skipping ) then in any other of their actions. For neither couetousnesse of enriching or enlarging their estate, nor the easinesse of attempting, nor the inticements of peoples insurrections, nor the thirst of reuenge ( which commonly makes Princes mighty in men and  
mony



mony, forget themselves when the maintenance of their authority & credit is called in question, especially perceiving the law in their hands to execute more readily then can particular persons ) nor any such like motives haue beene able, as I said, to induce the Turkes indiscreetly to skip or to ingage themselves in any enterprise far from home. Rather on the contrary they haue marched faire and soft from country to country, and deuoured ( as they continue still to doe ) all such as confine and are neighbours vnto them. Hence hath growen the consequence of so many happie victories, the benefite of so great and rich conquests ; the course of so easily preferuing what they haue gotten.

11 I haue said that for the most part they haue not inconsiderately skipped or ltrid in their enterprises, as the Christians doe and haue done : and as we see, when any of them haue taken such waies to greatnesse, the fruits and effects haue not prooued answerable to their proiect and promised fortunes. This vnhappinesse, common with the error founded vpon the reasons formerly alledged, ought hencefoorth to serue as an instruction to make vs become more wise and regardfull then we yet are, to the end that after we haue by an holy and vniuerfall amendment appeased the wrath of God, we may war against them with the same policies and aduantages as they haue practised in raising themselves to our cost and confusion. These examples also should admonish vs of what is to be feared, to wit, least failing to chastice & humble our selues, his diuine Maiesty inflict vpon vs a more seuerer punishment, then that we haue hitherto indured, and for this cause open a more large gate to those infidels vtterly to ruine and destroy vs.

12 Now lest any one should thinke I haue against reason held that the Turkes haue not, as we, forgotten thus inconsiderately to skip, I will recite certaine examples to that purpose. The first then that did it, was *Mahomet* the second, which vnforgottenly attempted *Italy*, *Soliman* per-

formed the like against the same country, after the enterprise of *Dix* in the Indies, which was undertaken the yeare 1537. then that of the yeare 1542. that of *Ormus* 1552. and finally vpon good grounds the attempting of *Malta*, which was so valiantly defended by the Knights of the order, as (next the honour due vnto the diuine Maiestie) all those braue Gentlemen, who with their grand Master *Parisor*, made it good against the Infidels, deserue to be consecrated to all praise, and to a most glorious and eternall memory.

## CHAP. X.

### That he hath not spent time vpon enterprises of small importance.

- 1 Get the greater, the lesse will follow.
- 2 The besieging of some small holde, may be the hinderance of the whole expedition, this exemplified.
- 3 The Turkes discretion in their expeditions and sieges.
- 4 The best course is, to become masters of the field.
- 5 Error in the siege of *Malta*.



**N**ature as wise and prouident, doth not busie her selfe about the birth of euery particular thing, but rather setteth her hand to the generation of the substance, which without any further paine, is afterward attended on by the accidents euery where inseparably accompanying her. In like sort a good and discreet Captaine in the carriage of his enterprises, should not aime at ought else but to conquer the places of importance; for of their consequence other inferior parts of the estate come tumbling in (as it were) of themselves, which as vnseparable accidents or qualities, vndoubtedly



vndoubtedly follow the first examples of greater moment, whereon dependeth and sub sisterh the others being.

2. We haue often seene, that a paltrie Sconce (either because of the naturall strength of the situation, thickness of the wall, goodnesse of the matter, couragious obstinacy of the defenders, or some other accident not foreseene or dreamt of, hath stopt the proceeding of a royall armie, and hath prooued it selfe as able to withstand the force thereof, as a citie greater, richer, and more peopled. And though we become after masters of such blocke-houses and small forres, yet that is no furtherance to a more important conquest; or helpe to the enterprise begun. We finde written that the Emperour *Maximilian*, because he to no purpose spent so much time about Asola (which he strined to subdue by the way, for the reputation and credit of the armie, he conducted to Milan) inconsiderately lost the occasion offered him to become Lord of that Dukedome; and performed not any thing after to the good of his affaires. The French also, after they had passed the Alpes in the time of *Lewis* the 12. thrined not in their attempts of the kingdome of Naples; hauing vpon an ill ground vndertaken Rocca-Secea, where they engaged both their honors and liues; for hauing besieged it certaine daies, and giuen the assault in vaine, they lent leasure and courage to the Spaniards, to bethinke themselves: made their powers lesse valued for so badde a beginning, and discouraged the people for euer attempting any thing in their behalfe, as no doubt they had done if they might haue seene a fortunate and better digested proceeding then theirs was, the name of the Spaniard being then odious amongst them. This fault made the Spaniards so bold as to say, that the rest of the kingdome was reserved for them, and not for the other, who had so ill husbanded their opportunities. In the yere 1556. holding on the said designe for the conquest of Naples, did they not vainely spend time, money, their forces, and paines at Ciuitella, to the ruine of that goodly armie which *Henry* the 2. of



France sent thither vnder the command of the Duke of *Guyse*: who was neuerthelesse a valiant and discreet Capitaine, and who had perhaps done better if his particular interest, or the ouermuch trust he reposed in the Popes Nephewes, had not blinded him: Other reasons may be alleaged for the small good this armie did the king, who had conceiued of it great and honorable hopes; but I will referre them to such as write that Historie. The Spaniards also haue thrice attempted the Ile of Gerbes, and euerie time lost a goodly and flourishing armie, able to haue performed a farre greater matter then they could hope for by getting the henroust (if I may so tearme it.) The year 1560. after the battell of Lepanto the armie of the confederates, 1572. which was then in the Leuant, hauing their forces augmented by the arriual of *Don Iohn*, made *Ochiallo* Generall of the Turkish armie, retire to Modon, as fearing those of whom he had made triall the yeere before. If they had put him to it as they should haue done, no doubt but they had found him dismaide, and hardly bestead how to defend as well the fortresses as his armie by sea: for he had not left aboue 60. gallies, to garde the hauen, and had bestowed the rest of his forces one yeare. But when he sawe they went to besiege Nauaria neere Modon, and that they had no saying to him at his landing, as he feared they would, he tooke heart at grasse, and after made a iest of the designs of the Christians armie, which he in such sort held plaie and entertained, as it performed nothing woorthie such a power assembled immediately vpon the good successe of a former victory.

3 The Turkes in what concerneth the ordering, commoditie, and assurance, in their enterprises, surpass (to say the very trueth) all other nations for well managing of warlike affaires: for they neuer attempted place that the designe thereof was not farre more woorth then the paine they employed about it; or that the enterprise did not deserue the like or more expence: carying themselues thus, they are by the effect of their enterprises growne mightie, for

for force and meanes, and haue opened the way to the encrease of their greatnesse and successe of their affaires: which in such sort assuring (wherein they haue aimed principally at profit) they haue more and more weakened our forces, not without an euident consequence of extreame danger: when they tooke in hand the conquest of *Cypres*, they were wise enough not to bestow time in taking *Cerynes* a fortres almost impregnable. They foresaw that it was of small moment, at the least not to import much in that they intended to compasse, but they rather directed their course and indeuours against *Nicosia*, as against the principall place of all the Iland, whereabouts they so well imploied their paines as they caried it. By which conquest it was found that *Cerynes* soone followed, (as of a necessary consequence) the disaister of their capitall towne.

4 In all the executions of their hardy designs they haue alwaies at the very first beene Masters of the field, which hath so furthered them as thereby the strongest holds of the country, which they could not otherwise haue gotten but by force of armes, haue beene surrendred vp vnto them. Such fortresses being vnable long to hold out when all hope of succour is cast off by the opposition of so strong and mighty armies as theirs are.

5 At the war of *Malta* it seemeth God did dull them, ouerthrowing the policies and practises which are ordinary with them. For the *Bassa* (who would needes begin with *S. Hermes* because it seemed commodious to stop vp the hauen and after to get the suburbs where the knights made their aboade) consumed much time about it, and lost the better part of his best souldiours. In the meane space the season of the yeare spent so fast, and the resolutions and valour of them in the towne prooued such, as in the end he grew confounded, perceiuing too late how slenderly he had preuailed, and that he must necessarilie begin a new with the principall place, which he should haue at the first attempted, if God (as I said) for the good of Christendome, had not blinded him in his enterprisc.

1560.



*Dorgut Raiz* Vice-roy of Argiers, who was to second this *Basha* in all his warre, and to whom he was commanded to communicate his designs as soone as he should arriue; (which he did some few weekes after his first setting downe and beginning to batter) soone discovered his error, and could vpbraide him with it, telling him he shuld haue gone right on to the fountaine, without stooping to the shallow streames. So as after the taking of *S. Hermes*, they did not performe or attempt any matter of importance, but as men tired and discouraged, they trust vp baggage and baggage to be gone as soone as the succour appeared before Malta; these leauing behinde them the memorie and testimonie of their shame, and ill grounded aduise, and the knights of their honour and valour.

## C H A P. XI.

That he hath laid hold on occasions.

- 1 *Occasion pourtraied.*
- 2 *It is to be obserued.*
- 3 *Examples of the Ottomans diligence in laying hold on occasions offered by the Christians.*
- 4 *The difficulties of a defensine and offensine league.*
- 5 *The false guesse of the selfe-ruine of the Turkish Empire.*
- 6 *The weaker Princes are easily subdued by the mightier.*
- 7 *Other occasions offered by the Christians to forward the Turkish greatnesse.*



He ancient Romans signified vnto vs by the picture of occasion (whom they adored as a goddesse, putting wings to her feete, supported with a bowle; behinde bald, and before hairie) that we must bee diligent to apprehend her when shee presenteth her-selfe, and not in any case to let her slippe: considering that if she once escape vs, she leaueth vs nought but a vaine and vexing repentance.



2 And to say the truth, in all a mans actions. There is nothing more commendable then to be able to make the best vse of occasion and especially in mater of war. In as much as he that knoweth his aduantage, how to take it and to carry the time before him is furnished with the principall adorning vertue of a Captaine, occasion being no other thing, then an opportunity that the time more by accident then prouidence offereth vnto vs, for the well performing of what we haue in hand, and for the abstaining and well comming off from a designe vnseasonably attempted, as the euent of the aboue mentioned interprise may sufficiently witnesse. This is that these Infidels haue studied at such times as God hath made them his instruments to afflict and chastice vs, and this is that we ought to doe against them, for the glorifying of Gods diuine Maiesty, not yet for ought I see pleased with vs. In a word all such as haue enlarged their estates haue either inoyed or hammered out some notable occasion which they wisely laid hold on, and haue consequently reaped the fruites of an vnusuall aduancement. The Grecian and Romane histories can teach vs this, but I omit them as too far from vs, to betake my selfe to such as are more familiar and neere vnto vs. *Pepin* and *Charlemaine* were by the Romish church called into Italy: the like was *Charles* of *Aniou* into the kingdome of *Naples*. Those of *Aragon* were invited to *Sicily* by the people and to the conquest of the kingdome of *Naples* by *Queene Ione* the second: The house of *Austria* is at this day enriched with many goodly kingdomes brought them by their alliance and mariages: one whereof subiected vnto them the Lowe-countries, the other gaue them Spaine with her apurtenances, the third for a perfect raising of this howses gretnesse, annexed vnto it the crowne of Portugale and the east Indies, so as if we neerely consider humaine casualties, we shall finde that force without occasion is fruitlesse or smally auailable.

3 The *Ottomans* haue not attained to the height of so mightie an Empire but by such occasions as we haue too

H

carelesly,

735.

800.

1263.

1476.

1579.

The Christians  
ministred occa-  
sion to the Otta-  
mans of their  
owne ouer-  
throw  
1 The first oc-  
casion: of the  
sloth of the  
Emperours  
of Greece.

2. Occasion:  
ennie of the  
Emperours of  
Greece.

About anno  
1290.

3. Occasion: the  
ciuill wars of  
the Emperors of  
Greece.  
Iohn Paleolo-  
gus.

carelessly, vnworthily, and as of our free bounty, presen-  
ted vnto them. The first spring from the negligence and  
couardice of the Emperours of Greece who through their  
extreame lasciuiousnesse and sloath (*Sardanapalus* and *He-  
liogabalus* like) became deformed monsters of all loosenes  
and riot: So as abandoning themselues to all voluptuous-  
nesse and excesse, that martiall vigor which had till then  
honored and preferued them, began by little and little to  
decline amongst them, and next amongst their people,  
(these framing their manners after their gouernours) which  
prepared meanes and occasions for the *Turke* to set foote  
one while, into some inferiour prouince and ere long into  
a mighty kingdome. The second occasion which shewed  
it selfe fauorable and proper for the *Turkes* was when the  
Grecians vpon a malicious enuy began to disfaueur and  
oppose the designs of the Christian Princes which had  
by league vnited themselues for the conquest of the holy  
land, and so ill aduised they were as insteade of seconding  
them they crossed them in all they might, to the end to stop  
the fortunat proceeding of their woorthy armies, not hee-  
ding poore soules that they thereby befriended the *Turke*;  
who did but watch his opportunities. For they well obser-  
uing this fault, and temporising the occasion which after  
appeared, failed not to spie when they might surprise them  
(as they did) all beaten, tired, and disunited in force and  
meanes, whereupon it finally insued that the Christians  
were vtterly expelled Iury, by the *Turkes*, who after tur-  
ned their armies against the Greekes themselues and berea-  
ued them of their Empire. These were mischiefes and  
wounds by them well deserued, neither are they to be pit-  
tied but so far forth, as they haue bread the calamities and  
ruines which haue and doe still continue to afflict Chri-  
stendome.

The iarres and diuisions of the Princes of Greece mini-  
stred the third time an occasion to the Turkish thriving  
greatnesse: This hapned at such time as the Emperour of  
Constantinople was so ill aduised, as to craue the aide of

*Amurath*



*Amurath* the first to defend him. This Prince which lay still in waite, willingly sent his troupes, not to succour, but to discover the country for the better advancement of his designs; and in very deed the souldiers returning from that voiage, deliuered so aduantageous reports of the riches, pleasantnesse, and fruitfulness of that country, painting it out vnto him so abounding in all commodities necessarie for the life of man, as he forthwith resolved to attempt it, so as not long after without bidding, he in person passed the Streight, and so well husbanded the occasion to settle himselfe in Europe, as since his successors haue there made the principall seate of their Empire. The diuorce and separation of the Greeke church from the Romanaine, prepared a large way for the fourth occasion, embraced by the Turks, more aduantageously to ouertop vs: since this diuision was a meane to distaste and allay the courage of the Princes of either partie, neither hath it euer since beene possible to reconcile or vnite them by any good or firme intelligence, so as remaining in this sort diuided, they haue neuer beene able to enterprise ought woorthy Christian pietie, or the greatnesse of their powers and monarchies; thereby to cut off and overthrow (as they might and ought) the proceeding of the common enemy of Christendome; who getting by his negligence, scope and libertie, is growne greater to our vniuersall hurt, which those princes haue euermore fostered; a disease now by their obdurate diuision growen remediless. This euill hath prooued the more lamentable because of the discord amongst other Christian Princes which refuse to make their benefit of others calamities, or to acknowledge them as corrections comming from the hand of God.

1363.

4. Occasion:  
the separation  
of the Greeke  
Church from  
the Roman.

5. Occasion:  
the Turkes aide  
called into Italy.

This mischief grew greater at such time as some Potentates of Italy inconsiderately called the Turke to their succour, shewing him the way into our seas farther then was conuenient. In this regard our portes stood open vnto them, they entred and conuersed with vs as with friends and alliats, a thing most abhominable before God and



1498.

1540.

1543.

man, and of most dangerous consequence. And to the end I be not held an outlasher, I will reckon some of those that haue so ouershot themselues. *Alfonso* the second king of Naples, and *Lodonick Sforza* duke of Milan, were those that brought in *Baiazet* the second: that against the French, this against the Venetians. *Isabell* Queene of Hungarie craued aide likewile of *Soliman*, against *Ferdinand* king of the Romans. *Francis* the first of France, and *Henry* the second that succeeded him, did not onely let in the Turkish power into our seas, but suffered them also to land at Nice and in Corsica, leading captiue at their returne, an infinite multitude of poore Christians, (without respect of amitie, age, or sexe, which they snatched vp in those places and along the Adriatick coasts.

6. occas.  
the plurality of  
the Christian  
Princes.

The sixth occasion obserued and embraced by the Turkes, may be said in my opinion to proceed from the consideration they haue had of the pluralitie of Christian Princes, supposing (as it is true) that it could not be without that iealousie and suspicion which ech man particularly conceiueth of his owne estate, ranke, and dignitie, and and so the whole being deuided into diuers gouernments, it must follow the parts should be more feeble and scantied of meanes to vndertake against him: since (as we haue saide) vertue vnited in one entire body, is alwaies more strong then separated into many parcels. That which is woorthie, is, that in this diuision of Monarchies, the ambitious thirst of greatnesse, hath taken dangerous footing amongst Princes, and hath bred (as by a necessarie consequence) discord, separation of willes, diuersitie of designs, and varietie of pretences, of all which partialities, hath sprung suspicion, the common plague amongst princes. This suspicion like a canker hath contaminated the vnion and rid the meanes how to knit and establish a holy league and confidence amongst them for a defensiue or offensiue war.

4 Now to make a defensiue league against the Turke is in these daies a hard matter in so much as the princes of Christendome

Christendome are so far from one another, and some especially from the enemy, as like men out of danger they weigh it not esteeming themselves most assured: And to undertake to establish an offensive league is no lesse difficult seeing the profit of their conquest cannot be drawne to a proportionable equality, it may be also euery man feares the greatnesse of his companion ( although neuer so much his partner for aide and common association ) but aboue all he that hath the most commodious hauens or his Prouinces most proper for the manning of the war. Or else he who can better maintaine his conquests would proue the most suspected and malignant. These considerations hinder them from vniting and assembling themselves as they ought for the common good.

5 Moreouer euery one flattereth himselfe that time and the worlds ordinarie change will breede ruine and alteration in the estate of the *Ottomans*, and settle their affaires without being constrained to expose themselves to danger, trauell, and charge.

6 Another reason and inconuenience may yet be alledged that each of these princes being weake in respect of the other they cannot so courageously resolue to undertake what were profitable and necessary for them; whence it groweth that the feebleness of their strength is yet made more feeble by this irresolution; so as a mighty power charging them they shal remain subiect to the discretion of the indiscreet enemy: by these means the lords of the seuerall parts of Lombardy became the pray of the *Venetians* who subdued them with as much facility as resolution; But had there pulle when they attempted the state of *Milan*, vtmost limit of their power, dominion, and conquests. After the same sort also the French in time past brought vnder all the Prouinces of *Gaul*, but when they would enter the confines of Spain, the opposition of that neighbour-greatnesse stopped their course and was a rampart to defend them from further proceedings. In the very like manner the *Turkes* hauing deuoured all the Princes of Greece,

1408.  
1412.  
1438.

*Macedonia*, and *Bulgaria*, *Servia* attempting the inuasion of *Hungaria*, they had their hands full, since the valour of these Kings and people (so fashioned, hardned and enured, of a long time to the wars as they were the better able to make head against them) discovered it selfe to be greater then the consideration of their indifferent estate could well beare, as witnesseth the exploits of *Ladislaus* and *Mathias Coruin*, who found the Turkes play to their cost. But so soone as those Kings and people did forgoe this first valour and suffered the exercise of armes to degenerat, *Soliman* ouercame them both at *Belgrade* and at *Mogacia*. After the Turks had gone thus far, they met with that bar of the house of *Austria* seconded by the German forces, and supported by the power of the king of Spaine; who shewed himselfe alwaies fearelesse of the *Turkish* forces: As for the *Venetians* they haue euermore (backt with the Popes and the Spaniards power) behaved themselves most honorably: one happinesse there is that those places of Christendome which border neere vpon the Turke were neuer in more mighty hands, nor had euer so few Princes to rule them, as at this day: whence groweth an infallible consequent that they are more easily defended and maintained, especially hauing that particular coniunction of the power of Spaine, which is such as the Turke cannot stir without incurring an apparant danger; It being manifest that besides that the king of Spaine is of ability without feare to resist him, he can also with his owne forces curbe him and bring him to reason. So as the Turke awed by so mighty a king, will not, as he was wont, so soone bend his forces against the Christians his neighbours. The Muscouit on the one side, and the kings of *Polonia* and *Persia* on the other, are of such power and courage, as they will alwaies make the same of their particular forces, to be both respected and feared.

7 Occasion:  
the diuersity of  
opinions in Re-  
ligion.

7 The diuersitie of opinions in matter of religion, haue made way to the seuenth occasion, haue disunited the courages, spent the forces of the Christians, & haue made them



them rise vp in armes one against an other. In the meane time the Turke getteth footing, groweth great in sight of all men, and is become a terror to Christian Princes.

Disloyall and traiterous Renegades or Apostates, are those which haue discouered to the Turkes the Christians secrets, haue acquainted them with the aduantages of landing and inuading, haue beene guides to their armies into the very hearts of our richest countries, and haue opened the doore of the eight occasion.

8 Occasion: treason and disloyaltie.

But for the ninth, let vs consider what subtilties they haue practized, and whereon that hath beene principally grounded. I am of opinion, that the better to order their affaires, and seize vpon the Christians with more security, their leagues, treaties of peace, and suspensions of armes, passed betweene them and our Princes, haue beene their greatest furtherances: for the Turkes neuer warred with anie Christian Prince or Infidel either to defend their owne estate, or with hostilitie to assaile an others, but they first of all made their countrey sure against the power of their neighbours, but aboue all, such as (seeing them elsewhere busied) had meanes to disquiet their affaires, inuade their territories, and assaile them at vnawares. The peace they haue so long maintained, with the Polonians can testifie as much: Againe the quiet they haue suffered the *Venetians* to inioy for these many yeares sufficiently bewraieth with what care they handle this businesse. The continued peace they keepe with the French teacheth vs likewise with what prouidence and wisdom their matters are caried; to the end not to receiue any incombrance or interruption by meanes of strange enmities, at such time as they proceed in their enterprises; They take truce with the Emperour alwaies to their aduantage; and lately intending to war vpon Persia they dealt for a suspension of armes with the King of Spaine, so as making all sure on one side they in a trice assaile the other, heereby so well playing their parts, as hauing the law in their hands they remaine as arbitrators of peace and war, pursuing alwaies

9 Occasion: the Turkes peace with some Christians, to warre with others.

waies the course of their destinies with an aduantage too great vnworthy and preiudicious to the Princes of Christendome; whose greater part is so awed by their forces, as they haue often chosen to enter into conditions of a dishonest peace or truce though neuer so vnassured, rather then to expose themselves to the danger of their mighty armies: not heeding that thereby they haue lost many faire occasions of doing good vpon them: whereof we neede not seeke farther for examples then now that the King of *Persia* keepeth them in continuall war (at least if such newes as comes thence be true) and that he hath lately giuen them an ouerthrow neere *Taurijs* of aboute foure score thousand men. Which if it be so, what better occasion can you desire (ô ye Princes of *Christendome*) to set vpon them and reuenge the dishonour of our passed iniuries? Can it be otherwise but that in their former incounters and in this last they must haue lost the flower of their captaines and choice souldiours, and is it possible that the swelling pride of their command and greatnesse should not shortly vndergoe some change and decrease if you will intertain the occasion which God offereth you? ô but you sleepe and are altogether vnprovided to assaile them. They are our sins that hinder vs and haue bred the disorders of ciuill wars which disquiet France and the Low-countries, with such obstinacie and cruelty as these Princes haue worke enough to order their owne affaires: their neighbours in the meantime hauing their eares filled with the noice thereof, looking what will become of such sturs and fearing lest the fire which so cruelly burneth their neighbours house, should fasten vpon theirs, which makes them stand vpon their guard to keepe out such broiles & disorders. In the meantime the Turke wanteth no time to recouer his losses; and to laugh at oure inconsiderate follies; follies indeede for vs, but wisdome for him. It is a maruelous matter to consider with what succes and aduice he hath quieted his neighbours, in such sort as he hath beene neuer knownen to haue had two quarrels in hand at one time. Imitating  
heerein



heerein the wisdom of the Romans who had an especial care not to haue two enemies to deale with at once, but if they assailed one, they tooke order by deuce and friendly meanes that the other were lookers on, or associates in their trauailes. *Scdm* the first, which warred with the Persians, so ordered the rest of his estate, as during all the time he was imploied that way, the *Souldan* of Egypt neuer disturbed him : his sonne *Amurath* continuing the same enterprise, neuer receiued let of any Christian potentate.

1514.

The designes of the Princes of Europe, & the wars they haue so long and so wilfully maintained one against the other, haue afforded the Turks a large passage for the tenth occasion to benefitt themselues by their obstinacies & diuisions ; neither haue they omitted nimbly to lay holde on it to some purpose for the good of their affaires. What enmities were euermore cruelly exercised with fire and sword then those our ancestors and we our selues haue seene betweene France and Spaine ? What malice was euer more deeply rooted then that of the two Kings ? What nations are there in the world more mighty or more valiant then these are ; and hence let vs consider what profit, what comfort would haue redounded to Christendome, and what fearefull ruine to the *Turke*, if by some holy league they had beene vnited ; such vndoubredly as there should haue beene no memory of them, whereas they are now most mighty, and most dreadfull. If we will descend to particulars, was there euer Prince that had better meanes to conquer the *Turke* then *Charles* the fifth ? For besides his valour, inuincible courage, and other notable parts which shined in him, he had sufficient force to execute his enterprises : he was followed by Captaines of incomparable vertue, his souldiers were most resolute, his people and Prouinces were all most desirous of so holy a war, he had hauens and roades fit wherein to harbour his ships, and in a word he had whatsoeuer was necessary, but how ? He was alwaies constrained to haue an eie behinde him, to stand vpon his gard, because of his neighbours who spared

1536.

10 Occasion :  
Christian Prin-  
ces warring one  
vpon an other.




not to molest him as soone as he did but once aime at so holy an interprise. King Philip his sonne hath met with the like incombrances : so as we may well say our sinnes haue ministred occasions enowe to the Turkes to assaile vs with such aduantage, as it hath beene an increase and establishing to his estate, we alwaies shrinking at the cruell shocke of his mighty forces. Amongst all the *Ottomans Amurath* the first was the most diligent to hunt after, and embrace occasions, who ( as we haue already deliuered ) sent his supplies to the Emperour of constantinople, passed the straights in person and got into his hands the two Castles. *Baiazet* the first, his sonne shewed himselfe nolesse politicke and prompt to discouer his aduantages, patient to attend his occasions, and diligent to gather the fruits where-with his hopes presented him.

## C H A P. XII.

That he hath behaued himselfe with  
nimblenesse and celeritie vp-  
on his occasions.

- 1 *The fortune of warre consisteth not in discerning but in the use of occasion.*
- 2 *Celeritie in wars most expedient.*
- 3 *The Turkes readinesse and wisdom in that kinde.*
- 4 *Furtherance of this celeritie.*
- 5 *Impediments of the Christians in their expeditions.*
- 6 *Treasure requisite.*
- 7 *Exact obedience in Captaines and Souldiers and an obseruation of militarie discipline.*
- 8 *Strength and abilitie of men and horse.*
- 9 *Examples of the Turkes celerity.*
- 10 *In their sea-actions and their order.*
- 11 *Defects of the Christians shipping.*



1 Because this Chapter, in regard of the continuance of the matter in handling, is but as one dependencie and coniunction with the former, we will still make vse of this word *Occasion*, heeretofore discoursed vpon, as of a table wherein is represented all whatsoever our forefathers haue conceited of it; and what we ought to admit thereof: following this path we are to remember that who in time laieth not hold on occasion, shall neuer more inioy a like time to recover it with the like commoditie of wel doing as he once had, if he had knowne how to entertaine it as hee ought. To discover then the opportunitie of affaires, is not al that is required: That which most importeth, is to serue our *Peg.lib.3.c.26.* turnes with it at an instant, when it presenteth it selfe, to guide our intentions to that perfection we aime at.

2 Celeritie is an especiall matter in all affaires of importance, but aboue all in the warres, wherein it is more necessarie then in any our actions. Because (as saide *Selim* the first) the least delay we therein vse, turneth to a grosse error, especially since it bereaues vs of the commoditie and advantage offered to put in execution, what we had wisely and with studie determined: *Hannibal* a woorthy and renowned captaine, was noted of slownesse, not in resoluing but in embracing his occasions of victory which might haue assuredly established his affaires. That great *Pompey* was likewise subiect to the same imperfection, which did vtterly vndoe him. In a word, no motion wanting speedinesse, can be of much force, or produce woorthy effects: Violent agitations loose alike their force with their swiftnesse, but such as are naturall attaine it, and fortifie themselves in it.

3 This is that the Turkes know well enough how to practise, fashioning themselves to quicknesse, nimblenesse, habilitie, and to a certaine store of whatsoever may seeme necessarie to that purpose, so as their promptnesse and

forecast hath neuer omitted the occasions presented vnto them without reaping the fruites and glory thereof.

4. But some one will say, that it is requisite for the suddainnesse of occasion that many things relie in the power of him that will follow this course. I grant it, for they indeed who will fitly make vse of such aduantage, must be alwaies in armes, and heerein also the Turke surpasseth vs, for he continually entertaineth so many souldiers, as it were hard to take him vnprovided, or to finde him (when need requireth) without a mightie army, which serueth to hearten him, and to awake his courage: but aboue all, he hath so great a number of horse ordinarily in a readinesse, as that is but too sufficient to make him proudly humour his owne will; so as thought and execution are in a manner one with him. This is yet farther accompanied with a powerfull commoditie which addeth facillitie to his promptnesse; and this is, that his horse and foot are lightly armed, and without incombrance of luggage, so as by this meanes he more easily assemblETH his troupes, ordreth them, and conducteth them wheresoeuer he pleaseth, without distinction of time. Againe, sobrietie and sparing (familiar among his souldiers) make much to the aduancement of his enterprises, contenting themselues, as they do to drinke water and eat rice and salted flesh, which they reduce into powder, so as euery one carrieth with him his prouision almost for a moneth, and when that faileth, they liue by the blond of their horses, which they salt themselves, like as doe the Muscouites and Tartars.

5. On the other side, when our souldiers march, they must haue such store of munition follow them, to their so strange confusion and hinderance, as they are neuer able to goethorow speedily with any notable attempt. This bringeth a twofold let to their enterprises. The first in their prouision, which in the vnmeasurablenesse thereof is neuer made in due time. The second, in the conuoy thereof, neuer so well ordered as it ought, whereof the euent of the enterprise of *Exechium*, is but too true a testimonie, the souldiers



souldiers then suffering more in regard of the famine and difficultie of conueying victuals vnto them, then of the enemies forces. Whole attempt had beene vnprofitable if the campe had not beene disordered by this inconuenience, whereby the souldiers became halfe dead for hunger, and grew so feeble, as the courage to defend themselves vtterly failed them. Which the General of the Turkish armie foreseeing, waited till such time, as the famine had brought them low, and made them strengthlesse, that he might vpon their enforced retrain assaile them behinde, and so wearie them with continuall skirmishing as they should at length chace and ouerthrow themselves, as indeed it came to passe. I remember I haue heard one worthie to be credited, say to this purpose; that when *Emanuel Philibert* Duke of Sauoy, deceased, was Generall of the armie in Flanders, he found no difficultie in the wars more important then the discommoditie of proportioning and carriage of necessarie prouision as he had oftentimes approoued. On the contrarie, it may be said to the Christians shame and confusion, that neuer any of the Turkish armies were knowen, through such default, to suffer extremitie or to be disordered.

1538.

*Qui frumentum necessariumque com-  
meatum non  
preparat vin-  
citur sine ferro.  
Lin. l. 3. c. 26.*

1557.

6. Let vs now come to the point of sodaine execution, and to the instruments thereof, and let vs dwell somewhat thereupon. I finde the most necessarie and profitable is to haue alwaies store of money in our coffers: and that is a hard matter, especially for such as are not prouident, and that in all things so pamper themselves as the Christians doe; but not for the Turke, for he hath (when and what he will) in store to serue his need for the warres; and for whatsoeuer belongeth thereto. This is the sinew of warre, and the onely meanes to hasten forward occasion, and attaine (as he doth) to a happie end of his enterprises, but at his returne home, he obserueth a barbarous and insolent course of rembourning his charge: After he hath performed what he vndertooke, he repaieth himselfe by new impositions, whereto he enforceth his subjects to contribute:

This to him is easie: but to vs the most difficult materiall point is the procuring of money: for the greater part of Christian Princes are so bad husbands and of so small fore-caste, that they haue scarce one crosse in store: and are alwaies at the borrowing hand; or enforced to pawne their lands and demaines. And though the Christians be not so couetous as the Turkes, yet they are of so good a holdfast, as no small time will serue to draw money from them, so as while that is doing, occasion hath alreadie turned her backe and left vs nought, but the shame and sorrow of our enterprises ill successe and effect. And if it chance that we hold on our courses, it is with such headlong rashnesse and ill aduice in all we doe, but particularly in prouiding of armes, horse, munition, and other necessaries, as all being performed out of season, there is neither the forwardnesse, the array, the election, the abundance, the resolution, nor the well disposing of matters which would otherwise haue beene, and which we see to be in our aduersaries.

7 There is another thing which addeth much assurance to the Turkes designs, and makes them more easily to execute: and this is the incredible obedience of the Captaines towards their Generall, and of the souldiours towards their Captaines and such is the loue amongst them as there is no danger or difficulty (be it neuer so great) which they will not easily ouercome, so willingly they performe what is inioyned them. It was neuer heard that any reuolt or mutiny stopt or slacked the course of their conquest.

8 They haue yet another most considerable aduantage and that is the strong constitution of their men, spirit and speed of their horse. Where on the contrary our forces dare scarce bouge vnlesse they be backed and strengthened by forraign succors either *Almines* or *Switzers*, people faint and of little courage vpon a sodaine and vnexpected action, as being framed of a dull and slow mettall seruing for nought but to make good the intire body of a battaile, and

be



be vnto it as a solide and vnmoueable rampart. Thein-  
 counters they haue had with the Turke at *Buda* and else-  
 where haue taught vs how vnprofitable they are & of how  
 slender effect for the speedy and happy aduancement of  
 the affaires of Christendome in those parts: Morcouer the  
 Turkes horse are of more speede and strength then ours:  
 the spanish Genet is indeede nimble and full of Spirit, but  
 wanteth strength and breath: Contrariwise the horse of  
 Germany is able and strong but tender withall and not rea-  
 dy vpon the hand, so as he is more proper to make a stand  
 and defend then to assaile, skirmish, or giue the chace.  
 The *Napolitane* is good and strong but of such a nimble-  
 nesse as is not held for perfect speede, on the other side  
 the enemy hath the *Hungarian* good for seruice, the *Bar-  
 bary* horse of incredible swiftnesse, the *Valackian*, the *Tur-  
 kish*, and the *Moore* almost hard for induring of trauaile and  
 well breathed, so as we may conclude that he inioyeth  
 whatsoeuer is necessary for the war, better, more redy, and  
 in greater aboundance then we, and that this is it which  
 makes him speedily and with aduantage, to serue his turne  
 with all occasions which present themselves.

9 There are so many examples of this aduantageous ce-  
 lerity in their actions as they are almost innumerable; but  
 I will only note two or three which may seeme in a manner  
 prodigious so admirable hath beene their successe. *Amu-  
 rath* the second hauing intelligence of the great forces lea-  
 uied by *Ladislaus* King of *Hungary* ( with whom he had  
 formerly concluded a peace ) with an intent to ouerrunne  
 him, being then busie in the wars of *Caramania*; he so-  
 dainly quitted that interprise, and with such maruelous  
 speed crossed all the *Helespont* as in seuen daies he arriued at  
*Varna* with fower score thousand men. In like manner *Sche-  
 der Bassa* imploied by *Baiazet* the second to diuert the at-  
 tempt of the *Venetians* vpon *Milan*, came with such extra-  
 ordinary speed as he appeered in the territory of *Treniso*  
 before they could haue newes so much as of his departure,  
 lesse of his arriual in those parts. *Selim* the first marched so  
 speedily

1542.

1444.

1498.

1516.



speedily from *Cesaria* to *Aleppo*, crossing the mountaine *Aman* with his army and artillery, as he came vpon the *Souldan* before he dreamt of him supposing him to be as then rather vpon his way to encounter the Persian then to attempt him.

10 This particular dilligence of the *Ottomans* is not to be limited all only with their land wars: they haue performed as much by sea, so vigilant and wary haue they shewed themselues in exalting the honour of their names, and of their great estate, by them maintained euen vnto this day: And since they are so incredibly nimble and aduised in maritime exploits, I hold it not from the purpose to touch briefly the order they obserue in assembling their forces. They reiect the vessels and ships of great burden as over-heavy and vnwealdy if the wind faile them, rather hindering then furthering him that conducteth them. Their Gallies and Gallions are speedy, well-manned and well-appointed.

11 Wee on the contrary drag with vs a great number of ships and Gallions as our best strength and choice prouision, but they are in prooffe the cause of such incombrance to the seruice in hand, as we for the most part waste the season vnprofitably and spend our oportunities in rigging and attending them; being also oft times enforced to disorder our Gallies, to the end these great cartes may keepe with vs. Hence groweth yet another discommodity, and that is, that hauing placed a kinde of hope in our ships, we in forgoing them, finde our selues too weake and failing of courage to assaile the enemy; who is not to be forced to fight but when he please, hauing too open a field to flie and espy his occasion, as it hapned at *Preneza* the yeare 1537. and at the battaile of *Lepanto* which was the yeare 1571. for then the ships of the league remained behind with a good number of souldiours vnprofitable for that action, in regard they could not arriue there time enough. The yeare after they encountred the like discommodity: since for the very same cause the army of the league, goodly

Anciently called *Nicopolis* a city of *Epirus*.

ly and mighty fought not at all, neither performed ought worthy so great a preparation. And when the Gallies of the Pope and *Venerians* met, and that they attended *Don John* ( who abode still at *Missina*, because of the then beginning troubles of *Flanders* ) the army of the *Turk* being then commanded by *Oechially*, he once presented battaile, but because of the aduantage of the winde which without other helpes draue our ships, and fearing the incounter of our round vessels, he made his escape by meanes of a certaine stratagem, which for the strangenesse thereof put the counsailes and iudgments of our army to a plunge. In verie deeде it is worthy the noting: for seeing the whole strength of our ships vnited with such confederat Gallies as were then there, make towards him, he gaue commandement that in euery one of his Gallies they should put fire to a barrell of powder and row backwards ( not making for al this any shew of flight, the prowes of their gallies still appeering towards them ) and as soone as the smoake had couered his fleete he halled on a maine, and in an instant hoisting vp al his sailes shaped his course to *Napolis* in *Romania*, our ships not daring to follow him.

In regarde he had gotten the aduantage of them they bearing but their mizen sailes, and knowing how dangerous it was for them being ignorant of his designes, to breake company: eight daies after we comming neere together there followed some light skirmishes, but so soone as they perceiued vs to faint, as being deprived of our ships, they charged vs with the whole army, in like sort as when we had them for succour they retired. So as it was then found by experience that the great ships serued but to keepe vs from buckling with the enemy.

I haue made mention of this incountre in my commentaries of the notable occurrants of these times written in Latine, and somewhat more at large then I heere deliuer, for I was present in the army during all that voiage, vnder the command of the Duke de *Mayne*.

## CHAP. XIII.

That he hath gone himselfe in  
person to the war.

- 1 Aquestion concerning the Princes presence in the wars.
- 2 The first commodity is, if the Prince be there in person, it  
ads courage to the souldiour.
- 3 The second is, it causeth plenty of all things in his army.
- 4 The third, it increaseth the army.
- 5 The fourth, it worketh facility and speede in aduice and ex-  
ecution.
- 6 Of the power of Lieutenant Generalls in the wars.
- 7 The fift commodity, is the Princes authority and dignity.
- 8 The first discommodity growing from the princes presence, is,  
that thereby the enemy procédes more providently.
- 9 The second, that his Commanders vse lesse diligence in dis-  
charge of their places.
- 10 The third, is emulation of the leaders, whence groweth con-  
tention.
- 11 The fourth, the emulation of the Lieutenant generall to-  
ward the Prince.
- 12 Examples to this purpose pro and contra.
- 13 The preposition defined by distinction.
- 14 The Ottomans wars in their persons haue succeeded well.
- 15 Exhortation to Christian princes to undertake wars against  
the Turke.



Hether the prince should in person goe  
to the war, or else send his Lieutenant,  
is a question often disputed with such  
reasons and earnestnesse by sundry graue  
personages, as whatsoeuer may be now  
deliuered to that purpose. would proue  
but an vnprofitable repetition of what hath bene formerly  
digested by so many rare spirits. This then excusing me,



I will referre the deciding thereof to men of more experience then my selfe; yet will I not forbear by way of discourse to deliuer my opinion; and cite such examples as may helpe for the clearing of these doubts. First then we are to reckon the commodities the Kings presence affoordeth in his armie, and so in order of the other consequences.

2 Whereof one of the principall is, that it putteth spirit and courage into the souldiers, it so neerely presseth them as they must of force, as it were, make their valour appeare, especially when they ioine battell where the Maiestie and life of the Prince, yea and their owne too is in hazard. Then is it that the honest desire of preserving their masters life groweth feruent in them, and so much the more by how much it is farre more pretious then the life of a capitaine or generall, either mercenary or subiect which the Prince might haue sent to command them. This occasion more then any other moueth them more freely to hazard their liues and meanes for their Princes seruice, which they would not so couragiously performe vnder any other that should command in his stead. They likewise expect greater and more assured rewards from him then from others.

3 Againe, the king is alwaies better followed; he is attended on with the consequence of farre greater provisions either of victuals, munition, money, or whatsoeuer may be necessary for the enterprise, than his lieutenant, who hath his power limited, his allowance stinted, and cannot dispose but in part of the credit and authority of his master, to whom he remaineth as countable. Moreouer, the subiect fixeth his eyes and affection vpon his Prince, and lauisheth his life and meanes according as the businesse is, and he is addicted. *Francis* the first, King of France, being before *Pau* powred money soorth (as a man may say) by bushels, yet *Odet de Lautrey* his lieutenant generall, lost the Duchy of *Millan* for lacke of three hundred thousand crownes that were assigned him for his charges, but were neuer deliuered him. Whereupon the *Switzers* failing of

1525.

1522  
Guic. lib. 14.

their entertainment (whom he had till then fed with hopes of pay) he was constrained to fight with such disadvantage as hee miscaried, and his whole army was put to flight; which had not happened if the King had beene there in person, for either money had not failed, or else the credit and authority that accompanieth the Princes presence had wrought them to patience and contained them in entire deuotion.

4 Moreover the great train of Nobility and men of quality that the Prince bringeth with him is a strengthening to his army, and addeth to it life and beauty, every man striving to appeare more gallant then other; which they would not vouchsafe to doe nor to subiect themselves, commanded but by an ordinary Generall; for there are alwaies about the King, by election or necessity, many great personages equall in power and dignity, and some differing too in rancke and charge, either as being Princes of the bloud, or for honor and authority woun by desert, al which would perhaps doe little for the Generall, but would most willingly obey and expose all for their King and master to whom they owe a duty both of nature and benefit. These great mens followers serue also to increase the army.

5 Beside these considerations the King bringeth evermore with him a resolution of his enterprises, wherein a Generall most commonly proceedeth with a restraint and aduise, as fearing in his too forward attempting, to exceed his commission. In the meane while, time passeth, and occasion escapeth, most often to the Princes hinderance and blot to his reputation.

6 In this regard if the wisdom and loyalty of the Capitaine be approued, Princes ought not too strictly to limit their charges: but if they doubt of them, it is indiscretion to put them into their hands, as we may see by these examples. *Don Emanuel* King of Portugal hauing sent the Duke of Braganza General into Africke, he fortunately wan and made sure for his Prince the towne of Aza Azamor: but that performed hee would not take Marocco (as at that time



time he might haue easily done) though he were counselled thereto by the wisest and greatest of his army, because that (said he) it went beyond his Commission: Lopez Zoaers Generall for the same King lost in like manner the opportunity to take the city of Aden, of especiall importance for the affaires of his master (for it standeth in the mouth of the Red sea) though the inhabitants would haue deliuered him the keies. Insomuch as hee should haue taken vpon him (as he said) more then his commission allowed him. The thing was of that consequence as hee might well haue forborne the obseruation of his fast, to swallow such a morsell. Neither had the seruice beene one of the least, he could haue performed for his master.

7 In conclusion we are to grant that the presence of the king bringeth with it a certaine greatnesse, and more aweth the enemy then his Lieutenant; as it was seene at the enterprize of Tunise; for *Barbarossa* sharply tooke vp and reproued those who said that the Emperour Charles the fift was himselfe in person in the Christian army, inferring heereby that he should then haue his hands fuller then he made account, and that nothing could be lacking in the enemies campe, when their Prince was there present. This is that may be saide of the good redoundeth from the presence of the king in his army. Let vs now see what may be alledged on the contrary.

8 First it may be said that the King which goeth to the wars in person ministreth greater occasion then he would to his enemy to prouide himselfe of forces, meanes and friendes: and affordeth him matter also of pretending a more glorious victory, with the hopes whereof and of rich spoiles, he putteth courage in his men, disposing them to attempt valiantly all things be they neuer so hazardous, so hartning them to fight.

9 It may be said likewise that the presence of the King maketh his Captaines lesse heedfull and diligent at all occurrants and aduantages, because they in part relie vpon the vigilant eye of the Prince, who is to carry away the



1523.

whole honour of the enterprife, their valour remaining as dimmed and eclipsed. This hapned at the battaile of Pauie. For the Commanders relying vpon the kings presence and discreet carriage of matters, had no regard but of their pleasures in stead of diligently berthinking themselves of the duty of their fenerall charges, which in the ende turned to the ruine and dishonor both of their masters and themselves.

10 A gaine an army where the King is in person, is alwaies replenished with Princes and great personages, all which promising themselves great matters, seeke not but to excel one another in place and command, whence grow among them iealousies, enuies, and sundry differences breeding infinite disorders, to the ouerthrow or hinderance of their Masters affaires. Who is not without his part of feare to discontent some in contenting others? This plague of ambition, is such as it will sometimes so wrest the consciences and honours of these great men, as they will not sticke to hinder the seruice of their Masters only to oppose the fortune and woorth of such a one, as they see out-strip-peth them in preferment; yea oft times their ambition groweth so extreame, as for despit ethey wil vtterly forsake their Princes seruice: Their vertue and valour being perhaps in the meane time not of the meanest, and such as if it were well imploied would gaine honour and victory to the army.

11 There is yet another discommodity, and that is, that the king carying with him the party, whō in his absence he intendeth to constitute his Lieutenant, he in the mean time repineth at his Masters worthy exploites, considering how the honour should haue beene his, if alone he had the managing of the army; againe, knowing that all such misfortunes or discomfitures, as may befall, it shall be attributed to the insufficiencie of the Prince, and not to him, he the lesse regardeth it. In a word, the glory we pretend, and the iealousie we haue of our particular honors, are two especiall powers, to shake and curbe generous spirits. The  
Emperour

Emperour *Charles* the first, had sufficient triall of it : for some of his Captaines and Lientenants could oft times with small store of money, and few men, gaine triumphant victories, as well at Milan and Naples as else where, which perhaps in presence of the Emperour, would not haue beene so fortunately atchieued.

Notwithstanding all that hath beene said, the question is not yet fully determined, rather it remaineth diuersly ballancing to and fro, as appeareth by these and the following examples.

12 *Charles* of France, surnamed the Sage, neuer set foot out of his studie to command his armies, yet knew he so well how to make the best vse of his Captaines valour, and manage his affaires suitable to the time, that he finally recovered his whole kingdome, and expelled thence the English, who possessed the greater part thereof. On the contrarie, the Emperour *Ferdinand*, who warred by his Captaines, himseife not stirring out of Vienna, receiued great and dangerous ouerthrowes. *Charles* the first, on the other side, wan more honour and victories by the valour of his Captaines, then euer he did in those warres and enterprises himseife vndertooke in person. If the attempt vpon *Marseilles* had taken effect, it might haue beene truly said that his Captaines had beene in all places victorious : witnesse *Pauië*, the *Bicock*, *Landrino*, *Naples*, *Coron*, *Genoua*, *Rome*, and *Africk* ; but where he went in person, as in *Saxony*, at *Tunis*, *Dura*, and *Vienna*, his fortune prooued indifferent, betweene good and bad. But at *Argiers*, in *Piemont*, and at *Metz*, he encountred on all sides such misfortune, as it deemed (as a man may say) the luster of his renowne and victories formerly gained.

13 Marke the effects of successe and fortune so different, as it were a hard matter to passe a sound and determined iudgement vpon this proposition : so as the more I imagine by the contrarietie of these examples to inlighten it, the more obscure me thinkes I make it ; the finall deciding thereof, may be framed thus. The King which vndertaketh

About 1364.

1524.

dertakerh the conduct of an armie, is either a discreet and aduised Captaine, or else he is altogether vnskilld in the mysterie of warre. In this last case I should thinke that it were most for his good, to relie vpon an others relation and execution, especially if priuie to his owne imperfections, he want a dexteritie to make the best vse of another mans valour, wisdom and counsaile. But if so be he be capable of the gouernment, and conduct of an armie, and that he haue courage to execute, in mine opinion he cannot doe better then to vndertake the warre and attempt himselfe in person: for if in all militarie vertues he equall the most valiant of his armie, he will surpasse them in fortune, credit, and authoritie, and in all the other good parts aboue mentioned. Kings compounded of these excellent parts, alwaies crowne their eminency with honourable triumphes. *Theodosius* the Emperour, *Charles* the Great, and sundrie others can witnesse this sufficiently; *Lewes* the 12. of France, hauing beene alwaies conquerour, and neuer conquered in whatsoeuer he vndertooke himselfe in person, was put besides the kingdome of Naples, by means of a battaile which his captaines lost neere the riuer of Garrillion, for lacke of resolution and aduice; which mischance was by that good prince so lamented, as he made a vow, thence forward to command personally in his wars; And to say the truth, if the Captaine be not discreet, valiant, and of long approoued experience, it is strange if he euer performe woorthy act: in such cases the presence of one only *Turnus* is more auailable then of a thousand such Captaines.

14 The Turkish Emperours who goe themselues to the wars, haue tasted the sweetnesse thereof by so many and so notable victories, as we are at this day their admirers. *Selim* the first was wont to say that battailes gained in the Princes absence were not to be tearmed accomplished victories, and we see that they haue scarce euer enterprised ought which hath not taken effect in the ende. Yea it hath beene obserued that when their Captaines haue beene ouerthrowne



ouerthrowne, if they themselves went afterward in person, they alwaies returned victorious. *Amurath* the second went himselfe after *Carapheim* generall of his army (who was ouerthrowen by *Ladislaws* King of *Polonia*) to war vpon that Prince, whom he ouercame and cut his whol army in peeces: *Mozit Bassa* was imploied by *Mahomet* the second in the enterprise of *Rhodes*, which he shamefully abandoned; but *Seliman* going himselfe in person, caried it by plaine force, and chased thence the Knights of Saint Iohn of Ierusalem, who disquieted his estate by their ordinary excursions in the Levant. *Amurath* Captaine of the said *Mahomet* receiued a notable ouerthrow at the hands of *Vsumcassan* King of Persia: but *Mahomet* going after himselfe in person vanquished the enemy already victorious, and put him to a desperat plunge. The *Mamelucks* ouerthrew *Querseglus* and *Calabeim*, *Bajazet* the second Commanders: *Selim* the first after personally vndertaking them, ouercame them, and wholly rooted out both them and their Empire. *Amurath* the third now raigning hath been so many times beaten by *Cadabenda* King of Persia in person, and through the vnskilfulnesse of his Commanders, that a man may well say that neuer any of the race of the *Otomans* receiued so notable ouerthrowes as this hath. Whereto may be added, that he met with last of all before *Taures*; where he lost about 80000. men together with the *Bassa* Generall of his army; a great blot to the glory of his ancestors, yet the losse being so far off from his estate, he receiued not so great a shake as if it had beene neere him or in his country.

15 But who will take hold of such aduantages to doe good vpon him, seeing the greatest Princes of Christendome are turmoiled in ciuill wars and troubles of their owne estates? surely none: Nay rather he is like to gather strength more then euer, which he would not so easily doe, if he were to incounter the Christians well appointed, resolute and in a readinesse ioyntly, and with one consent to make their benifit of so goodly an occasion.

1444.

1481.

1522.

1469. &amp;

1407.

1474.

1583.

1589.

## CHAP. XIII.

That he hath evermore gone well  
appointed to the wars.

1. That our deliberations may take good effect, we must proue  
all courses, but undertake nothing rashly.
2. Rather, superfluous then but necessary prouision is to be  
made of what belongeth to the wars.
3. Advantages of errors committed in military prouision.
4. The wisdome of the Romaines and Turkes in their prouision.

1



Nothing can be imagined more contenting the spirit then the happy successe of that euery one vndertaketh answerable to his condition: much more a great Prince when he hath resolved vpon anie thing, especially the war, is not to forget any one thing of what soeuer may perfect his designe, which he ought to conceale and keepe to himselfe all he may. We haue one notable example hereof yet fresh in memory, and that is of the Prince of Parma *Alexander Farneze*, who for a time had the managing of the troubles and wars in *Flanders*, where he almost neuer attempted any thing which according to his intent, he did not performe: In very truth his acts were such as he deserveth to be reckoned as one of the most iudicious, wise, and aduised Princes of our age, particularly in this point of making prouision of things necessary in due season. And to say the truth, who soeuer disposeth his affaires, is evermore attended on rather by shame, reproch, and repentance, then honour, glory, and contentment: That Prince which once loseth his reputation by this default, hardly recovereth it, but remaineth infamous; he is lesse feared of his neighbors, and which is more, he himselfe entrencheth into a certaine ill conceit,



conceit, and distrust of himselfe; which in such sort accompanieth him, as in whatsoever he afterward a new vndertaketh, he resteth vnassured, doubtfull, confounded in all his determinations, and is vncapable of constant and resolu'd counsaile, carying alwaies the repentance of his former fault with a sorow which tormenteth his verie soule, so much the more strangely, by how much such a Prince is the greater, or is well conceited of himselfe.

2 This is an aduertisement which should open the eyes of all such not to vndertake any thing but what is well digested, and with such order and forecast, as there be rather abundance then necessity: for when the provision is small and that it neuer so little miscary, it depriveth the Prince, not of courage but of confidence and aduice, of whose lacke insueth the want of wherewithall to warrant and shelter his reputation, vniess it be that he will say, I had not thought, words most dangerous in the wars where he can erre but once, and vnwoorthy ever to proceede out of the mouth of one wise and aduised, vniess he meane that the misse of these two vertuous partes be to be borne withall.

3 *Prospero Colonna* a great Captaine proued this to his cost at such time as he vnderooke to assaile Parma without cannon or other munition of war requisite wherewith to take such to raske as were the French souldiours then in the towne. For they sent him away well laden with blowes, shame and displeasure, vnable to performe ought of what he too vnadvisedly attempted. *Fredericke of Bossola* met with the like at the same place for want of counsaile, mony, and other meanes which are not borne as *Pompeis* souldiours in striking the ground with our foot: *Gucciardin* was then within the towne and had a command within that garrison.

And though the Captaine be wise, yet if the armie once discover that their provisions faile them, that they be far from succours, farre from places of retrait: then is it, loe that they become astonished, that feare and disobedi-



ence seisceth them, and that all these meete in one, make a foule adoe; which the enemye perceiuing (as it is vnpossible but he should) will if he be wise, make his benefite of our necessitie; which will serue him as a rampart and bridge at his pleasure to assaile and harme vs, but to preserve himselfe safe and vntouched: It is that the Turkes taught our men at Exechium.

4 The Romans more wary, neuer fought but in grosse and answerable to the proportion of the enterprize, their armies were either *Pretorian* or *Consulary*; the Turke hath alwaies sent to the field mighty forces, and aduantageously furnished; neither hath he euer quitted enterprize for lacke of men, munition, or money. What was his provision of artillery at the siege of Malta, but in a manner infinite. For not to reckon his other charge, he there discharged three score thousand cannon shot. At the siege of Nice, where the French were, *Barbarossa* Generall of the Turkish armie, brought such store of artillerie, as the French that were at their own doores had lacke of powder to continue their portion of batterie which they had vndertaken; and were constrained to borrow of the Turkes, to whom they should rather haue lent; since the enterprize was theirs, and they brought the other thither.

## CHAP. XV.

### He hath neuer fought out of season.

- 1 *Especially wisdom to be vsed in giuing battaile.*
- 2 *Errors of Charles the 5. and other Christian Princes in their Sea-fights.*
- 3 *The Turkes wisdom in that kinde.*
- 4 *Sea actions vnreasonably vndertaken.*
- 5 *Aduantages that the Turke hath in such cases aboue the Christians.*



1 Very man is able to resolue that he wil fight with whatsoeuer force shall present it self, & with hopes of victory, or elie to sel his life at a deare rate; but to perform it against heauen

*Capienda sepi-  
us rebus in ma-  
is preceps via  
est.*

*Seneca.*

*Agamem.*

and time, was neuer heard of; for in such cases courage, wisdom, and power become danted, so as consequently there followeth a despaire rather then any honorable fruit of a labor & indeuor wel imploied. In a word, who so precipitates his enterprise without attending fit time and season, seeketh nought else but to lose his time, his pain, charge, and reputation (which is the maine point) to his ruine and confusion.

2 The Emperour *Charles* the fifth might make vs wise, since hauing obstinately vndertaken the sege of *Metz* out of due season, and without mature aduice; he was constrained to rise from before it with such a disorder, shame, and losse, as he afterwards hardly thrived; Not long before that, for lacke of applying himselfe to the time when he enterprised vpon *Algiers*, how many ships and men lost he? so many as it was a long time ere hee could recouer himselfe, learning this lesson to his cost, That earth cannot force heauen. And though the valour and policy of the Turke can challenge no part in that action, yet can he make vse of the Christian losses to his aduantage. Now if tempests and inconstancy of weather opposed this prince both at *Algiers* and *Metz*, they did not lesse at such time as he attempted the voiage of *Tripoli* in *Barbary*: for the contrariety of windes made him waste much time at *Saragolla*, and after by the like contraint and violence, as much at *Malta*, during which time the most part of his souldiours died, and in the end vterly despairing to reach *Tripoli* in due season, the army a boade at *Gerbes*, where it was after ouerthrowne as well by tempest as by the Turkes, who knew well enough how to aduantage themselves by this disorder. The first yeere of the war of *Cypres*, the armies of the Pope and of the Venetians counted notable losses by tempest of sea, euen in the mouthes of their own hauens, and all for too late assembling themselves.



3 The Turke neuer fought, especially by sea, but when the season and opportunity would permit him.

4 Some one that may perhaps long to overthrow this position will alledge that the Princes of Christendome haue neuerthelesse in the winter attempted voiajes by sea. It may be, but I should thinke it was either in regard of the hope they had, not to incounter the Turke as they might in the sommer, then for any assurance they had or might haue in the well-speeding of a voiage inconsideratly attempted.

5 In breefe, if we must aduenture beyond reason, it were better we did it fighting against the Turkes, then against the windes, with the Moores then with stormes and shipwrackes. To say the very truth, our Princes of Christendome haue their forces and estates so far separated one from the other, that before we can reduce them to one consent and body; time and opportunities are fled. But the Turke hath his powers so limited and ranged, not depending but of one only head, as he is alwaies in a readines to repell all assaults almost before the threatning of them can be with him. In conclusion, if all these reasons suffice not to cleare the proposition, yet should they teach vs at the least to proue wise, resolute & aduised hence forward not to enterprise ought so out of season, as that we should be druen to fight with time rather then men; they should teach vs to gaine rather then to lose occasions; to abound rather then want; to seeke to be honoured and to thrive rather then to receiue dishonour and losse: but the maine point in all is to haue God on our side as our chiefe strength and most assured conductor.

#### CHAP. XVI.

That he hath neuer diuided his forces.

1 *Wisdom of the Turkes in undertaking one, not many wars at once.*

2 *Diuison of forces dangerous,*

3 *Those*



- 3 Those few good Commanders that are found in a confused multitude are not to be farre separated.  
 4 The ouerthrow of one army may breed terror in the rest.  
 5 Provision cannot be made at once for many expeditions.



1 Vch hath beene the wisdome and foresight of the *Ottomans*, as they haue neuer almost had to do with two enemies at once. Contrariwise they haue so well ordered their enterprises as the finishing of one hath drawn on the beginning of an other; but when they forsooke this beaten and sure way, then loe miserie ouertooke them, as it hapned to *Mahomet* the second, who would needes warre with three armies at one time, sending one for Italy, at such time as he tooke *Otranto*: the other to *Rhodes*, where his Generall and armie were well beaten: the third he himselfe went to conduct against the *Mammœlucks*, if by death he had not beene preuented. He had in these three armies about three hundred thousand men, besides his armie at sea, consisting of about five hundred saile. The voyages and designes ill digested, all these three armies were discomfited; for that of Italy, though it tooke *Otranto*, got nothing by it; seeing that as soone as the souldiers vnderstood of their masters death, they quitted the place vpon composition.

I 481.

I 482.

2 But methinkes this proposition, whereby I maintaine that it is not good at once to set a foote diuers enterprises, may be thus impugned. That the successe of the *Turkes* death, and the commotion it wrought amongst his people, was cause that those armies miscaried, and not the separation of them and their enterprises. I confesse as I ought, that whatsoeuer betideth vs, necessarily hapneth by way of a first or exciting cause. But to come to the ground of our principall matter; without farther subtilising this discourse, it is easily scene how hard it is for a prince to provide sufficiently at one time for sundry enterprises,

ses, at the least vpon a sound foundation thereby to reape honorable fruites : since all diuision of forces bringeth with it a debility, and becommeth rather a subiect of iniurie then to be able to iniure others, to be beaten then to beat, to be others pray rather then to pray vpon others: for as a body diuided by parcells is not of that weight taking it seuerally, as when it is reduced to the first vnitie: In like sort the forces of a prince, when they are diuided and disunited haue not that vertue and substance as they would haue in their vnitie and well-ordered coniunction : for prooffe, who considereth that *Mahomet* had three hundred thousand men, will say that the vnitie of such force was invincible ; but diuided it proved not so (though indeed each of these powers by it self (at the least in regard of the Christians) was a most mightie army, had it had proportion squared to what it would attempt ) and if this masse of 300000. souldiours had marched in one intire body it had beene easie for them to haue attained their purpose, one seconding another as he might haue done with that of Rhodes ; Parros , and Otranto , which he had in this case vndoubtedly conquered.

3 An other reason may be yet alledged, and that is, that it is hard to finde such Captaines as are fit for the conduct of armies ; that in these great assemblies of forces there are few resolute souldiours ; and that they which are such being once by their diuision ( as a man may say ) diminished , it is a kinde of gelding the army of those which may serue by their example to assure and incourage the other confused multitude.

4 Moreouer when we vndertake three enterprises at once (as *Mahomet*, who serueth to this purpose did) if it happen but one of them to faile ; the newes of their misadventure, maketh the rest ( vndoubtedly depending the one vpon the other ) to faile of resolution.

5 Again, as we haue before deliuered, it is necessary that the war be vndertaken in grosse, and that assay be made of our forces as soone as may be, that we may not be driuen long

long to entertaine a great army ( which for delay of execution doth oft times disband , breake vp and ouerthrow it selfe with it selfe, but especially with answerable prouisions the better to inioy great happinesse with smal charge; which will neuer befall him that diuideth his forces and at once attempteth in diuers places. We will then conclude that the *Ottomans* for the most part haue not had but one enterprise in hand at once , and that to atchieue it they haue so well prouided for it , as the victory hath remained on their side.

## CHAP: XVII.

That he hath not long held warre  
with one alone.

- 1 *Why the Turkes haue not continued war with one alone.*
- 2 *A long war addeth courage and experience to the enemy.*
- 3 *It moueth neighbours out of the feare of their owne like misery to aide the oppressed.*
- 4 *The Turkes manner of shifting his wars , and making peace at his pleasure.*

- 1  Hat more assured testimony can wee haue of a continued wisdom, or to say better of a well caried subtilty amongst the *Ottomans*, then in that they haue alwaies come off well in concluding their wars , and haue not maintained them

long against one and the selfe same enemy ? The practise of this policy hath beene most aduantrageous vnto them; such people as they haue not been able at the first to subdue, they haue left in peace, yet haue not forborn in the meane time to turne their armes elsewhere. I haue fashioned to my selfe two especiall causes of this discreet course.

- 2 The first is the feare they haue euer had lest they

M

might

*This was Licurgus rule to the Lacedemonians.*

*Plut. viii. Lic.*



might make good souldiours of those against whom they should wilfully maintaine a lingering war. A thing ill practised by the Spaniards in Flanders and the low-countries; for continuing war many yeres together against them, they haue acquainted that people (before soft and effeminate) with the fearfull clasphe of their armes, they haue so encouraged and imboldened them, as at this day there are few nations more industrious about their fortifications, or more resolute in the field.

3 The other occasion which hath withheld the Turke from making war long time together vpon one people, is, in mine opinion the feare he hath to incite their neighbour Princes to take armes against him. For if the compassion & fire which burneth our neighbours house doe not mooue vs, the feare of the like to light on vs will make vs bestirre our selues.

4 The Turke then following these steps one while assaileth the Venetians, despoiling them now of a Prouince, then of a good towne or place of strength. And hauing there made vp his mouth he praieth next vpon the Hungarians, doubting lest he might pull vpon his necke a generall league of the other of Italy. He euermore pretendeth in shew that hee will attempt no further: rather that hee meaneth to plant the vtmost of his limits at the place by him last conquered: In the meane time he forgetteth not to be watchfull where he may feate himselfe of some other place of more importance, more easily to incroch vpon vs. After he hath gotten from the Hungarians some peece of their country, he retireth himselfe before their neighbours be assembled, or that they haue meanes couragiously to reuenge themselues of their iniuries. In conclusion, he so well behaueth himselfe as he hath neuer suffered vs to fasten vpon him what soeuer wars he hath made vpon vs, and he hath alwaies so timely made his retraite, as he hath not enforced the neighbours of the country assailed to ioine and be in league together; he in the meane time resting vpon his aduantages of hauing a great number of souldiours  
well

well trained and entertained in continuall wars whereby they become more experienced in all occurrents, then ours; by theſe meanes attaining to the triumphes of ſo many crownes and eſtates.

*The end of the firſt booke.*



## THE SECOND BOOKE.

### CHAP. I.

#### Of Religion.

- 1 *Religion the principall bridle of the ſubiects.*
- 2 *Excellencie of the Chriſtian religion:*
- 3 *The vaineſſe and abhominaton of the Mahometan religion.*
- 4 *Diſputation of religion forbidden amongst the Turkes.*
- 5 *The great Turkes example is a confirmation of his religion.*
- 6 *So are the calamities of the Chriſtians, and of others different from them in opinions.*



N like ſort as by the diſpoſing of what hath beene before handled we haue made it apparant by what wayes & meanes the Turke is become great; ſo are we now to deliuer the manner how he holdeth; and maintaineth what he hath already gotten.

1 All ſuch as haue gone about to lay the foundation of

ſouerantie haue begun with religion, as that wherof prin-

ces must necessarily make vse, to containe their people in obedience and worship of one God true or false ; if this were not, it were impossible they should acknowledge one Soueraigne in earth, were they without the feare & knowledge of one Supream in heauen: We might alleage ancient histories whereby it would appeare that all such as haue gone about the establisment of a monarchy, haue had an especiall care to grounde it on the pretence of religion, by whose mysterie and ceremonies they helde in those whom they sought to range to their lawes, by this scruple making them more tractable and pliant to receiue instruction; *Numa Pompilius, Lycurgus, Sertorius*, and others are sufficient proofes, whose credit grew from the communication they gaue out they had with som Diuinity; others that could not hit of the way to frame a new religion fortified themselues neuerthelesse with a pretence of it, in reforming the old, as did not long since *Ismael* King of Persia and his Cousine *Harduellus*, who performed great matters in the partes of Asia by introducing a new superstition of religion.

*Vid. Plot. in  
their lines.*

*About 1499.*

2 But to the purpose, we must auow that as there is no religion more true, so is there none more fauorable to Princes then the Christian, for the quiet and preservation of their estate and minde. In somuch as this by way of conscience subiecteth to the king & all other superiours (howsoeuer peruerse and vitious) the heart, the person, & goods of the subiect; what greater reason or instrument of state can we meete with then that which bringeth the people vnder a full and perfect obedience? If our Saviour Christ submitted himselfe to the law of the Emperour and paid tax and custom for himselfe and Saint Peter, who will doubt that his disciples are not to doe the like as true obseruers of his precepts? I remember a discourse written by the Iesuites of a certaine Prince of a country newly discovered in India, who as one very politicke and wise perceining the simplicity and purity of the Christian doctrine, though himselfe were an Idolater, permitted that his subiects should



should be baptized, catechized and instructed in our faith; and was present at their baptism; furthering to his power all the actions of the Iesuites; because (said he) I am assured if these men observe their law as they are bound, they will faile neither of loialty nor obedience, and will pay me my tributes and reuenues without fraude or contradiction.

3 Let vs now enter into the principall matter of the subject which we haue vndertaken to handle. The law of *Mahomet* is full fraught with fables and grosse absurdities, and so far from reason to maintaine them, as it would be an easie matter by way of some holy manifestation of their errors to alter the estate & government of the Turkish Empire. What more strange impertinency can there be then that of their *Alcaron*? It is impossible to deuise more absurdities, dreames and couenings, then those their law-giuer *Mahomet* hath introduced: but he perceiuing well enough that the foundation of his false doctrine was such as it would be easie to ouerthrow it, knew cunningly how manie ways to remedie it. First he framed all the precepts of his law according to naturall sense, and made them suitable to the course of things base and earthly, therby to make their obseruation so much the more pleasing and easie to be admitted and maintained, as being founded vpon the pleasures of the flesh and the world; he could neuer better charm the reason and lull asleepe the spirite of that dull and wholly illiterate nation, then to tie them to the performance of a law altogether sensuall.

4 The other meanes he held to make his law lasting, was the expresse forbidding to enter into disputation about any one point of it, vnlesse it were with the edge of the sword: In regard whereof he termed it, the law of the sword. Thus the Prince of the Turke who hath in his hand the sword & force, is also consequently the Arbitrator & Iudge of the doubts and controuersies which arise in his law, and determineth them as he seeth good, so as he is wise enough to suffer any newe opinion to take footing. For as soone

as that hapneth he turneth his sword against the authours thereof, and that with such rigour and cruelty as he vterly rooteth them out not leauing so much as a seed or any parcell of them. The troubles and dissentions which heresies haue brought in amongst the Christians serue him for examples, he seeth such histories daily verified; he is very well informed of them, and turneth them to the best vse beyond the experience his predecessors haue had of such fruites as spring from a new interpretation of their law. *Harduelles* in a very small space wan such credit amongst that barbarous people, that by means of a certaine new interpretation of the points of their sect, he busied all Asia, where he sowed so many troubles, as he well neere indangered the whole estate of *Baiazet* the second.

5 But that which maketh the law of this cursed race more durable is, that the Emperour himselfe obserueth it with that deuotion, honoreth it with that reuerence, embraceth it with that religion, and preserueth it in that credit and authority; as it is hard to imagine a man more deuout and affected towards it.

6 Againe, the misery and vexations that the Turks (deprived of all other light but that their mother sense affordeth them) beholde other nations dispersed thorow their dominions and of a contrary beleefe to indure, wholly weddeth their dull soules to this false doctrine: neither is there that misery which that vile *Mahometane* race make not all those to suffer who embrace not their religion, but aboute all the Christians.

## CHAP. II.

Of the direct dependency of the  
Turkes subiects vpon their  
Soueraigne.

- 1 Subiects must haue their eyes chiefly vpon their Soueraigne.
- 2 Tyrants strength and guard of strangers.



- 3 *The absolute authority of the Ottomans.*
- 4 *The Princes favour, the subjects safete.*
- 5 *His subjects exact obedience and the cause thereof.*
- 6 *Rebllions whence proceeding.*



1 He best cement that can be made to giue long continuance to an estate, is to worke so, as that the subjects, of whatsoever qualitie or condition they be, may haue alwaies neede of him that is their Commander, to the end they may immediatly depend vpon him and reuerence him: but because it is hard to bring all the world to this passe, especially in a great monarchy: those at the least are to be drawn to it, as farfoorth as is possible, who should be the sinewes and supporters of the Princes power.

2 This moued such Tyrants as durst not assure themselves of such people as they had subdued, to haue about them Captaines, Souldiours, and seruants which were strangers and had neither kinsfolkes, nor friendes in that country, but relied absolutely vpon them. This heere tofore was the maner of the Soldans of Egypt; and though they be courses so violent, barbarous and vnworthy of Christian Princes, as they should neuer be set before them, yet may they somewaies aduantage them in the consideration of their ends and aime of their intentions, applying them and appropriating them so far forth as Christian policy and the interest of faith may permit.

3 Now then we will deliuer what vse the Turke in these times makes of them. He to establish his Empire and amplifie his greatnesse and authority, intitlesh himselfe not only Prince and Monarch of his estates, but Lord also and peaceable Master of the persons, habilities, goods, houses, and possessions of his vassals; neither is there inheritance or succession so assured, be it neuer so lawfull, but it dependeth of the disposition and free-wil of the Turke, so as if any aske of his subjects whose house it is wherein he dwelleth,



dwelleth, and to whom belongeth the land he tilleth, he makes no other answere, but that they are the great Turks his Master; moreouer they all tearme themselves slaues of their Prince: whence followeth that they can not any waie maintaine the quiet possession of their goods, nor account of any thing as of their owne but by his especiall fauour. Much more if they aime at raising themselves to any eminent place of honour, they are to beg it of the magnificence and pleasure of their Prince; meanes which serue to curbe those barbarous people, yet to be reiected of Christians and abhorred of lawfull Princes, who receiue and hold their monarchies of the hand of God. There are more honest precepts to be given, whereby they may purchase and preserue the loue and obedience of their people, without vsing such cruelties and tyrannies. But because the argument propounded requireth that I relate the meanes this barbarous race hath obserued to become great, and that I am fallen into that matter, I will continue it: yet not as approuing any such course, or as indēuoring to set them downe, by them to forme a receiuable example, or to induce Christian Princes to make them their paterne of gouerning their estates.

4 By this former discourse then we haue deliuered how the Turkes subiects haue neede of him, some to preserue what they haue gotten, others to attaine to dignities and places of honour. And in a word, their being and life depending indifferently vpon the Prince, their principall care is to winne his fauour.

5 This dependency fortifieth it selfe & increaseth by the obedience and government of great personages, imploied by the Turke in his seruice, and fashioned by himselfe to this end, who are from their infancy brought vp at the Princes charge, and instructed euery one according as hee is naturally inclined either in the excercises of armes or any other laborious trade, so as such not knowing other father or benefactor then their soueraigne (from whom they receiue both goods and honours): neuer thinke of kindred

or

or friends, neither haue they any touch of bloud or naturall alliance, dedicating their body, minde and whole deuotion to the only good of their masters affaires, whose creatures they acknowledge themselues to be, to whatsoever degree of honour they be preferred: neither is it in their power to amasse other wealth then that which is rawght them by the hands of the great Turke. To make it more plaine to the Reader who these are; they are the Spachi, Spachioglani and Ianizzars; in these consisteth the strength and guard of the Turkish Empire. I hold it not amisse to discouer in a word (as by the way) what is the forme and condition of these bandes and companies: so to deliuer a more cleare vnderstanding of their manner and power. The Spachi and Spachioglani are horse men, whereof there are a thousand in number, which march at the right hand of their Lord. The Selactari or Soluptari, are other thousand horse, which accompany the great Turke on the left hand, when he marcheth, as the Spachioglani on the right; of these two companies are chosen the Gouvernours of Prouinces, and vpon these according to their merit, the Turke bestoweth his daughters in mariage. The Vlusezgi are other thousand which march after the aboue named, who in part are called out of the bands of Ianizzars, as men noted for their especiall valour: or they are such as haue beene slaues, and for their notable seruice performed toward their masters, or for hauing saued the life of some Bassa or Beglerbee in the wars, attaine to this degree of being one of the Turkes garde. The Charopies are of like number as the Vlusezgi, and march after them. The Ianizzars follow after, who are foote, and appointed for the guard of the Turke: These at their first institution were few in number, but now they amount to 4000: In these two sorts of foote and horse, consisteth the strength of the Turke, being as the seminarie of the Sangiaks, Bassas, and Lisirs. This great number we speake of, giue no armes or any other marke of hereditary gentry, being in such sort ordained as they cannot attribute to themselves



any thing in particular, nor attaine to any preheminence, but such as by their vertue they may inuite their Prince to bestow vpon them. It is the onely meanes whereby the Turke gaineth all the obedience and loialtie he can wish; obedience in regard they are (as I haue said) trained vp vnto it from their infancie, which in them turneth to a naturall habite, placing the fruit of their labours in the assurance of such a seruitude: Loyaltie, in as much as they expect from him their whole aduancement, and acknowledgement to receiue more benefits of him then of any other Prince; neither hath it beene knowne that they euer committed treason of importance, vnlesse it were the reuolt of *Gazelles* at Damasco, and of *Acomat Bassa* at Cairo, in the time of *Soliman*. Which was but (as a man may say) a fire of stubble extinguished at the very first appearance and pursute of their Master. Now the Ianizars, and the other mentioned; who are the sinewes and principall foundation of the *Ottomans* greatnesse, and who receiue so many commod'ies by this dependencie, and doe daily expect more; haue no more deere care, then to vphold their Masters safetie, and preserue the greatnesse of his estate, whereunto their owne fortune is linked.

6 To shew by what meanes the Turke maintaineth this dependencie, let me say that all dependency of the subiect vpon his Master and Soueraigne, may receiue an alteration

either by { force } of the people:  
                   { furie }  
                   { authoritie, of some great man of the country! }  
                   { by the support of a forren Prince. }

Matters thus disposed (not to enquire nicely after all sorts of inconueniences) it resteth that we see how he remedieth these kinde of accidents, and preuenteth the causes of such

like infirmities as these, which in time might weaken and ruine his Empire: let vs begin  
                   then with the strength of  
                   the people.



## CHAP. III.

## How he hath depriued his Subjects of strength.

- 1 *Wherein consisteth the strength of an estate.*
- 2 *The Turkish Empire maintained by the vse of armes, as that of the Romans.*
- 3 *Taking of Christian children by the Turkes.*
- 4 *The manner of their education: and the commodity accreweth thereby to the Turkes.*
- 5 *Great assemblies amongst them forbidden.*

1  He strength of an Estate consisteth in the valour of the Nobilitie, loue and faithfulness of the Subject, reputation of armes, multitude of Souldiers, and commodities of horse, which may bee therein bred or nourished.

2 The Turke then which would attaine to this point, onely by armes, horse, and Souldiers, obserueth euermore this rule: He taketh away all vse of armes from such Provinces as he hath newly reduced to his obedience, he forbiddeth them the commoditie of horses fit for the war, & endeuoureth all he may to choake in them the springing vp of men proper for the exercises of arms; and hath an eye that in all his dominions, nor any man haue in his house weapons for the warre, no not so much as a knife, vnlesse without a point; Moreouer, he alloweth not any Iewe or Christian to haue or keepe any horse, imitating heerein the manner of the Romanes, who obserued both the one and the other, especially at the surprises and surrenders of townes; The principall conditions were alwaies, that they should forgoe their weapons, their horses, and deliuer hostages: hence is it that we reade so often in *Cesar*, *Arma proferri, iumenta produci, obsides dari inber*. Heereby

depriving the subdued people of all meanes to vndertake or maintaine a rebellion. Again, Hostages gaue them a future assurance of the fidelitie and obedience of their subjects: for amongst such as they admitted, the chiefe of the Counsaile and such as were valiant men at armes, were the first mentioned: but about all, those of whom they might conceiue any doubt or suspicion. We reade that *Cesar* hauing taken Auxerra (which was not one of the greatest nor best peopled townes of France) drew thence sixe hundred Hostages: So as it is to be thought, that the rest after such an abatement, could not be of any great courage or strength to reuolt.

3 The Turke without troubling himselfe with the care how to traine after him an vnprofitable multitude of Hostages, in an instant riddeth his subjects hands of their best forces, and strangely armeth and fortifieth himselfe with themselves, against themselves; and heerein he thus proceedeth. He maintaineth in pay about two hundred Commissaries, who as Superintendents trauell vp and downe all the countries of his obedience, to see and oversee all that is saide and done by the Christians. These men goethroughout Grecia, Wallachia and Bosnia, and extort by way of tenthes, the children from the bosomes of their fathers and mothers, according as they esteeme them fit and likely to be fashioned to the wars.

4 These childre thus culled & assembled from all cuntries of his obedience are after sent to Constantinople and distributed amongst the Merchants, and Citizens by name, and inroulement; to the end they may be there instructed in the lawe of *Mahomet*, and taught the Turkish tongue: After (when they come to the age to beare armes) to be of the number of Ianizzars. For during their youth they are trained vp to all such military exercises as may put valour in them, and make them souldiours; and this by particular Masters appointed to teach them to shoote, wrastle, leape, vault, and so to harden their bodies as the trauailes of the wars may be after held but as pleasures and naturall



all actions. Thus the Turke by this tithing of Children assureth himselfe of his people in a two-folde manner ; in despoiling as he doth the Prouinces of the flower of their martiall men ; and applying them to his owne strengthening both at home and abroad.

5 Hereunto he addeth the expresse forbidding his subiects all assemblies, or building of any strong houses, which may stead them in time of sedition or tumult, neither are they allowed the vse of bells, by whose sound they might call themselues together to the execution of some plotted revolt, or mutiny. In a word, they are naked of all meanes, to fortifie, to arme, to assemble themselues or to become any waies; fit for the wars; no other subiect is left them to worke vpon but the tillage of the land, whereto, as to al other mechanical artes, they apply themselues ; so becomming base, abiect, and vnapt for the wars.

### CHAP. IIII.

The causes that may moue a  
people to fury.

- 1 Despaire armeth the weak.
- 2 How to auoid tumults and ciuill commotions.
- 3 Feare amongst subiects is upheld by Iustice, and plentie of things necessary.
- 4 Praise of peace and Iustice.
- 5 Execution of Iustice amongst the Turkes pleasing and tolerable, though vniust.
- 6 An exhortation to Christian Princes to administer Iustice.



It hath oft hapned, and in our times we haue had triall of it, that the people, though vnarmed, haue in their despaire and fury disquieted a whole estate, and brought the common-weale into an exceeding distresse and perplexity. *Furor*



*arma ministrat* (saith *Virgil*) *Iamq̃, faces & saxa volant.* We haue the testimony of the Romans time, in those ciuill wars which hapned in Italy & in Sicily, & of the mischiefes which followed those rebellions; as much hath beene seene to happen in these times in the Ile of S. Domingo about the change of gouernment introduced vpon those conquered people, forced to subiect themselues to a new kinde of seruitude. In very deede that people is not weakely armed which hath a heart, a good spirite, and a nimble hand.

2 This is the cause why the Turke to prevent these popular commotions, hath deprived the people of all sorts of armes, to the end they may forget both the vse and courage to handle them, and that they may not by them take occasion to mutiny. Now to prouide that so barbarous a yoke driue them not to despaire, he maintaineth a general peace and tranquillity throughout his estate: he hath a care that iustice be equally distributed: that they haue plenty of victuals, and all other vsuall commodities, the better to lull alleepe their fury.

3 By these meanes every one maketh the best of his fortune and liueth quietly at home, embracing that naturall desire of holding his owne, which to performe every man emploiet whatsoeuer may proceed out of himself: moreover this quiet and ease of minde doth so soften men, as they rest free from the thought of plotting or vndertaking sturs and rebellions: Iustice, quiet, and plenty, are three things which haue for their opposites, the violence of soldours in time of war, the corruption of Iudges in time of peace, and scarcitie and famine in both. The iniustice, the abuse, and avarice of officers and magistrats, are those which procure the subuersion and vnauidable ruine of a country. I could adde to this discourse many examples & domesticall proofes, but not to enter into too deepe a sea I will spare them, and will content my selfe to say only that all those of ancient times, and such as haue had any touch of a good minde (either Christians or infidels) haue

euermore

euermore confessed that the sincere execution of iustice is the strongest pillar of all well ordered estates, as on the contrary iniustice is the ouerthrow, not alone of men and countries, but of beasts also.

To returne to our matter, it is sure that when the common subiect hath wherewith to nourish, cloath, and handsomely accommodate himselfe and family; when in the middelt of armes he is safe in his owne home; when he standeth not in feare of forged crimes, or bribery of Iudges; then is it that he falleth asleepe in securitie, and careth not but to entertaine that tranquillitie, reiecting all thought of rebellions. This is it which the Turke (who warreth continually wth his neighbours) putteth in practise to maintaine peace throughout his dominions, and to be beloued and faithfully serued of his subiects, whom he tieth to him with those strong bands, which are to say the truth (besides Iustice and tranquillitie) most proper for preservation. A great helpe heereunto is his continuall imploying his Captaines and Souldiers in the wars, especially out of his owne countrey, and to the spoile of his enemies.

5 Peace is the horne and true mother of abundance: Then is it that euery man tilleth his land without disturbance, and quietly inioyeth and encreaseth his owne store, since as the Poet saith, *Pax arua colit*: Iustice Queene of vertues, is that which serueth as the base and most sure foundation to peace, which could not otherwise subsist, nor the lawes likewise; then is it that they gaine strength and vigour.

5 And though the forme of the Turkish Iustice be not without much vanitie and oppression, and though all matters be determined amongst them by way of witnesses, who are alike bought and sold; and that iudgements passe as gold and siluer is stirring: yet the quicke dispatch they receiue, maketh them forget this inconuenience; and though the sentence of such Iudges be often pronounced against all order of Iustice, yet is there thus much good gotten.

gotten by it ; that men consume not themselves bodie and goods in pleading and trotting after Lawyers and Attornies, which haue their consciences as large as the other, who are bought more deerely : besides the delay, vexation and vncertainety of the iudgement. And though the sentence of such men be much displeasing, yet the people haue this to comfort them, that they many times see them endure most notable and exemplary punishment : for the Turke sometimes vpon the least complaint brought against them, putteth them to death, be they neuer so great personages, as well to enrich himselfe with their spoiles, as to manifest himselfe to be a Prince most respectiue of iustice and equity, and to giue also a manner of satisfaction to his subiects so oppressed as *Selim*, lest that example of *Bostand Bassa*.

6 Hence Christian Princes are to fetch an aduertisement how to be more carefull then they are in making their ministers obserue a more vpright and speedy distribution of iustice amongst their subiects : not vpon the grounds and intents of this barbarous Turke ; but rather because they are one day to render an account before God, who to this ende established them in place aboue others.

Questionlesse the long delaying of suites is the most damnable plague to be found at this day in all estates : The abuses committed otherwise by the ministers of Princes are more tolerable then these ; where the whole is in question. For this cause Princes ought to looke more neerely to this then to any other thing.

#### CHAP. V.

The common remedy applied by  
the Turke against the force  
and fury of the people.

- 1 Another way of preventing popular seditions, by hauing alwaies bands of foote and horse in a readinesse.



- 2 *The Turkes strength in his court.*
- 3 *His other strengthes.*
- 4 *Inconueniences that grew by the Romane Legions :*
- 5 *Preuented by the Turke.*

I



Hough the meanes formerly deliuered be sufficient to keepe the Turkes subiects from rebelling, yet there are stronger by him practised, wholly to preuent and extinguish euen the least sparke of sedition, and to prouide against other like inconueniences. He maintaineth a great number of horse and foot alwaies armed, alwaies in pay, and distributed in garrisons thorow out his Empire, especially in places most proper to resist or assaile. These curbe the people, and vpon the least shew of rebellion lay hands on them, repress their insolency, and suffer not the least apparance of sedition to take roote, remouing the causes euen at the first without respect to any. This is the reason that there hath neuer beene knowen any popular rebellion in his estate.

2 The port of the great Turke, as they tearme it (as who would say his courte and gard) consisteth chiefly and ordinarily of foure thousand horse, distributed into foure companies, to wit the *Spahioglani*, who are in al a thousand besides their seruants, which march not in their rancke but apart, and of these euery one hath seauen or eight. These range themselues on the right hand of their Lord where-soeuer he become; and the *Solastri* (equall in place and authority) on the left. These two sortes are accounted as children of the great Turke, and are nourished and brought vp in the *Sarraglio* at his charge (as hath beene said) and there trained vp in all exercises of armes. After these, march the companies of the *Ulisexgi* & *Charipici*, inferiour to the other in rancke and authority. Those on the right hand, these on the left, either consisting of a thousand horse. And where-soeuer the great Turke goe,

O

they

they neuer forsake him. These foure thousand horse together with twelue thousand Ianizzars are the strength and gard of the person and port of the Turke, with these forces he is alwaies able to hold in awe and subiection a city more populous then Constantinople, and not stand in feare of any attempt against his person.

3 In other places of his Empire he bestowes other great numbers of the Ianizzars to be assistant to the Gouvernors and Bassas, besides the succours they are to haue of such horse and foote as those are bound to furnish on whom the Turke hath at other times bestowed such arable lands as haue bene conquered by armes, whence he draweth one man or more as the necessity of his affaires requireth, and according as is the value of what they possesse. These are called Mozzellini. Such as are tied to this contribution may be compared to the Feudataries of our Prince, towards whose seruice they are to finde a light horse or musket, and some of them two, more or lesse according to the imperiall institutions of such fees and tenures as to binde them. After all those we haue named, march the *Alcanzi*, or *Aconizij*, as a man would say Aduenturers, which haue no wages, & are appointed to march a daies iourney before the campe, pilling, harrowing, and hauocking all before them, whereof they are to answere the fift parte cleere to the great Turke: of these there are thirty thousand, besides them there are the *Azapi* (of meane quality) but such as serue his turne for Gally-slaues, mariners and pioners to intrench, fill vp ditches, raise engines, and perform other such like seruill offices, their number is 40000. Ouer and aboue these vnder two *Beglerbees* or Lieutenants generall, the one in Europe the other in Asia; he hath neere an hundred thousand horse in ordinary intertainment. The *Beglerby* of *Grecia* or Europ. (which is as much to say as Prince of all Princés) hath his place of residency at *Sophia* a towne of *Seruaia*. That of *Asia* abideth at *Culthea* a towne of *Galatia*. Each of these hath vnder his obedience many *Sangiacks* (as much as to say sherifes or bailifs) the very children

dren of the great Turke which governe in the Prouinces where they command are bound to obey them. This great multitude of horsemen are so well mounted and armed, as none can chuse or wish a more fit or direct meanes then their ordinary strength to hinder all popular reuolts or rebellions, be they neuer so great. That which happened to Gazeles after the death of *Solim* doth sufficiently approue it; he thought to stirre against *Soliman*, and to moue Syria to rebell; but he was prevented by that mighty power which *Soliman* found euen then in a readinesse, wherewith he ouerthrew him. These ordinary provisions of war are the more terrible and effectual, in regard that all the people of his obedience are intirely disarmed of whatsoever offensive weapons.

about 1529.

4 The Romans obserued this custome, to distribute diuers of their legions about the frontiers of Germany alongst the Rhene and Danowb, to the same end and purpose as the Turke entertaineth his horse. But it seemeth that he proceedeth therein more discreetly then did the Romans, for they kept all their forces together in one place, and vnder one Generall, of whom depended the absolute command of the armies: whence it fell out that to accomodate themselves, they ouerthrew the houses of particular men, ruined, and famished the countrey, as well by the haucke they made (which alwaies attendeth so great a multitude) as by their large provisions most necessary for an armie: The other prouinces farre distant were exempt from this oppression, yet not from contribution, but those which sustained the armie, were so overburdened, as their miserie incited them to rebell, and shake off their obedience. But contrariwise, the Turke which disperseth his horse and foote into diuers Prouinces, vnder the command of sixtie and six Sangiacks, draweth not after him such disorder or ill satisfaction as did the Romans. Their great assemblie in one place was cause of seditions, debates, mutinies and other mischiefes, most difficult to be prevented. They did not perceiue how this manner of



proceeding was a means that the Souldiers grew too much to affect their Captaines, and that the Captaines found themselves by them enabled to attempt (as they often did) many things to the prejudice of the Empire. And in very deed it oftentimes hapned that their armies made choice of their General for Emperour, in despite of the Senatours authoritie; either in regard of the valour they knew to be in them, or of some pecuniarie corrupting their affections, which the Senate could not remedy: And in trueth it was a very easie matter for the Generall, so farre from home, and holding his forces vnited in one body, to practise the Colonels, and the Colonels to bargain and buie the harts and affections of the Souldiers, by them to possesse the Empire, so as sometime the armie of Spaine chose their Generall Emperour, and at the same time that of Germany theirs: whereof we haue many examples, as also of the calamities and miseries which did thence accrew to the Estate and subiects.

5 It is an inconuenience whereto the Turke cannot be subiect; for keeping his troupes and armies so spread abroad and disperst, they haue not the meanes to mutinie (especially being in no place ouerstrong) nor yet grow to affect their Beglerhies or Gouvernours, whom they seldome see or repaire to: much lesse can the Beglerbee in his owne behalfe easily winne or entice the hearts of the Sangiacks, or affections of the Souldiers, as he might well doe if the troupes were alwaies together in time of peace, and abroad in one and the same prouince.

#### CHAP. VI.

How the Turke represseth the power  
of the great men of his estate.

- 1 *The authoritie of a Prince (if his vertue be not eminent above all the great men of his kingdome) is by their vertue obscured, whence groweth the diminution of the subiects obseruance.*

- 2 *From whence the authoritie of the Nobilitie doth proceed.*
- 3 *The detestable crueltie of the Turkish Emperour against the next of his bloud.*
- 4 *Vsage of great men taken by the Turkes.*
- 5 *The vncertaine fortune and estate of the Turkes officers.*



1 **O** the end the dependencie and authoritie whereof wee haue hitherto entreated be without alteration maintained, it is requisite that the Prince haue a care, that there be none in his countrey who for their greatnesse may incourage the people, and embolden them to attempt ought, backt by their authoritie, countenance and conduct.

2 This greatnesse may grow from three principall causes: either in regard they are Princes of the bloud, or for that they are noted to be nobly descended and rich, or else for the reputation they haue gotten, and a long while preserved, either by cunning, or by their owne valour, and merit: things that winne credit and name amongst the common people. Concerning the first cause, the children, brethren, and kinsmen of the Turke, are great by consanguinitie. The Barons of the country obtaine the second ranke, whereto the noblenesse of their family calleth them: for the third, such ministers and officers as beare a stroake and swaie in matters of the highest consequence, are accounted great.

3 The Ottaman Princes, of nature barbarous and cruel, ordinarily shelter themselves from these inconueniences, with courses far from all humanity, in as much as without all respect of Law, religion, or other ciuill consideration, they vpon the least scruple that may be, ridde their hands by execrable murthers, of their neereft kinsfolkes and friends, yea euen of their fathers and brethren, alone to inioy and by their death to assure to themselves the quiet possession of their kingdome. *Selim* the first murdered two of his brethren, procured the death of all his ne-

phewes, yea and of his father also. He would often say that there was nothing more sweet then to raigne out of the suspition and shadow of his kindred; and that he deserved pardon for what he had committed, since it was the same play and vsage he should haue receined, if any other but himselfe had attained to the crowne. *Amurath* the third which now raigneeth, made his entry by the death of his brother, and searched the establishing of his Empire, euen in the belly of his mother, then great with childe, making for this end, one end of her & what she went withall: these cruelties are monstrous in the sight of God and man, and full of horror and infamie: yet hath it not beene knowne for all this, that euer any citie, any people, or armie, did reuolt or mutine. This inhumanitie is amongst them growne to that lawfull and ordinarie consequence, as they vsually put it in practise, without feare of blame or reproch. The examples thereof are as infinite as their memories, stinking and abhominable. In a word, this butchering is amongst them an hereditary succession, descending from one to another, which God would reuenge with our hands if we would amend our liues.

4 As for the Barons and Lords of the countrey, *Mahomet* the first, destroyed their seed, expelling them out of his estate, as he did all the originarie Turkish Princes his allies; and if by chance there remaine any of the *Ottoman* race, he is so kept downe, as he traileth (as they say) his belly vpon the ground, liuing most poorely without all charge, and manage of affaires: so as neither valour nor riches can make him appeere or shine in the worlds eie; rather he remaineth eclipsed amongst the vulgar sort, without honour, credit, or estimation.

As for the Princes and mightie men of the countrey by them subdued, they know well enough how to ridde their hands of them, in sort as we haue before declared: so as neuer Empire was raised, or maintained with more execrable murthers, then this hath beene in these daies; they neither sparing Princes of their bloud, nor the chiefe Potentates



tentates of their prouinces; for they blinde them, if not kill them.

5 Now concerning the ministers and officers, who by long managing of waightie affaires, haue attained to Honorable places, authority and reputation; there is not one, be hee neuer so great, which at the least winke, wrath, and pleasure of his Lord, loseth not his life immediatly. *Baiazet* caused *Acomat Bassa* to be put to death, an excellent man of armes and a woorthy Captaine, saying the too much reputation of the seruant was a cause of the too great ielousie of the master. *Selim* likewise put many to death, and amongst others *Mustafa Bassa*, whom he caused to be strangled at *Prusa*, and after to be cast out to the dogs. This was his recompence for fauoring him in the vsurpation of the Empire against *Baiazet* his father then liuing, and for making riddance of his two brethren *Acomat* and *Corcut*. He suspected it was he that had reuealed his secret (as indeed he had) to *Aladin* and *Amarath* children of his brother *Acomat*, because contrary to his expectation he sought their death. It is in a manner an ordinary course with Princes that one light offence obscureth and maketh them forget a thousand good seruices performed for the good of their affaires. For my part I am of opinion that this rage, and inhumane cruelty familiar with the house of the Ottomans, is but a true and iust iudgment of God, who will by their parricid handes chastice the Apostasies and wickednesse of one by another, considering the greater part of them are Christians who haue denied their faith, and by that miserable act climed vpto the height of those eminent charges and dignities they possesse. As not long since his diuine Maieستie permitted a poore simple souldiour to kill *Mahomet Bassa*, a man most mighty in credit and authority; but more rich of power and meanes; yet such a one as had beene a Christian and had taken vpon him the orders of Priesthood.

## CHAP. VII.

How he confoundeth the practises  
of forraine Princes his  
neighbours

- 1 *The diuorce of the Greeke church from the Romish confirmeth the Turkish Empire.*
- 2 *What were requisite to stir up the Turkish subiects to rebellion.*
- 3 *The Greekes utterly destitute of meanes for such proceedings.*
- 4 *His owne subiects throughly curbed.*

1



Ne of the most assured meanes practised by the Turke, as an infallible course of setting his estate against the intelligence which his people might hold with Christian princes, is the diuorce & separation he maintaineth betweene the Greeke & the Romish church, supposing while this schisme shall continue amongst them, that they will neuer establish betweene them a sound amity. This made the conquest of Constantinople easie vnto them; this hath forwarded the proceeding of his victories, and as it were, put into his hands all those rich and goodly Prouinces, whereof he is at this day the peaceable, but Tyrannicall owner: moreover he so narrowly obserueth our unhappie discord, as he by a perpetuall counsaill endeouoreth all he can possibly, that the Patriarkes render no obedience to the Pope: neither is it long since *Zacharias*, Patriarcke of Constantinople, was like to be staked for hauing admitted the new Calender and the reformation of the course of the yeere, made in the time of *Gregorie* the 13.

- 2 Now to returne to the principall point, it is to be presupposed

supposed that the projects and carriage of popular rebellions, cannot be vndertaken without the support and direction of the mightiest for wealth, meanes, and authority, in the country which we would surprize; and that Princes will not bouge to set a foote these plots and enterprises, but by offered occasion of some fortresse which importeth the assurance and consequence of the estate, and may serue for a refuge to recouer their decayed strength: or else that their designe relieth vpon some promised succour, or finally vpon the consideration that those who invite them to this conquest are so strong within themselves, as they may hope for an honorable issue of their enterprise.

3 These are all necessary particularities, but not any of them resteth now in the hands of the Greekes abused by extreame seruitude, and so far from hauing any fortresse at their deuotion, as they cannot once stir without being discouered; and though they were disposed to vndertake, they haue at their backe so great a number of men at arms, as at the least breath of a rebellion, they would cut them off before they should haue meanes once to peepe forth of their shels.


4 The Turke againe maketh them sure to him so many waies, though all barbarous and vnciuill, as he scarcely alloweth his subiects leaue to draw their breath, nor suffreth his mighty men once to hold vp their heades; or forraine Princes to be able in due time to attempt ought against him.

*The end of the second Booke.*

P

THE






## THE THIRD BOOKE.

### CHAP. I.

#### The causes of the fall and ruine of estates.

- 1 *Estates are subiect to change.*
- 2 *Some of longer, some of lesse continuance.*
- 3 *Great, small, and meane estates, and their causes of ruine;  
externall, internall, and mixt.*
- 4 *Lesse estates come to their endes soonest by externall causes.*
- 5 *The great by internall.*
- 6 *The meane more durable, yet subiect to alteration.*



He order that nature obserueth in all things created doth plainly enough teach vs that whatsoener is borne passeth and hastneth towards death ; and that all things which haue a beginning necessarilie and interchangably roule towards their end. This proceedeth either of an ordinarie and naturall course, or of the violence and alteration of compound bodies. Hence we drawe this construction, that estates change, monarchies faile, and the ruine of one serueth as the raising to the other.

- 2 Againe, as of humaine bodies some are more strong,  
vigorously,

vigorous, and of a better composition then others, and so are of longer continuance; so we see the same difference in kingdomes and estates: in as much as some preserve themselves longer, either because by their nature they are more surely founded (as for example the Signory of Nobles is more lasting then the popular estate, and a Monarchal estate more then a common-weale, because a Monarchy keepeth the causes of corruption more aloofe from her; or is policed with better lawes) or because of the situation which is naturally more strong then the other, as we see at this day in the Signorie of Venice.

3 But because this assertion is subiect to diuers objections, we will diuide it only into two propositions. First then of principalities, some are small, some great, some indifferent, either in regard of their subsistence or first essence, or of the comparison which may be made betweene them and their neighbours: Secondly, the efficient causes of the vtter ruine of estates are either inward, or outward, or mixt: The inward are to be fetched and conceived in respect of the negligence, ignorance, and riot of Princes which give themselves ouer to all voluptuousnesse; whereto may be added the factions, secret practises, ambitions, and desperate humors of subiects, with sundrie other occasions, all fit to bring estates to their vtter ruine. The outward causes are the stratagemes, armes, and force of the enemy. The mixt are such as participate of both, as are the rebellions of the people, treasons of particular men, put in execution by forraine ayd and force. Since then it is so that all principalities are subiect to ruine by one of these three causes; we are now to unfold what maladies may infect, as well great and indifferent, as small estates; and draw all within the compasse of inward, outward, and mixt causes.

10 Now like as in naturall things naturall corruption is more tolerable then violent, so must we consider whether the alteration and impairing of estates and common weales chance by reason of age, or by the violence of some not foreseene cause.



4 Returning then to our former division and well examining it, wee shall finde that small Estates come to their ends rather by meanes of outward causes ( brought in by force and violence ) then otherwise : In as much as their power being insufficient to withstand their mighty neighbours ambitious attempts, they are at the first incounter overfet with the storm of his conquests; in this maner the severall Signories of Lombardy fel in subiection either of the Duke of *Milan*, or of the Venetiās; the free cities of Thoscany became a pray to the Duke of Florence: The Princes of Africke to the King of *Fez-Marocco*, and *Algiers*.

5 On the contrarie, great Empires are vsually subuerted by meanes of inward causes; either by ease & plenty, which customarily makes Princes to swell with insupportable pride; by voluptuous riot ( whereto people amidst their abundance are most prone ) or else by insolency and presumption seazing the great ones of the country when they see themselves much followed and reuerenced, all fit incentives to dispose a hart ( but indifferently generous ) to plot for his owne raising.

*Nec quenquam iam ferre potest Casarue priorem,*

*Pompeiusue parem.*

Then is it ( as one saith ) that *Cesar* cannot brooke a superior, and that *Pompey* stomaketh an equall.

6 Meane estates vndergoe danger as well as the two former, yet far lesse, since they hold the meane as the other the extreames, for they are not so vnfurnished of strength, as that it would be easie for euery one to inuade and oppresse them, neither are they of that greatnesse and wealth, as to afforde matter to particular men to grow mighty, or else abandon themselves immoderately to delights & pleasures, or to transport themselves beyond the limits of reason. This is it that so long preserved the common weales of *Sparta* & of *Venice*, which euermore respectiuey intertainned a meane and equality.

The mixt causes of the ruine of Estates are inward treacheries and outward force. Treason hatched within an  
Estate



Estate much more indammageth a great then a small or meane Empire. For a monarke is not able to turne his eie vpon every corner of his Kingdome; and stirring spirits are fortified in their attempts either with the hope of impunity (the nourse of vices in all Estates and governments) or with the opinion they haue conceiued of not being discovered till such time as their projects meete with some good successe. These things happen sooner, when the Prince is far off then at hand. Spaine can witnesse it, which was so vnappily betrayed by *Count Iulian*, as it thereby fell Anno 714. into the hands of the Moores. So was the Empire of the Mamelucks by the treason of *Caierbeim* posselt by *Selim* 1516. Emperour of the Turkes. Who would search more narrowly into Christendome shall finde that the ciuill wars of France minister more examples for prooffe of this then is necessary. Thus wee see that small estates are most to stand in feare of forraine force, since they haue not wherewith either of or in themselves to be able to resist or to take breath: That the meane estates are alwaies lesse offended by outward force then the smallest, and more free from inward treason then the greatest.

CHAP. II.

From what coniectures the continuance of estates may be gathered.

- 1 *Causes of the change of Estates.*
- 2 *The ruine of Estates is most answearable to their beginnings.*
- 3 *The rootes of common wealths how maintained.*
- 4 *Security especially so be auoided.*

I



Will no farther extend the discourse of the former chapter, nor diue into the other efficient causes of the ruine of estates: for should I handle what might be farther said of this matter, I should wander too far frō the propounded subiect, and perhaps racke the argument beyond his due pitch. I will then tie my selfe only to the coniectures of the continuance or fall of estates, omitting other causes, as also all that may be referred to the iudgement of the heauens, the influence of the stars, and to their vertue; sithence this knowledge is fraught with so many obscurities and contrarieties in what is written thereof, as I will spare to search too far into it: Though otherwise we are to imagine that nothing is made in vaine, and that those celestially bodies moue not by chance, but rather by diuine order and disposition. Againe, the errors of their Ephemerides and the different supputation of the first masters of their profession, make the knowledge to be vncertaine and their so surely grounded maximes to afford contrarie resolutions. Let vs not meddle then with the aspects of the stars, or the natiuities of estates, but regard and consider the effects of what is at our owne home without taking so high a flight. We say then that estates suffer either by the vnremouable ordinance of God, or by the naturall course of time, wherewith in time they grow feeble, and change: or else by the wils of men, so vnstable and light, as they ordinarily breede an vniuersall alteration thorow out a whole estate and common-weale. We will only drawe our coniectures from naturall causes (not to meddle with the iudgement of the diuine Maiesty or mans inconstancy) nakedly and simply to speake of them as neere and familiar, to the end we may not enter into the chaos of causes heavenly and most remote.

2 So then we are to thinke that the continuance of estates is proportioned to their beginning. It is with them as with  
 sensible

sensible creatures, which the more they hasten to arrive at the perfection of their being, the sooner also they faile and die: the contrarie is seene in those which with a slow and measured pace attaine to a more faire maturity and perfection: as for example, among beastes the horse, amongst trees the willow are of no long indurance: but those that (as the Hart and Oline) make by degrees and slowly towards their ripenes, are likewise more lasting. We may say the like of Empires and Estates: for as we see them slow or swift in their increase, so are they more swift or slow in their ruine. Have not the French more then once conquered the duchy of *Milan* and the kingdome of *Naples*, and that as a man may say almost in a moment? so have they many times lost it and all in a moment: such conquests resemble Torrents tumbling downe the mountaines, which in lesse then an hour, by reason of the great shoutes of waters they bring with them, become fearefull and dangerous; when soone after in an instant, we see them fallen and shallow, so as a childe may wade thorow them without trouble or danger. Now not to leaue this conquest of *Milan* and *Naples*, we must to this purpose by examples contrary to the former make good the ground of our proposition: which to performe, I will set before you the manner how the Spaniards conquered and held these prouinces.

I finde it hath been by a long course of time, and infinite trauaile accompanied with all the paines and troubles, which those who set vp their rest vpon a conquest and resolute to abide out the wars, ordinarily indure. Hence their labour hath taken such roote, as nothing since hath been able to escape their hands, howsoeuer they haue been oft times galled and put to their plunges. It is requisite then that Empires haue their rootes to sustaine them, which must be deepe and sound, otherwise it is impossible they should long continue. Now that they may be such, there is an especiall wisdom and many yeeres required.

3 The true rootes of an estate are the loue of the people  
towards



towards their Prince, the sincere and holy distribution of Justice amongst the subjects; military discipline well policed and obserued by the souldiours; honours, rewards, and benefits bestowed according to vertue and merit: that great men be not slightly set by, abased or contemned: that the common sort of people be intertained with all honest satisfaction: necessary prouisions for the maintenance of places of strength; well husbanding of the treasure; friendly intelligence with neighbour Princes; vncorrupt election of officers; modesty in their proceedings: these are the very true rootes able to fortifie and make monarchies to flourish and raise them to eternity: which rootes can neuer proue settled spring, or send forth worthy fruit, vnlesse they be planted in the soile of wisdom, aduice and industrie, and husbanded by the continuance of time.

4 It is often seene that great Conquests and victories attained without losse or labour, so blinde the Conquerour, as they make him become like one of those long reeds or canes which carry outwardly a good apparance, but are inwardly hollow and of fraile substance. They cause him to contemne his companions, and those who assisted him in obtaining his victories, but more the subdued people, whence ordinarily followeth, that the higher is his fortune, the neerer is his fall. Wee haue straid sufficiently. It is now high time to returne to our principall discourse: and as we haue heretofore made it appeare that there are three sorts of estates; so wee are now to vnfold in what ranck of the three the Turke is to be bestowed.

### CHAP. III.

That the monarchy of the Turke is  
comprehended within the number  
of great estates.

1 *The substance of the ensuing Chapters.*

2 *Greatnesse*

- 2 Greatnesse of the Turkish Empire.
- 3 Compared with the Romaines.
- 4 The marueilous successe thereof in warre.

I



From the diuision of estates deliuered by vs in the former chapter, this is to take his foundation, and by these causes wee are to make choice of that of the three which is the surest; by what accidents or infirmities both the one and the o-

ther may vndergoe a change, either outwardly or inwardly, and in which rank of the three wee are to lodge the Turke. Some one perhaps will iudge this question superfluous and vnprofitable, seeing his renoune, his conquests, and his long rule doe but too much teach vs what he is: notwithstanding all this I should not thinke it besides the purpose a little to particularize the causes of his greatnesse.

2 The estate of the Turke is held without question to bee one of the greatest and mightiest, as well in regard of the large circuit it containeth, as of his power: he is great because of so many Prouinces reduced to his obedience; and though he haue not so great a share in Europe as the Romaines sometimes had, he hath to counteruaile this, more aduantaged himselfe in Asia and Africke: for when the fortune of the Romaines was at the greatest, and that they had their armes most at libertie, yet went they not beyond Euphrates: It is very true, that *Traian* went farther, but all the Prouinces he subdued were soone abandoned by *Adrian* his successor.

The Turke hath not done so, for he hath extended his dominion as far as *Tigris*; he possesseth all *Mesopotamia*, or as they terme it *Diarbecke*. From thence he reacheth as far as *Balsera* or the Gulfe of Persia, which the Romans neuer saw, and the Gulfe of Arabia. And to say better, all is his from the red sea to the Cittie *Aden*, which is in the maine continent beyond the mouth of this sea, more then an hundred and fiftie miles: he hath also enlarged his do-

Q

minions

minions toward the South far beyond Egypt. In Africk all is his, except three places of strength which the king of Spaine holdeth, *Pegnon de Veles*, *Oran*, and *Melila*: *Mauritania* also is his, only three fortresses excepted, which are *Tanger*, *Arzilla*, and *Mazagan*, conquered by the *Portugall*: when I name Africk, I intend that country commonly termed Barbary, and not Ethiopia.

3 Having now seene the largenes of his dominions, we are next to discourse of his meanes and power. I finde that he hath better established the one and the other, then the Romans euer did whē they were at their intirest greatness, because in such a most large compasse of his country, there is no king or common weale beareth sway to distinguish his dominions: which was otherwise with the Romans, who had many such wedged in, within the continent of their Empire.

There is not any one of his subjects that dareth to say that the house wherein he dwelleth, or the land he tilleth, is his owne. They acknowledge to hold all they haue of him: he ordinarily intertaineth diuers great and mighty armies both by sea and by land. So as it must needs be granted that he is greater in his estates, meanes and power, then euer were the Romans, for he so peaceably maintaineth what he hath conquered, as he can no waies vndergoe the troubles and wars which the Romans endured at the hands of *Mithridate*, the *Parthians*, *Farnaces* and others. Moreouer, next Europe the *Gaules* are not his enemies. The *Cymbrians* are his associats; so as he fostereth such a tranquillity and obedience on all sides, as he amassest inestimable treasure.

4 And more, (a thing worth the noting) in three hundred yeeres space since he began first to reigne, he hath receiued but foure notable ouerthrowes (that excepted which he receiued the yeere past neere *Tauris*) But the *Romaines* in lesse time receiued more and greater at the only hands of the *Carthaginians*. In sum, there is not that nation in the world which can vaunt of so many victories  
in



in so short a space, or to haue triumphed of the captiuitie or death of so many kings and great Princes, as the great Turke; or that haue with such happie successe and discipline so soone raised so mightie an Empire as his is at this day. Is it not a fearfull matter to heare it related that Mahomet the second (an infidel) hath had such fauour of the heavens, as to haue bene able in the space of 32. yeeres raigne, to subdue two Empires, vsurpe twelue kingdomes, and take by force two hundred cities: That which affordeth the greatest cause of wonder, is, that all this hath succeeded in the very time when the art of military engines & fortifications were in their perfection, and wherewith we might haue armed our selues to withstand him. In conclusion, what shal we say of *Selim* the first, who in lesse then foure yeeres space vanquished the *Mamelucks*, subdued all Syria, Palestina, the red sea, a great part of Arabia and all Egypt: These are questionlesse goodly and notable *Tro- phies* of the Turkes greatnesse, but most dishonorable and dangerous for all Christendome.

CHAP. III.

Whether the Empire of the Turke draw towards an end.

1. *The Ottaman Empire leaneth toward ruine.*
2. *The reasons are the bordering princes vpon the Turkes estate, and their providing for their safety.*
3. *Made wise by others harmes they stand vpon their defensive war.*
4. *They are bridled by strong fortresses.*
5. *Contrary arguments.*

**W**E haue discoursed as briefly as might be of the fall and ruine of estates, of their efficient causes, and vpon what coniectures a man might gather them. It is now time that we see and examine in like sort whether the empire of the Turke be nere

his end, and abatement of his greatnesse, according as a man may draw from conjectures it leaneth towards his declining; and though the foundation heereof be built vpon reasons so cleere and euident as they are not to be contrari- ed, yet will I alledge one that carrieth more apparence then all the other; and that is, that the greatnesse of his empire is at the highest that it may be by the ruine of Prin- ces by him expelled, vanquished and made away one after an other, whilst he hath in the meane time triumphed of their estates and rich spoiles; but now that he hath none to oppose him with hopes of so fauourable issue as had the o- ther: his ambition, heart, and courage will grow idle and languish; whence in time will spring the ruine of his Em- pire; Is he not already come to that passe? The Princes that confine vpon him, though more weake then he, to bid him battaile, assaile, or defend, haue neuerthelessse so orde- red their affaires and meanes, as they are able at this day to sheeld themselves sufficiently from his attempts.

2 Amongst others the King of Persia, doth he not so ballance his power as he hath giuen him many great over- throwes, and one lately (as I haue said) neere *Tauris*? The *Tartarians* also hold him plaie and more prouoke him then he them; and of late they got from him *Cassa* a strong and wealthy towne; moreover whilst he was busied about the wars of Persia the *Georgians* took and sacked *Xistis*; but they were not able to hold it; so as the Turke hath repossessed himself of it. The *Muscovit* doth not on- ly defend himselfe from the incursions of the Turks, but he oft times also skirmisheth with them, commanding as he doth aboue an hundred and fifty thousand horse. The King of Polonia likewise more mighty then the Musco- uit, is so strong as he will not take wrong; but is able ra- ther at all times to repell the violence of his enemy. The house of Austria together with the aid of the Princes of Germanie, hath wherewithall to make their party good and to oppose him: the *Venetians*; vnitied with Italy and Spaine (which in such a case will not abandon them) are likewise



likewise able enough to defend themselves and hold their owne. As for the king of Spain, he is so mighty by sea and by land, both of men and mony, as he dareth undertake himselfe to incounter the Turke in battaile, much more to defend himselfe if assaulted. The King of Fez is not anie way awed by him, and is more strong then he, at the least in Africke; which he approved to the common hurt of Christendome by that overthrow and death of the King Don *Sebastian* of Portugall, where so many Christians miserably ended their daies. The last of those which abut vpon the Turke is *Prester Iohn*, who hath hitherto behaved himselfe so honorably against him, as he hath neuer shewed any token of fearing his forces. So as, being now vnable by reason of the concord & stout opposition of his neighbours, to gaine farther ground; he must of necessity (vnlesse God in regard of our sinnes be otherwise pleased) begin to recoile; and that greatnesse which he hath built vpon others ruines must decay and lessen; since the matter which gaue the increase is on his part wanting.

3 There is yet an other point which fortifieth this opinion, and that is: that all such Princes as confine vpon the Turke, are by others example made more wise, aduised and considerat, then they were before the ruine of such as serued for a pray to the *Ottomans*; whereby they will discreetly looke to themselves how they courageously hazard their persons or estates at one battaile: they will rather be content to stand vpon their defence, attending while time beget some apparent occasion, roundly and to the purpose to set vpon him.

4 Again, there are at this day so many fortresses, so strong and so well appointed, as they are in a manner impregnable, so as the Turke is not like to finde the way so open as heeretofore he did to carry them: but if he should put himselfe vpon that hazardous enterprise of forcing them one by one, it were as much as to become the author of his owne ruine.

5 Neither ought any man in opposing this, alledge the

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losse of Cypres, since it hapned not so much through the Turkes power, as because of the distance of Venice, which was to supply them with men and munition. A man may by a contrary argument say as much of the sauing of Malta (speaking according to humaine causes) for it was not protected either by the forces within it selfe, or by the succor sent thither from other parts: but only because the Iland was so far distant from Constantinople as the army could not in due time and season receiue their prouisions and bee refreshed as was requisite, nor well imploie such as were sent thither. If it would please God that the Turke might often make such voiajes, he would prepare vs faire occasions to attempt the reuenge of the outrages Christendome hath by him sundry waies receiued.

## CHAP. V.

By what kinde of causes the Empire of the Turkes might most easily faile.

- 1 *The power of the Turke not to be easily ouerthrowne by outward causes.*
- 2 *The power of Princes & estates bordering vpon the Turke, as the Persians, Tartarians, Moscomits, Polonians, Germans, Venetians, Spaniards, &c.*



1 S wee haue at large intreated in the chapters going before by what causes all estates may be brought to their last end and ruine; so are we now to come to that of the Ottomans, as one of the greatest; and examine by what inconueniences it may vndergoe a change. I am of opinion that this their so raised greatnesse can hardly decay by vertue of outward causes; seeing the Princes bordering vpon

vpon their estate, are euery one in particular weake to as-  
saile them, as they might well doe if they were peaceably  
vnited. *Quæ non præ-  
sunt singula,  
multa iuuant.*

2 This weakenesse presupposed, it followeth that it will  
proue a hard matter to ruine him by forraigne force, whose  
strength and meanes it is requisit we examine to inlighten  
this opinion.

First, those that confine vpon the Turke next Africke,  
are the King of Fez, of Marocco, and Prester Iohn : next  
Asia, the Sophi and the Tartarians : in Europe the Duke  
of Muscouy, the King of Polonia, the Emperour, the Ve-  
netians, and the King of Spaine.

As for the King of Fez he hath men enow, but small  
store of mony, so as he hath not the meanes or ability to  
maintaine a lasting war : Againe, though I should suppose  
he were able to be at the charge, yet I finde him naked of  
other things necessarie to aduantage himselfe vpon the  
Turke, such as are places of strength to forward his pro-  
ceedings, and assure his retrait : so as he is like enough to  
come short of his aime : and if he should performe some  
worthy exploit in Africk, doubtles the King of Spaine his  
neighbour would soone be iealous of his good fortune.  
And in very deede this is not the point, for it is all one  
with Christendome whether the King of Fez be too strong  
for the Turke, or the Turke for the King of Fez, since  
both are the Christians enemies. As for Prester Iohn, all  
the world knoweth he hath enough to doe to defend him-  
selfe against the Turkes forces ; neither is it long since he  
wan from him all the hauens he had vpon the red sea, and  
amongst others that of *Archiech* and *Mazzua* : now for  
the Sophi, if we search their histories we shall finde that the  
kings of Persia haue alwaies had the worse of the Turks, &  
among all other *Mahomet* the second ouercame *Vsumcas-  
san* ; after him *Selim* the first did as much to *Ismael* whom  
he forced into the remotest parts of his country. *Tarmas*  
also met with the like measure at *Solimans* hands : and on  
the contrary we see that *Cudabenda* hath had such a hand  
[of]

of *Amurath* the third now raigning, as he hath often vanquished his armies, and now of late at *Tauris*: and though he haue atchieued most worthy victories, yet hath he nothing aduantaged himselfe. In the *Turkes* country, he hath not wan one fortresse of importance, or ought else that might counternaile the charge of his wars: This hath succeeded in regard the *Sophi* is strôg of horse, but vnprovided of foote, which should be the principal force of such as besiege or defend. Moreouer, to force places of strength there is required great store of cannon & other munition, all wanting to the *Sophi*, who may well meete the enemy in the feeld and bid him battaile, but not pursue and assaile him if he retire into his fortres; because of the aboue said defects of foot & artillery; & though he were provided of them, yet wants he the skill how to vse thê like others. The example of *Tauris* approueth this sufficiently, for after he had this last yeere vanquished the armie of the *Turks*, and slaine an hundred thousand men, he could neuer take the Cittadell wherein the *Turks* had drawne all their munition of war, and left aboue eight thousand men; neither is there any newes hitherto that he hath taken it & expelled them thence. The *Tartarians* are as ill stored with foote and artillery as the *Persians*, and except that they last got of the *Turke*, it may be trully said that they neuer did him harme. As for the *Moscouit* which abutteth vpon him (as doe also the *Polonians*) they haue in regarde of the *Turke* small store of men, horse and mony; so as the most they can doe is to hold their owne. Now concerning the *Germans*, they haue lost much of their ancient reputation by the ouerthrow they receiued of the *Turke* at *Exechium*, *Buda*, and sundry other places; so as they are glad to keepe home without daring to assaile him. The *Venetians* haue beene so vnfortunate, as they haue neuer moued war against the *Turke* but it hath succeeded contrary to their hopes: and which is the worst of all, they neuer consented to anie treatie of peace, but they did forgoe some important member of their estate. And to  
say



say the truth *Mahomet* the second got *Negropont*, *Scutari*, and *Groya*; *Baiazet* tooke from them *Lepanto* and *Modon*, and after in a treaty of peace they made with him they parted with *S. Moore*; in an other treaty they left to *Soliman* *Napoles* of *Maluasias*: *Selim* the second wan by force the Ile of *Cypres*, *Duleme*, and *Antiuari*: And though these be heauy losses, yet in regard they were far distant from their estates they are more supportable then if they had beene neere hand, so ought they now more then euer aduise how to strengthen themselves against the Turke by their braue resolution and prouision, which they may better doe now then euer, in regard their forces are more liuely, and the members of their common-weale more vnited and compact then heeretofore. Now we are to come to the king of Spaine. Let vs say that he hath store of mony and all prouision necessary to be imploied in the wars; that he is not without sufficient numbers of foot and horse alwaie in pay; that hee hath the commodity extraordinarily to leuy so many men as may make the Turke stand in feare of him; that his forces by sea are good and strong, and that he can increase them at his pleasure; that he hath store of victuals, commodity of hauens, for conuenient landing in his countries; and in a word that he is so mighty, as that neither he standeth in awe of the Turk, neither dareth the Turke assaile him: yet this power and hability could neuer hitherto be imploied to the purpose against the common enemy of Christendome. Not for want of will or inclination thereto, but because he is hindered by the reuolt of *Flanders*. The suspition also and feare of his neighbours armes, would neuer permit him to display an vnited and firme power against the Turke: he hath rather beene enforced to wast his time and meanes vpon the particullar preservation of his estates somewhat distant one from an other, in stead of courageously exploiting them against the Turkes to the good and consolation of Christendome. But our sinnes are they especially which haue deprived vs of the glorious fruits and aduanrages we

might haue gained by so worthy a power. In conclusion, we must grant that since the Empire of the Turke cannot receiue any damage or alteration by outward causes (which are wont to ruine estates) it is necessary that inward causes either separate or mixt effect it; yet before we discourse of these two meanes I hold it not amisse a little to examine, whether his estate may be by maine and open force overthrowne.

# CHAP. VI.

That it is not an impossible thing for the Christians with open force to vanquish the Turke.

- 1 *The Turke is not inuincible.*
- 2 *Examples of their sundry overthrowes.*
- 3 *A comparison of their good and ill succeſſe in battailes. All proofes that they may be conquered.*

1



He conclusion of the argument of the former chapter, is, that the Turke cannot by way of open force receiue harme or ruine of importance; because of the mighty power and meanes he hath of his owne. But heereby is not inferred that therefore Christian Princes should faile of courage or hope, to goethorow with their affaires to his preiudice; rather otherwise placing their confidence in the Almighty, they are to hope better then euer, for the reasons I shall heereaſter alledge; by the handling wherof I hope to proue that ſo far is he from being inuincible, as on the contrary he may be eaſily vanquiſhed as many experiences may reſolue vs.

1397.

- 2 We haue elſewhere ſaid that Baiazer the fiſt was overcome and taken aliue at the battaile he fought at Mount-Stella againſt the great *Tamberlain*, vnder whoſe hands he died

died a captiue. *Carambeius* Bassa of *Amurath* the second, was discomfited by *Ladislans* King of Polonia in the valley of mount *Hermus* : he came with an intention to reuenge himselfe of the losse and dishonor that the Bassa of *Notalia* had receiued at the hands of *Iohn Huniades*, which at one time recouered from him a part of *Serquia* and all *Moldania* : but instead of performing this he became himselfe prisoner of that King, and had almost all his army put to the sword. *Baiazet* the second sent *Calibeius* and *Querseogles* his sonne in law into *Asia* against *Caitheus* Soldan of *Egypt* with a great army to reuenge the intertainment the Soldan had giuen *Zizimus* his brother, whom he had succored with men and mony against him : his army was overthrowne neere *Adena* a towne of *Cilicia*, where the Turke receiued the most notable overthrow that was euer giuen him. For of an hundred thousand which presented themselves in the battaile, the third part remained not aliue ; yet those that performed this noble execution, were scarce one against sixe ; but the aduice of two Italians and of the *Mameluckes* so furthered the affaires of *Caytheus*, as he spied a time to charge the Turkes when they least expected it. *Soliman* left the siege of *Vienna* with losse of 60000. men which were there slaine, hauing giuen twenty generall assaults to the towne. The yeere following he assembled an other army of 200000. men, with intention cruelly to reuenge the harmes he had receiued ; but the Emperour *Charles* the fift went to meete him, with such forces, as the other fled so hastily as he had scarce leasure to saue his baggage. *Don Iohn* of *Austria* naturall sone of *Charles* the fifth in the yeere 1571. got at *Lepanto* that so renowned victory of the army of *Selim* the second ; this hath since made them walke ( as they say ) with the bridle in their hands, and confesse they had passed too rash a iudgment vpon the power of the Christians either by sea or by land. I omit to speake of the prowesse & noble acts of *Scanderbeg*, against the Turkes, and how many times he overthrew the Commanders of *Amurath* the second : and valiantly

1439.

1440.

1482.

1529.



recovered Albania the place of his birth whereof he and his predecessors had beene deprived by that Tyrant, neither will I againe cite the examples of *Iohn Huniades* or *Mathew Coruin*, who in a manner with a handfull of men opposed and discomfited the Turkish forces, nor of the Portugals; though they haue at sundry times assailed the Turkeere the red sea, barred him of passage, and rid him of the meanes of farther issuing out of the mouth of that sea. What should I speake of the Tartarians, who but lately tooke from him Taurica Chersones (called at this day Perocopsky) if the reports which come from those partes be credible?

3 Such as haue beene curious in the search of the Turkish history haue obserued, that In the space of two hundred and fourescore yeeres they haue fought with their neighbours thirty and sixe batailles, whereof they haue only gained eightene and lost the rest. These are all signes and successes whereby a man may conclude that they are not inuincible, and that their fortune hath beene ballanced betweene gaine & losse, so as we may beleue, if God for our offences did not busie the forces of Christian Princes elsewhere then against the Turke, where he hath had the ouerthrow once, he had had it thrice: by all these foregoing examples we may collect that this proud enemy hath not his head so hard as it may not be broken, or else sorely brused. And though Christian Princes are not of power sufficient apart and of themselues to take him to taske, yet may they doe it by ranging themselues to that vnion and concord, as that there be amongst them but one common fortune. This being granted (as I presume it shall) we are to vnfold how they may purchase his ruine.

## CHAP. VII.

Why the leagues among Christian Princes  
are commonly of small effect.

- 1 *Leagues are concluded for the respect of honour and profit.*
- 2 *The inequality of gaine bringeth a difficulty to the conclusion of leagues.*
- 3 *Christian Princes the farther they are from the Turke, the lesse haue they feare of dangers wherewith other more neere him are possessed.*
- 4 *No man vainely exposeth himselfe to an apparant danger but where an euident commodity inuites him.*
- 5 *While each strines to protect his owne frontiers from the Turke, others are neglected.*
- 6 *The inequality of aide begetteth a contention who shall command most in the wars.*
- 7 *Remedies against such difficulties and calamities.*

1  Here are many respects and causes, which customarily make the leagues of Christian Princes altogether vneffectuall, which may appeere to some a matter of hard digestion, and for this cause I hold it requisite particularly to cleere it.

It is a receined maxime that all the actions of Princes are vndertaken for two principal causes, honor and profit: that the consideration of honor often masqueth vnder the pretence or good of their affaires: we will then only meddle with profit which we may tearme interest.

2 Now this interest (a common maske for all faces) cannot be a like equall betweene Christian Princes with one consent vndertaking the war against the Turke: for they diuerlsly confine vpon the common enemy, and this diuersity breedeth a difference also betweene their resolutions and interests; and though this be an inconuenience not in

the case in handling to be contemned, yet the principall difficulty dependeth not heerein : It rather consisteth wholly in the concord of the treaty of the league, and this concorde is hard to be wrought for these following reasons.

3 All these Princes are not neighbours of the Turke in the same equality : some are more strong then other : this difference of strength affordeth to some a commodity to defend themselves or offend him with their owne forces : others are weake, and consequently exposed to the incursions and spoiles of the Turke. It is an infallible maxime, that the farther Princes are from the danger, the lesse forward are they to stir, prepare for the war, or contribute to the charge or meanes requisite for the vndertaking thereof with the like feruency and affection as they would if they saw themselves so neere to the mischiese, and that there were apparant danger.

4 Againe, that Prince which seeth no great profit or interest in such an enterprise doth lesse regard it then he who necessity inforceth to stand vpon his garde, and feare that tyrants inuasion. Moreouer, if the Princes vnited to this league and combination shall once know that they shall get little or smally aduantage their estate, it is not to be expected ( when they enter into it ) that they will bring with them that courage, resolution, affection, and forwardnesse as the businesse would require. See then how the disposition of the interest makes the beginning difficult, the proceeding and issue vncertaine, by reason of the diuers alterations and varieties which accompany euery associated Prince, sutable to his passion or affection ; Whereupon would vndoubtedly follow an impossibilitie of establishing this league, and vnion vpon so sure foundations, as that the beginning may be good, the middle and end better : since the effect without vnion amongst many agents remaineth evermore as nothing or nothing woorth.

5 We fall then farre short of our reckoning, vnlesse wee can minister some remedy to the diuersities of this interest  
and



and profit. This inconuenience is attended on, and counterpeized by another of as great or greater consideration: And this is the interest and particular consequence of the neighbourhood that euery one indifferently hath with the Turke; by the which indifferency, each one according as his feare is, will desire the warre may be vndertaken to his aduantage. As for example, Spaine feareth the neighbourhood of Algiers; Venice of Albania: hence will grow that the league taking effect, the Venetians will thinke that the forces of the league may be imployed in the Leuant, the Spaniards toward the South: so as it will not be possible to manage the enterprise to both their satisfactions.

6 There is yet another inconuenience that our Princes will not be able by an equall portion to enter into the league, inasmuch as one wanteth meanes to contribute thereto in money more then a sixth part, another a fifth part; others that haue no money, will contribute men or ships; others more mightie in both, will vndertake halfe or a second. These are all the portions by whose assemblie a league may be formed. Of their indifferencie groweth yet another difficultie or inconuenience (as we list to rearme it) and that is, that whosoever contributeth the halfe, would likewise haue in his handes (as the greatest and mightiest) all the power and swaie. In which it will follow, that the other shall not vndertake or performe ought but by his aduice, direction, and assistance: If he will make a stand, they are not to go forward; if he list to march elsewhere, then their desires carrie them, they must follow him: If his affaires presse him to alter his resolution and minde, and that hee will retyre to his home, they are constrained to doe the like, so as all their charge, paines, and holy intentions, are vtterly ouerthrowne, and they oftentimes rest exposed to the iniurie and reuenge of their dangerous neighbour, against whom they iointly rose in armes.

7 These are, to say the trueth, considerations and inconueniences of that value and consequence (measuring them  
by

by their parts, and not by the whole ) as we must conclude that none but God is able to tune this league to an agreeing harmony , which we are most humbly to craue at his Almighty hands with a strong faith , a true amendment of life, and a more perfect charitie then this age affoordeth.

## CHAP. VIII.

The defects which may be obserued  
in the leagues of the yeere  
1537: and 1571.

- 1 *The conditions, successe and errors of the league in anno 1537.*
- 2 *Of that of 1570.*
- 3 *How a league may be established to auoide the formerly committed errors.*

I



Continuing the matter of the former chapter, it will not be beside the purpose, by the way to touch the defects which were found in two the most memorable leagues that haue beene made in our time betweene the Princes of

Christendome. The first resolved vpon in the time of

1537. Pope Paul the third, betweene him, the Emperour *Charles* the fifth, and the Venetians. It was then, beside the conditions, agreed vpon that the Emperour and the Knightes of Malta should set forth 82. Gallies, the Venetians a like number, the Pope 36. only. *Andrew Doria* was chosen Generall of the Emperours army, *Vincentio Capelli* of the Venetians, and *Marco Grimani* Patriarch of Aquileia of the Popes, hauing for his Lieutenant *Paul Iustinian*; and for the maine land seruice *Ferdinand Gonzaga* was chosen Generall. Moreouer it was concluded betweene the princes, that whatsoeuer they should get from the Turkes with  
the

the forces of the league either in Greece or Dalmatia should be left to the Venerians as in recompence of their so great expence and losse that they should suffer by warring vpon the Turke. *Soliman* seeing the forces of the league assembled, made hast to lanch his Gallies foorth into the maine. Such was his diligence as they were within a few daies in a readinesse and went for Candy, where they made some hauocke, but of no great moment. After these roades *Barbarossa* made a stay of al the army in the gulse of Larta; there to attend the Christians which came onward, but so slowly as the season passed without performing ought, or without that they once met together, and that which was yet worse, our men inforced by tempest, retired themselves to *Corfú* whencethey set foorth. *Barbarossa* followed them as far as *Antipaxo* within an hundred miles of *Corfú*, but perceiuing them to prepare themselves to fight he speedily retired to the gulse of Larta, so as our army was resolved for *Dirachium*, otherwise called *Drazo* or *la Velona*, but that being a dangerous harbour for the gallies, they turned their force vpon Castell Nouo which they carried by assault: an exploit (to say the truth) of that small importance (respecting their charge and prouision) as it wan them as much dishonor as profit, the towne being won the Spaniards seized themselves of it. The Venetians disputed it as a thing appertaining to them according to the articles of the league; but it was to small purpose, wherefore quieting themselves since it was not to be remedied they tooke an occasion thereupon to shift themselves of the league. The yeere following *Soliman* recovered Castle Nouo with the losse of those Spaniards which kept it, who were all put to the sword, those which escaped enduring a most miserable seruitude: and though the peace treated by the Venerian was somewhat disadvantageous, yet they indured that more willingly, then to be otherwise dealt with then was agreed vpon: other causes might be alleaged, as the ceasing of trafficke and many other discomforts, besides the impouerishing of their Estate,



all which necessarily attende the intertainement of armies.

1570.

2 The last league of the yeere 1571. yeelded not much better fruits, for after a great charge, and the gaining of so famous a victorie, no other good redounded thence to the Christians, but that the Turke made an assay of their valour; and by little and little the confederate forces diuided themselues: the Venetians departing vpon occasion of almost the same ieaiousies, as in the former league.

3 It will be now time to deliuer how all these inconueniences may be stopped, and the league become firme and durable, without consideration of any particular interest, to the end that every one may voluntarily in deuotion consent thereto to the glory of God with a free heart, and an vndaunted magnanimitie: In which case, the conditions being rather free then forced on either side, we may reape thereby fruits woorthy and honorable: These two leagues heeretofore mentioned, hapned in a time so dangerous for the Venetians, as it was more then necessarie that the Christian Princes (though not interessed) should vnite their forces to assist and protect the other. So the one standing in the water vp to the throat, and incompassed with danger, and the other on the contrary, free from feare of perill, they entred into the couenants and conditions of the league, not such as they ought to haue beene to make them lasting; but such as were presented to men standing in neede of them, who inforced by necessitie, might not refuse them, to the end to cleere themselues of a neere threatning mischiefe. Leagues wil then be durable when they shall be stablished at a time whē men are free and exempt from all constraint; and not to attend as they do, till the Turke affright one of the confederates, and that he be alreadie come into the field so strong both by sea and land, as the Venetians or some other of the confederates are already by him assailed. At such a time to seeke a remedy by their hastie assembling, is the way to imprint a certaine feare in their people; and make them flocke together

gether in the fold as sheepe in presence of the wolfe. It is requisite then that the league be contracted at leisure, in a time of peace, and in a season when the associates may be invited, not by any vrgent danger, but voluntarily, and with such an alacritie of heart, as they may vnite their persons, their meanes, their powers, and their courages all together to offend the common enemy.

CHAP. IX.

A league which may be treated without danger of the former defects.

- 1 *The qualities of perfect leagues.*
- 2 *The conditions of leagues, and what each of the confederates is to attempt vpon the enemy.*
- 3 *The commoditie of them so concluded.*
- 4 *Aduise for a generall contribution against priuate gaine.*
- 5 *That the danger we stande in of the Turke, is greater then many suppose, and that therefore those that are most remote, ought willingly to contribute.*
- 6 *What should moue vs to ioyne in league against the Turke.*

1



Ow then to reape the woorthie and honorable fruits of a holie league & association, we are to remooue the defects and inconueniences which haue made the former leagues prooue abortine : And the better to effect it, it is necessary

that their treaties be voluntarie : that Princes voluntarily ioyne their powers & meanes to one end, though by different courses : so as growing to capitulations, the one doe not aduantage himselfe vpon the straightning of the others affaires. This is it which equalling the conditions, will cause euery one to partake in the enterprise, without all suspect or particular ieaousie : It is not enough that the defects

of these leagues be discovered, if they make vs not more wise in the framing of other to come: to the end we may with all deuotion and sinceritie builde them on a strong and vnmooueable foundation; and thus in my opinion may be the manner of our proceeding.

2 It is not required that to establish this league and make it fructifie, the confederate forces should assemble in one place, but at one time: my meaning is, that our Princes must bee readie to assaile the enemy at once in diuers places, and that euery one bende his forces towards parts which are neereſt to him, so to begin the warre to some purpose: As for example, the Spaniards should inuade the parts of Algiers: the Venetians and the Pope, of Albania: the gallies of Sauoy, Malta, and Florence, should continue their ordinarie courses against the Turke; vnlesse they would ioyne with the Venetians or the king of Spain: the Polonians should set vpon Walachia: the Emperour and Princes of Germany vpon Hungary.

3 Questionlesse if each of these did in this manner assaile him, their courage and force would be the greater, as would likewise be their desire to persist in their enterprife, without any respect of paines or expence, hoping all would redound to their honour, profit, and particular securitie: which they cannot expect from the other leagues, and this is that which hath in part made them defectiue. The enemy that should be so many waies set vpon, would be constrained to diuide his forces, which consequently would become lesse able to protect him, on all sides whereſoever he should be assailed. First, the gallies of Malta assisted with some other, and scouring (as they might) the Leuant seas, would keepe in such awe those that guard Alexandria and Rhodes, as they would not dare to peepe out: Againe, if Spaine would inuade Barbarie, the gallies of Algiers would be sure to keepe home: so as the strength of Venice ioyned with that of the Church, would doe what they list, and would meete with no encounter by sea which they should not easily ouermatch: especially if at  
the



the same time the Emperour and the King of Polonia, would warre likewise vpon the Turke. We haue an example of the times which verifieth our position. When *Soliman* vndertooke the warre of Hungary, against *Charles* the 5. *Andrew Doria* Generall of his galleies, with a very small armie troubled all the Leuant, tooke by maine force Coron and Patras, and harrowed all those seas without controule or encounter of the enemies: whence followeth, that if the Christians would as I haue saide, at one instant set vpon the Turke, they would force him no doubt into a narrow straight.

1532.

4 There is one point that would make the enterprise easie, more forcible and lasting, but it would hardly be digested, and that is to draw all Christian Princes which confine not with the Turke, to contribute vnto it. All these suppose themselves free from danger and make no reckning of others sufferings, in whose behalfe they thinke they should not contribute, as those that were like to haue but the charge and the other the profit. In a word, all catholike Princes are so wedded to this particular interest, which is euer more differing and vnequall among them (as hath beene before alledged) as the league would neuer be thorowly concluded or of long continuance, this must of necessity be forgotten, and the only desire of the exaltation of the Church of God must be that which must range them to the necessarie point, whereof they need not trauell to seeke examples out of their owne houses, which if they would but imitate all would succeed wel, to inuite them to it I will alledge one.

The principall aime of the league set on foore by *Godfrye of Brillion*, and of so many Princes and Nobles some greater then himselfe which accompanied him, was not placed but vpon the particular honour of the Maiesty of God, whereabout euery man employed himselfe with such zeale and deuotion, as without attending the succours or furtherance of any great King or Emperour, they drew together an army of an hundred thousand horse and three

about 1088.

hundred thousand foote, wherewith they subdued almost all the east.

5 Leaving apart all these considerations let vs come to the opinion that some haue of their being far from danger, and we shall finde peraduenture that they are neerer thereto then they are aware.

1363.

When *Amurath* came first out of Asia into Europe was not Hungary ( which is now subiect to the Turke ) farther off from the confines of the Ottomans Empire then are now the countries of Saxony or of Bauiers, then they of Franconia, the Swichzers and the French; yet we see it now most in his possession.

6 Shall we then say because we haue a mountaine before vs, or a riuer betweene vs, or some estate that seemeth to shelter vs, that therefore we should hold our selues happy and in security, and not be touched with others danger and misery? No surely. For if we be Christians we ought not only to haue compassion of others calamities, but afforde them also our good and charitable assistance: moreouer he that measureth future things but by the consequence of things present, findeth himselfe oft times beguiled; we are to haue such prouident care of what is present, & to come, that we may leaue to ours the same assurance we wish to our selues, to the end to preserue them by this prouidence from such danger as they might incur after vs. And though we should not carry that regard of our children and posterity, and that the consequence of our estate did not spur vs on to such an enterprize, shall there remaine in vs so little courage and charity, loue and deuotion to the glory of God, from whom we haue our being and of whom wee hold our powers, as that we should all forget to husband his vineyard, and expell thence such as intrude themselues into it and pollute it? wherefore serue all those heapes of treasure which the Princes of Lombardy amasse, one in enny of an other? whereupon will those so mighty Princes of Germany and the Imperiall townes spend their reuenues and incomparable riches? what occasion can all of them

them finde more goodly then this to attaine to an immorall glory? It is then for the inlarging the kingdome of Christ that we must imploy all we haue, and for the deliuerance of those sacred places ouer which those barbarous infidels tyrannize, to redeeme so many thousand of poore Christian slaues which suffer and grone vnder the yoake of that intraged dogge, to giue life to an infinite number of Christians, to reuenge their wrongs, to punish the iniuries & blasphemies which that tyrant and his helhounds haue breathed out against the glory of God, his holy name and church. And if humaine appetite must needs be an actor in this theater, it would be an easie matter for great Princes that send their forces, to vrge this consideration in the capitulations, that they should haue in fauour of their contributions part of the spoiles and conquests that they might happily obtaine. Againe, if the loue of the seruice of God had a working in them, they might vndertake in person the Generall conduct of the army, or command part of the confederat troupes. *Godfrey* a poore Prince, in comparison of those that now sway Christendome, alienated the Duchy of Bouillion for so godly a voyage. *Stephen Count of Chartres* did the like with his estate, as did also many great men, who had no other motiue thereunto then the enterprise of the holy land. *Charles* the senenth King of France, did he not succor the Emperour of Constantinople with a great number of horse which he sent him vnder the conduct of the greatest personages of his kingdome? And must we sit idle with crossed armes whilest the cruell flames of this infidels tyranny burne and consume the houses of our neighbours?

CHAP. X.

Wherein consist the greatest forces  
of the Turke.

- 1 Whether the *Ianizzars* be the chiefe strength of the Turke.
- 2 That horse are more necessary in the war then foote.

3 The



- 3 The progresse of the Turke before and after the institution of the Ianissars.
- 4 Victories gotten by the horse.
- 5 Ouerthrowes giuen by the enemies horse to the Christians.
- 6 Conclusion that horse in service excell foote.



It seemeth that the greatest part of such as discourse of the forces of the Turke attribute his chiefe strength to the band of Ianizzars, as the only sinew of his power: and amongst other reasons wherewith they strue to fortify their opinion, this is one. It hath hapned many times that the army of the Ottomans hath beene so hardly laide to, as the battaile hath been in a manner lost, yet haue they gathered strength and kept themselues on foote, yea they haue gotten the victory, and all through the vertue and valour of these Legionaries.

*Machiauels  
opinion for  
foote.*

2 *Machiauel* discourseth vpon this point, and as one much passionate holdeth himselfe to this argument, that foote are more necessary then horse in all exploits of war, and he laieth his principall foundation vpon the example of certaine Romaine Captaines, which (saith he) to breake into, and force the enemy on foote haue caused their men at armes to alight from their horses and fight on foote against them: It is a poore argument and of small importance, sincethat for once that they made their horsemen alight, an hundred occasions were offered to make them mount on horsebacke if they had the commodity of horse; he which is on horsebacke may when he please alight, but a footeman cannot get vp on horsebacke when hee will. This mony shall serue to pay *Machiauel* whom I leaue to proceed forward. I affirme, that in a ranged battaile, and in the plaine field the forces of the Turke consist and principally rely on the horse. The proofes are cleere and at hand, as the processe of this discourse shall discover.

- 3 First no man is ignorant of the great victories the  
Turke

Turk got long time before the institution of the Ianizzars. *Amurath* the second the yeere 1420. was he that first ordained them : yet Ottoman had before that taken *Sebastia* (a city of importance in Asia) where he slew above an hundred thousand of his enemies. *Orcan* his sonne had dispoiled the Emperour of Constantinople and of Bithinia at severall worthy incounters. *Amurath* the first had passed Asia into Europe, with his forces tooke Gallipoli, Filipoli, and Andrinople ; and we may thinke that he did not obtaine those victories without dangerous and bloudy incounters : he conquered also diuers other cities and won many other victories of the Princes of Seruia and Bulgaria, whom he compelled to stoope vnder the yoake of his obedience. *Baiazet* the first ouercame *Sigismonde* King of Bohemia, and put all those French to the sword which Charles the 6. of France sent to his succour. *Calepin* his sonne vnderstanding that *Sigismond* had raised an army, vpon the newes of the ouerthrow giuen by *Tamburlaine* to *Baiazet*, to salue his losses went to meete him at Salumbezza, and so valiantly incountred him, as his whole army was cut in peeces, so as it cannot be said that the victories the Turke hath obtained since the institution of Ianizzars haue beene either greater or more memorable then the former, rather they were the steps to these other happy atchieuements. The beginning of things containe in them the efficient vertue of the whole. This disputation might proue great and might ballance on either side, if I did not ad waight to one of the opinions.

I will then say, that before the institution and seminary of Ianizzars, the Turks receiued but one memorable ouerthrow at mount Stella at the hands of *Tamburlan* the most strong enemy that euer they assaied, and that after their institution they receiued more and greater, as were those of *Vsumcassan*, of *Iohn Huniades*, of *Mathew Coruin*, of the *Mamelucks*, of the great *Scanderbag*, of *Don Iohn of Austria*, of the Kings of Persia and others.

4 The second prooffe which I will produce to fortifie the  
T truth

1305.

1363.

1396.

1397.

truth of my proposition, is, that all such as haue had the better hand of the Turkes, euer had it by the meanes of their horse, wherein they did exceed the enemy in number and strength, as we haue so often saide of the Persians and of the Mamelucks. The great *Sophi Ismael*, had he not vanquished *Selim* the second with the strength of his horse, if when he did set vpon the rier-ward, where the Turke was in person, the thunder of his Cannon had not so affrighted the horse, as they ran away with their masters, to the disordering of the whole armie? The onely thing that ouerthrew the fortune which the Persian had almost alreadie in his possession. *Cudabenda* King of Persia, hath many times ouercome the Turkish forces, by the onely strength of his horse, whereof he hath more and is better armed then the other. The Hungarians in like sort haue many times put the Turkes to the woorse by their fight on horsebacke.

5 The third and strongest prooffe of my assertion, is, that all the harmes we haue receiued of the Turke, haue come by his horse, as at Nicapolis, at Salembezza, at Varna, at the riuer of Moraua, at Exechium, at Buda and elsewhere.

6 And if it euer hapned that the Ianizzars recovered the battaile halfe lost, it is to be imputed to this, that they were reserued for the rierward; so as it was easie for fresh men to repell those which were already weakned and tyred. But I thinke no man but will grant, that if instead of the Ianizzars they had beene as many horse, they had performed as much. As on the contrarie, if the other had kept in store some fresh troupes of horse, as the Turkes, they had dealt otherwise with them, and kept them well enough from be-reauing them of the victorie. In conclusion, the horse are they that defeat the enemy, and become masters of the field, that prepare the way for the foote to the beseiging of townes, and giue them time and leisure to force and take them.



## CHAP. XI.

Where the Turke might be most easily  
assailed to ouercome him either  
by sea or by land.

- 1 *Examples of sea victories.*
- 2 *The goodnesse of our hauens.*
- 3 *The number of our skilfull mariners.*
- 4 *The Christians farre beyond the Turkes in maritime matters.*
- 5 *The Turkes horse fearefull to the Christians, unprofitable at sea.*
- 6 *That the Turkes are easily to be ouerthrowne at sea.*

I



Here were much matter for doubt and disputation vpon this question, if reason and experience did not cleere it: for experience we haue it fresh in many accidents; which instruct vs that an attempt by sea, would be lesse difficult to vs, and more hurtfull to the Turke, for the reasons and examples which I will deliuer. As often as our forces haue to some purpose put themselues into the Leuant seas, they haue beene euermore victorious, as at Metelin, at Casalonia, at Preuesa, at Scorsolari. If any one opposing me object the ouerthrow of our armie at Gerbes, which hapned about the same time, let him read the discourse of the Historie, (as is requisite) and he shall finde that that chanced not through the force and valour of the enemy, but rather through our owne fault; insomuch as our armie could not take their opportunitie to dislodge in due time; but suffered themselues to be besieged by the hardnesse of the season, and by tempests; which so disordered them as it was easie for the enemy to force them. *Grimani* Generall of

1580.

*Vid. 181.*

the Venetians, let slippe the occasion of a woorthy victorie, when he knew not how to take his time to charge the enimie, as he might well haue done at Sapienza. But on the contrarie, as often as the Emperour *Charles* the first set forth an armie to some purpose, the Turke durst neuer looke abroad; as when he vndertooke the voyage of Tunis and of Algiers, where neuerthelesse he encountred many disasters, he brought before Tunis seauen hundred saile, and before Algiers fve hundred onely. Thus much for experience.

2 Now we must see what reasons we haue in store to prooue that we may more easily assaile the Turke by sea then by land. Among others this may passe, that our seas are more frequented, and our ports more rich and safe then those of the Leuant. For first (set aside Constantino-ple) there is not thoroughout their obedience, any one Porte that may be equalled to those of Venice, Lisbone, Siuill, Antwerp, London, Amsterdam, Lubec, or Danske, &c. and very few also that may be compared with those of Naples, Genoua, Villa-Franca, Nessina, Palermo, Ragusa, Marseilles, Tolon, Bourdeaux, New-Hauen, Rochelle, and Rouane, &c.

3 It is cleere then that we surmount the Turke not only in numbers of Portes and good harbors for the retraict and shelter of our armies, but also in Mariners and men accustomed and experienced in both the seas. Moreouer, there is not perhaps in the world a coast that affoordeth greater plentie of men then that of Genoua, Dalmatia, Sclauonia, Venice, Candye. Againe, there is not a nation to be found of more resolution or better prooffe for sea affaires, then are those of Marseilles. I omit to speake of the Catalonian, the Portugall, the Biskayan, the English, the Norman, the Hollander, and Zelander, all people marueilous skilfull in Nauigation.

4 I would willingly demaund, what it auaileth the Turke to possesse a large and spacious sea bordering country, if it remaine vnhabited; neither were it enough if it were: for  
the

the exploits of maritime warre, it is requisite they be valiant, resolute, and such as can endure trauell and paine. Alongst all the coast of Africke, the Turke hath not one Hauens of account besides Algies. In all Egypt hee hath only Alexandria, and Dalmatia, at the least which are held in any consideration. In Soria, take away Saffo and Pamphilia, those neere Tirus, Ephesus, Cicize, and the rest so celebrated in ancient times, remaine at this day namelesse, and buried in their owne ruines. They haue Gallipoli which is of no great traffike: they haue that of Constantinople, whereof they steade and vaunt themselues most of all: Morcouer, all these Ports are not so good or so conuenient as ours, either if we consider the forme, or the commoditie of situation, nor so well stored with artillerie as ours are.

5 Againe, fighting by sea, wee shall not need to feare their horse, whose encounter in regard of their multitude cannot be but a terror vnto vs; relying as they doe vpon them, as the principall nerue of their forces; but as for foote, we excell them in number and valour:

6 For conclusion, it is most certaine, if we could once deprive the Turke of the vse of the sea, he would be soone ouerthrowne by land with a sufficient number of gallies, which might be maintained in the Archipelago: we should cut him off from all trafficke with Egypt and Soria, as also keeping certaine gallies in the Straight and chanell, we should hinder the commerce of Asia and Constantinople, which he could not be long without, so that by continuing this manner of warring vpon him without intermission, we should by little and little heaue him out of the whole

Empire of Greece, where there would be

enough to satiate the greedie am-

bition of the Chri-

stians.



## CHAP. XII.

Of the inward causes whereby the  
Empire of the Turkes may  
come to ruine.

- 1 *Of inward causes by which an Estate may be overthrowne.*
- 2 *The occasions of the change of the Turkish Empire, are, a defect that may happen of the Ottoman race:*
- 3 *The hatred, contempt, and disobedience of the Turkes officers and seruants:*
- 4 *The discorde that may arise betweene his children about the succcession.*
- 5 *That it is hard now to stirre vp and maintaine dissention amongst them.*
- 6 *Another occasion may be the Iannizzers libertie and insolencie towards their master:*
- 7 *Another the rebellion and revolt of his countries and their Gouvernours.*



1 *As we haue before deliuered by what outward causes the Empire of the Turkes may soonest receiue an alteration, so we are now to handle the meanes whereby he may be inwardly weakened, and whether by the infirmities which are begotten in other estates, that of the Ottomans may be likewise distempered and corrupted; of the inward causes, of this corruption; some concerne the Heads and Ministers, others are deriued from among the people. I will then produce some few examples noting the errors of such as sway a Soueraigne authority, and so orderly come to the other, to collect thence what may serue to procure the Turkes ruine.*

- 2 *That which would fall most to our purpose would be if the great Turke should die without heires of the true line*  
and

and race of *Ottoman*. For in such a case it is likely the *Beglerbyes*, *Vizirs*, *Bassas*, *Sangiacks*, and the greatest personages of the Turkish nation, would each one for himselfe endeavour to possesse himselfe of whatsoeuer he could most easily compasse.

3 The second cause would be, if in regard of his cruelty, or negligence, the Prince should giue his subiects occasion to hate and contemne him: but the mischief would proue yet greater if it did arise from the cowardlinesse or sloath of the Prince. For his strength consisting wholly in the great numbers of his souldiours ordinarily intertaind, how could he possibly containe such mighty armies in deuotion and quietnesse; if he did not daily busie them in the exercise of war? And lesse how could so many nations be held within compasse of feare and obedience without the feare of ordinary armes? It is not to be doubted then if they had a Prince who were giuen ouer to idlenesse and a loose life, or that they discried him to be a coward & slothfull, but they would be forward to draw their swords against him, and thence worke their owne destruction. *Baiazet* the second had prooue of this, for abandoning himselfe to all pleasures and resolving vpon a priuat and retired course of life, to spend his time in reading good authors; his sonne sought his destruction, and in the end fauored by the *Ianizzars* depriued him of his life and kingdome. For though *Baiazet* repressed the first violence of his sonnes ambition, yet he was at the last forced by the *Ianizzars* not only to pardon his rebellion, but also to send him with an army against his other sonne *Accomat*, who supposing his father ment to prefer *Selim* before himselfe, who was the elder, caused the noses and eares of his fathers messengers most shamefully to be cut off; the enormity of this fact ill digested, and worse interpreted was that which cancelled the greater faults of *Selim*, to take vengeance of this last & lesse outrage; whence it came to passe in the end that these same *Ianizzars* posselt *Selim* of the empire, who soone after put to death his vnhappy father. *Amurash* the third

now

now raigning hauing withdrawne himselfe from the actions of war to liue in ease and quiet hath lost much of his souldiours and seruants ancient obedience, zeale, and obseruance, such as they were wont to carry towards their Soueraignes greatnesse. The Bassa of Cairo who had the gouernment of Ægypt, named *Ragusei*, being summoned (according to their Emperious custome) to make his appearance at the port, flatly refused to come thither and made his escape with a world of treasure which he had amassed by extorsions and pilling of the people, during the time of his administration. The Ianizzars which were at those times appointed for the wars of Persia, would not once moue a foote to march thitherward: but as halfe in a mutiny said plainly they would not any more go vpon any enterprise vnlesse the great Turke their Lord would vnderchamber himselfe from among his concubines, and vnder take the voyage himselfe in person, so as he was constrained by vertue of giftes and increase of pay to win them to the war. Moreouer of late after the ouerthrow of Tauris, the Turke hauing appointed a new generall for the succoring of his vanquished army, and reenforcing of such as remained within the cittadell; all the commandements he could lay vpon him, could not preuaile so much with him as to get him to march forward, rather he grew to capitulate with him, and that finished, he made the most adoe in the world to muster vp twenty thousand men, who refused likewise to goe to that war, otherwise then vpon all the aduantages they could deuise to demand: not like subiects and slaues, but as if they had beene neighbours, allies, and confederates. These breaches already made in the obedience they were wont to render thir lord and Master, may perswade vs that they will easily rebell, vpon the first occasion that shall present it selfe without respect of their Princes greatnesse, or obseruation of their ancient military policy.

4 The third occasion might befall, if there were many brethren to debate the Empire after the death of their father,



ther, As it hapned betweene *Zizimus*, and *Baiazet*, sonnes of *Mahomet*, and betweene *Acomat* and *Selim*, sonnes of *Baiazet*. This *Baiazet* was fauoured of the *Ianizzars* against his brother. *Zizimus* was vpheld onely by the aid of the Soldan of Cairo, and King of Persia. *Selim* likewise was borne by the *Ianizzars* and *Bassas*, and *Acomant* by forraine Princes : they incountred and fought cruel battailes, whose victories brought the whole Estate in danger : *Baiazet* and *Selim* remained conquerours, each one his party by meanes of the great numbers of men that accompanied them, and of the valour of the souldiours of the old bandes which serued vnder them. Notwithstanding all these opportunities which God so to the purpose prepared, nor one Christian Prince once stirred, or so much as made offer to arme in fauour of the weaker of those which contended : which would no doubt haue entrangled both of them in a long and dangerous strife, enough finally to haue ruined or much decayed the house of the Ottomans, when they should haue called such an one to their succour as would haue rather blowen then quenched their fires. Amongst all the Princes of Christendome there was none but the great master of Rhodes, which sent some supplies of artillery to *Zizimus*, and which after receiued and defended him from the hands of *Baiazet*, when he was driuen to retire himselfe to his protection.

1482

1513.

5 These domestique quarrels cannot now become so strong ( especially such as might happen betweene brethren ) as then they might, considering that the *Mamelucks*, who as neighbours might haue fomented and giuen intertainment to such differences, are now extinct and their name no more mentioned. They were in their time the only emulators of the Turkes glory : *Rhodes* hath made an exchange of her fortune, and is now in the power of this tyrant. *Cypres* beareth the like yoke. These two Ilands afforded an especial commodity to sow dissentions among the Turks, to fauour and succour one of the parties.

6 The fourth cause would easily arise from the presumption

tion and head-strong rashnesse of the Ianizzars, likely enough to attempt and execute as much as sometime did the Pretorian bands of the Romans, who made slender account to fill the Empire with slaughters and massacres, wherein many Emperours ended their daies: they electing others at their pleasures against the authority of the Senat, and the loue and reuerence they ought to haue borne towards their country. The like may we hope or expect from the Ianizzars, that they will one day assume to themselves the same power and learne to performe the like, whereof they gaue an assaie at such time as they compelled *Baiazet* the second to resigne the Empire to *Selim* his sonne. They did almost the like when *Soliman* caused his sonne *Mustapha* to be murthered; for they besieged him and inuironed his tent for certaine daies space, crying out they would know the cause of that yong Princes death. In the end by the deuise of the *Bassa* and with stoore of coyne, he wan to him foure thousand of them, who disengaged him of the feare and danger wherein he was plunged.

7 The fift cause may be fetched from the ambition or discontent of the great ones of the countrie, or of ministers swaying the supream authority & credit in places of gouernment. *Gazeles* gouernour of Soria made way for a renolt of the like quality, as did also *Acomat* Generall of Egypt: *Gazeles*, assisted by the *Mamelucks*, *Arabians* and those of *Rhodes*, endeuoured to set himselfe vp against the great Turke: but he was discovered by *Cayembeins* whom he had acquainted with the conspiracy. This man either for feare ( as looking into the danger of the enterprise ) or for enuy of his companions greatnesse, reuealed all to his Master *Soliman*, who presently dispatched against him *Farratha Bassa*, by whom he was vanquished in battaile. *Acomat* had not the leasure to proceed far in his attempt, for as he did inconsideratly precipitate himselfe into the triall thereof, so was he as speedily discovered, and in an instant suppressed and slaine, without hauing thrived ought in his designs.

## CHAP. XIII.

## Of the mixt causes.

- 1 *What are the mixt causes.*
- 2 *How Estates are overthrowen by mixt causes.*

1



IN this third booke we haue at large discoursed how by inward and outward causes, Estates may be indangered: now we must speake of causes compounded, of the one and the other, which, to discourse more intelligibly, we tearme mixt, which likewise are of power of themselues to alter an Empire and to bring it, either by an vniuersall or a particular change, to a lamentable ruine. These mixt causes then are those whereby both the enemy abroad, and the subiect at home may by a common consent conspire against an Estate and subuert it.

2 One of the causes or meanes may be a popular insurrection nourished by the enemy, or else the conspiracy of some particular men set on by forraine practises; or to tearme it better, the treasons which subiects may hatch in fauour, and by the meanes and authority of their neighbours. This hapneth in a twofold manner, when the subiect beginneth and setteth on foote the practise, or when a stranger laieth the way open vnto them vnder some coulered pretence, or else when some one particular person or all a whole communalty frame the occasion thereof in regard of some displeasure or oppression. Finally, this falleth out also when the enemy abroad tempereth with one, two, or three, of the principall men to reuolt against their prince and take armes in hand to ouerturne and ruine the Estate.



## CHAP. XIII.

How particular persons may  
be gained.

- 1 *How his people are to be prouoked to rebellion.*
- 2 *How his great men and chiefe officers are to be gained.*
- 3 *These courses at the first not succeeding, are to be oftner attempted.*
- 4 *Wary proceeding is requisite, lest those that manage the businesse incurre danger.*
- 5 *To whom such businesses are to be committed.*

I  T resteth now that we make it appeere how such practises may be set on foote and cherished: we will then beginne with the enterprise to bee plotted by some particular person, by whose assistance it may take effect. We must presuppose that this person is either priuat or publike, the priuat persons are those which suffer themselves most often to be corrupted by mony, and with these there neede not so many ceremonies or broakings: but if they be publike persons of rancke and authority, either in regard of the greatnesse of their family, or managing of state affaires; there is far greater difficulty in corrupting them then the other: yet if we may but discouer in them the stinges of ambition and desire of greatnesse, and that we propose to them the assurance of speedy succours, for the execution of the desaigne; then is it that we bring them to dare any thing, especially if they haue neuer so little disposition to be reuenged of some receined indignity. It is indeed a hard matter to worke particular and priuate persons without great vncertaineties and dangers.

- 2 But if we must haue to doe with the great persons of the Estate, we must warily make choice of our time, sound  
them

them whether they be male content or ill affected towards their Prince, either in respect that some one is aduanced to their preiudice, or for some other cause which may awake in them a longing to shake off their yooke and seaze themselves of the Estate. These are the meanes and occasions, which should be chosen and diligently husbanded by our Christian Princes, smoothly and with dexterity to procure the ruine of the common enemy ; putting on ( as they say ) the foxes skin when the lions is wanting. The displeasure and ielousie which *Faratha Bassa* conceived against *Hebraim Bassa* because he saw him raised by *Soliman* to greater honour and estimation then himselfe, so depriued him of all reason, as suffering the desire of reuenge by little and little to transport him, he began to plot a rebellion, but discovered he was forthwith put to death : the selfe same occasion was the overthrow of *Pirrus* and *Mustapha*, raised by *Soliman*. In our time in the court of *Amurath* the third now raigning, these ielousies and hart-burnings haue beene great betweene *Mahomet* and *Mustapha*, and since that betweene the same *Mustapha* and *Circalla* ( who hath outstript him ) and all for fauour of their Master. If these humors and ill dispositions had beene well looked into and wisely imploied to their best vse by some great Prince of Christendome, they had beene so mattent to haue bred a dissention and reuolt amongst those barbarous people.

3 Now though such practises should not perhaps at the first be of sufficient power to worke that vniuersall change which we wish in that tyrants Empire; yet are we not therefore to desist as men dismaied ; remembering that most commonly the beginnings of innouations and commotions so extraordinary, are feeble, and that that wisdom sheweth it selfe like it selfe which can so diligently suckle and nourish them as they may attaine to a happy growth. I am of opinion, that when we encounter with instruments that are not without ambition, courage, and a thirst of reuenge ; after we haue felt and sounded them once, twise,

or thrise, we shall in the end make a breach in their loyalty and obedience; especially if we set before them (be it vnder a true or false title) the certaintie of some mightie succour, whereof they may see the preparatiues; for so they will the more courageously attempt against the life and estate of their Prince.

4 Moreouer it is not to be forgotten, that when such practises shall be discovered by the Turke, and that he shall see the Christians more diligent then hitherto they haue beene, to sound the affections of his seruants and subjects: he will thereupon enter into such a distrust of them, as euen that will make him offer them some hard measure. This distrust will be enough to beget a thousand suspicions and hard conceits in his seruants, and subjects, either for the managing of affaires, or for the danger that the opinion of loyalty incurreth, when it hath to deale with such a distrustfull and suspicious Prince, as this would prooue: so as by little and little it would worke vs out some occasion fitting our purpose; especially, if whilst this practise were hatching, and on foote, the children of the Turke should take armes one against the other, or that during their fathers life, they should dispute the possession of the Empire: for the ice being already broken, there would be a more easie passage and better successe, then if it had not beene taken in hand at all.

5 But because an especiall iudgement, patience, and much wisdom are requisite in such businesses, we must make choice of men furnished with all these parts, to the end they may wisely know when to take their opportunities and times, to sow these dissensions, and that there be not want of mony to distribute amongst this people, which are farther in loue therewith, then any other nation the world affoordeth.



## CHAP. XV.

How the people of the Turke may  
be wrought from his  
obedience.

- 1 *How the Turkes Christian Subiects are to be wrought to rebellion.*
- 2 *A place must be chosen for refuge of such as rebell.*
- 3 *The vaine fooleries of their Alkoran are to be discovered.*
- 4 *How bookes written to that purpose may come to his subiects hands.*
- 5 *How such bookes are to be composed.*
- 6 *What fruites are to be hoped from their reading.*
- 7 *Exhortation to the Ianizzars.*
- 8 *The conclusion of this worke.*

1  He Turke hath two sorts of people subiect to his Empire; one followeth the sect of *Mahomet*; the other the truth of the Gospel of *Iesus Christ*. The Mahometanes are quiet, as those which being of one and the same law, haue no cause to make any tumult. The Christians cannot stirre, as being ouertopped and awed by a greater power then their owne, which curbeth them so, as there is no better way to moue them to rebel, then to make them handle (as it were) and see the assurance of an approaching succour, to provide them of armes and all other furniture for the wars: for otherwise it is impossible they should dare to make the least shew once to moue, whilst they haue the enemy ouer them alwaies in a readinesse and armed, who would in a moment confound them, especially being as they are naked and vnprovided of armes, offensive or defensive. *Selim* the second doubting the worst, by the counsaile of *Occhially*, caused al the Christians inhabiting the sea coasts,

to retire themselves farre vp into the maine land, to the end the presence of the Christian forces should not incourage them against him, as it hapned at such time as *Andrew Dorea* atchieued the enterprise of *Patras* and *Coron*.

2 If the Christians should euer vndertake the like disigne they ought to take especiall heede how they vnship their succours in those parts of the continent where the horse are at hand, since they were likely enough by their strength to choake at the first the reuolt of the Christians, for so mighty are they in horse, and of such speed and dexterity, as they would in an instant beare downe before them whatsoeuer should oppose them. Wherefore it would be better to enter by *Albania* and by places mountanous and of difficult accessse, where the horse are not able to serue, as in the plaine. This is as much as we ment to say of such Christians as are vnder the Turkes dominions, all which I will imagine want not will to rebell, if the Princes of Christendome would furnish them of meanes.

3 Now let vs see what way were best to be taken to prouoke the Mahomerans to reuolt, and to fill their countries with troubles, and ciuill dissentions. If we will but consider how their religion is fraught with vntruthes, their *Alcoran* abounding in follies, we shall finde it easie to picke matter enough out of it to set them together by the eares, especially if wee doe but disperse among them certaine bookes fit to conuert them, or make them doubt of the foolish superstitions they obserue, composing them for Europe in the Sclauonian tongue, and for Asia in the Arabian.

4 But because it would be hard to conuey these bookes into the countries of the Turkes obedience but that they would soone perceiue the denice and speedily remedy it: It were best beginning far off, in the Indies and in the parts of Asia and Africke held by the Portugales: for because of the trafficke which is great in those parts many Turkish Marchants and others ariue there from all quarters. They come to *Mozambique* in Africke, to *Zophala* and *Quiloe*  
in

in Asia. They descend also as low as the Moluccas, Cochien, Goa, Dia, Ormus, and sundrie other parts appertaining to the crowne of Portugale. These bookes also might be dispersed abroad in the countrie of the Gentiles, which are friends and confederates of the Christians, as in Calicut, Zailan, Cambela, and others; and the like at Oran, Arzilla, and in other parts of Arabia subiect to the crowne of Spaine and Portugall, and in all other parts of Europe which border vpon the Turkes.

5 There must be a care had that the title of the booke be so coloured, as it doe not at the first discover the intent of the author, but rather that it intice them to peruse it with a certaine curiosity and shew of pleasantnesse and delight. It is requisite also that the discourse be not fraught with any disputations or subtrill point against the Articles of their beleefe, but that contrariwise it be full of tales and matter fit to moue laughter; yet with some well conueied passage which may by the way discover or make them doubt of the fables of their Alcoran.

6 The Turkish Marchants or others, into whose hands this booke should light, would confidently reade it in those parts where the Turke is not obeied. And though perhaps they durst not aduenture to carry it with them, yet the impression and substance of what they had read would remaine fixt in their mindes, so as they would after relate it as newes to their friends and families, in such sort as it would grow by little and little to be diuulged thereabout, whence would spring a longing in others which should come and goe into those countries to buy & reade them: In this manner the Alcoran in proceesse of time would grow out of credit amongst them, and those things which with scruple and obseruation they collect thence, would turne to a iest and subiect of laughter, whence there could not but insue some schisme and diuision amongst them, for the most religious men of their sect and the most interested would oppose themselves wilfully to maintaine it. Neither



would it make for the purpose to make mention in any sort of our Saujour Christ, much lesse to let it be knowen that the author thereof were a Christian : for the immortall hatred they beare to that name would make it odious, and would bring it at the very first to be reiectēd. It should rather be so contriued as if it came from some other of an other sect, wherein a man might borrow the hand of the inhabitants of Cambaia, of India, of Arabia, or of Persia. In this manner it would be better welcome and would carrie with it more estimation and authority.


7 It were well also if there were framed and published a remonstrance to the Ianizzars in the Sclauonian tongue, whereby might be signified vnto them their originall, and howe in their infancy they were cruelly halled from the bosomes of their Christian fathers and mothers, conueyed into Turkey, and there nussed vp in the sect of *Mahomet*, not hauing iudgement as then to distinguish of good and euill ; that they are the pillars to vphold this Tyrant which hath set his foote vpon the throat of their fathers liberty, and which keepeth them as slaues vnder the yoke of a dishonorable and barbarous seruitude. This would auaille much, especially if there were thereto annexed an exhortation to take better knowledge of themselues, and hence, forward like good children to imbrace and free their miserable parents, which daily lament them ; and aboue all to perswade them to returne to the deare bosome of the church wherein they were first, regenerate and which attendeth with spread armes to receiue them, entertaine them, and saue them.

8 These things well caried would in the end make the Turke so suspicious, and vntractable, as he would offer occasions enow to his people hencefoorth to rouse vp themselues, and better aduise how to shake off that cruell and vnsupportable yoke which so mightily oppresseth them, and to fashion themselues to a more happy and secure life for the quiet of their consciences and saluation of their


their soules. This is that whereof the Christians ought diligently to bethinke themselves; and not to worke one anothers ruine and destruction, as they spare not to doe against the expresse commandement of God, which so often recommendeth vnto vs loue and charitie towards our neighbours.

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